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Abstract 
 
Industrialisation and trade are two major contributors to growth and development. 
Historical experience has clearly demonstrated the importance of industrialisation 
and manufactured exports in the transformation from a backward country to an 
advanced country. Moreover, industrialisation is not only an efficient way to 
increase productivity and welfare, but also an effective way to promote social and 
cultural changes. Over the recent decades, two trends in developing countries' 
industrialisation and trade have been well documented in the literature. First, 
manufactures have taken increasingly important share in many developing 
countries' export basket. Second, the fast-growing trade between developing 
countries, say, South-South trade, has been highlighted. Given the importance of 
industrialisation and trade in development process, this PhD thesis aims at 
contributing to knowledge on the evidence, mechanism, and determinants of 
developing countries' trade and industrialisation, centring on South-South trade, 
export upgrading, export directionality, and terms of trade over the recent two 
decades from 1995 to 2014. Each of the four topics is addressed in one of the 
following four chapters from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 2 criticises the existing approach towards the definition of the Global South 
and South-South trade, and clarifies that the delightful picture of South-South trade 
highlighted in the literature is actually an "illusion". Including de facto developed 
countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers) and emerging countries in the group of developing 
countries strongly inflates the size and growth of South-South trade. If these 
countries are excluded, then the relative size of South-South trade becomes quite 
small. In particular, this chapter demonstrates that including these de facto developed 
and emerging countries in South-South trade statistics heavily overstates 
technological and manufacturing capabilities of the so-called "Global South". 
Moreover, this chapter also explores the composition of developing countries' 
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exports to different trade partners and their trade potential with the rest of the world. 
It reveals great differences in the composition between developing countries' 
different export directions and significant asymmetries in mutual trade potential 
between developing countries and the rest of the world. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the determinants of developing countries' export upgrading 
with a particular interest in the role of China and productive investment. Amongst 
general factors, access to sea, human capital, productive investment, and trade 
openness are found to be major contributors to developing countries' export 
upgrading. The robust effect of productive investment reflects the importance of 
political and social agents' motivations of industrialisation and, perhaps more 
importantly, endemic political-economic embeddedness that determines the 
motivations. This echoes the centrality of strong and developmentally-oriented 
elites in the developmentalist model of industrialisation and development. 
Developing countries' absolute gains from trade with China, as reflected by the 
significant improvement in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis China, promote their 
export upgrading. Importantly, mediation analysis shows that this export-
upgrading effect operates, to a large extent, through the enhancing effect of trade 
with China on developing countries' productive investment. This export-upgrading 
effect of absolute gains from trade with China is stronger and more robust in the 
period of 2002-2014 than 1995-2014, which is consistent with the growing role of 
China in the global economy since the early 2000s, reflecting on China's commodity 
boom and its strong performance in manufactured exports. That is to say, trade with 
China serves as a source of investment for developing countries' export upgrading. 
This finding provides a new and indirect channel to understand the influence of 
China on developing countries' industrialisation, going beyond the conventional 
perspectives of the "crowding-out" effect and the "re-primarisation" effect. It 
suggests that, for developing countries, China serves more as a stimulator of capital 
accumulation than a competitor in manufacturing market or a predator of natural 
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resources. Therefore, the priority for developing countries is the appropriate use of 
gains from trade for productive purpose. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the latest evidence to the discussion in the 1980s on developing 
countries' export directionality, and explores the determinants of this directionality. 
Between 1995 and 2014, more than half of developing countries tended to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports, while the opposite is 
true for the rest. Productive capabilities are found to be a major and robust 
determinant of this directionality of export sophistication. Productively more 
advanced developing countries are more likely to have more sophisticated 
Northbound exports than Southbound exports, which is likely to be due to their 
ability to access the more competitive markets of developed and emerging countries 
and/or the downstream value chains with their relatively sophisticated products. In 
contrast, productively less advanced developing countries have to access developed 
and emerging countries' markets and/or the downstream value chains with their 
less sophisticated products, due to the lack of competitiveness in more sophisticated 
products. This finding suggests that the conventional argument that South-South 
trade is more beneficial to developing countries than North-South trade should be 
interpreted conditionally, because, for those productively more advanced 
developing countries, Northbound exports are likely to be more sophisticated. 
Another important contributor to the directionality of export sophistication is 
geographical distance. Larger distance to other developing countries reduces a 
developing country's Southbound export sophistication or increases its Northbound 
export sophistication, which is consistent with the argument of the gravity model in 
a broad sense.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade under 
the trichotomous global economic hierarchy consisting of developed, emerging, and 
developing countries. Time-series analysis shows that developing countries, 
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especially those specialising in fuels or minerals, have experienced an improvement 
in their net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries over the recent two 
decades. In contrast, developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China 
and other emerging countries tends to show negative or trendless behaviour, except 
those specialising in mineral fuels. In summary, on a global scale, developing 
countries specialising in fuels or minerals have tended to hold a favourable position, 
whereas those specialising in agricultural products or manufactures have 
experienced a less favourable or even unfavourable situation. On the other hand, 
income terms of trade of all groups of developing countries vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, regardless of developed countries, China or other emerging countries, has 
significantly improved. This indicates developing countries' absolute gains from 
trade with the rest of the world. However, the rest of the world has comparable 
improvement in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis developing countries. Therefore, 
despite the favourable income terms of trade facing developing countries, the 
condition for global (North-South) convergence does not hold. As a consequence, 
developing countries have to mobilise more resources to maintain the favourable 
income terms of trade, which impedes their domestic consumption and investment, 
and the unequal global exchange has remained. Particularly, this global inequality 
is magnified by the persistent North-South gap in productivity and technology and 
by developing countries' high population growth. The global inequality is rooted in 
the competitive nature of the markets for primary commodities and simple 
manufactures and the oligopolistic nature of the markets for sophisticated 
manufactures. In this sense, the findings are in line with the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: Developing Countries, Industrialisation, South-South Trade, Export 
Sophistication, Terms of Trade 
JEL Classification: F14, F63, O14, O19, O25 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Industrialisation and trade are two major contributors to growth and development. 
Historical experience since the industrialisation of the United Kingdom in the late 
18th century has shown that almost all successful economic catch-ups are associated 
with industrialisation, in particular the industrialisation of export structure (Szirmai, 
2012; Cimoli, Fleitas, and Porcile, 2013). The wave of industrialisation spread from 
Northwestern Europe to Central Europe in the middle 1800s and then to Southern 
and Eastern Europe and Japan in the late 1800s and the early 1900s. The first half of 
the 20th century also witnessed partial industrialisation in some offshoots of Europe, 
mainly in large Latin American countries (e.g., Argentina and Brazil), as early 
attempt of import substitution industrialisation after the Great Depression. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, developing countries started or, for some of 
them, re-started their own industrialisation. This wave of industrialisation was 
inspired by the structuralist economic thoughts led by Raúl Prebisch and economists 
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and the success of the Soviet state-led industrialisation. During this period, 
Latin American countries and those newly independent countries in other world 
regions carried out industrialisation mainly in the form of import substitution. 
However, the import substitution industrialisation model eventually failed to reach 
its goal of industrialisation and economic growth. The reason of this failure is 
complicated and there is a great body of literature on this topic, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it must be noted that the failure of the import 
substitution industrialisation model is, to a large extent, due to biased interpretation 
of structuralist economics and problematic implementation1, in addition to external 
                                            
1 The original proposal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
 2 
shocks (e.g., the debt crisis in the 1980s).  
 
In contrast, the Asian Tigers have demonstrated another scenario of late 
industrialisation. These countries followed a mixed path of initially import 
substitution-based and later export-led industrialisation. According to Wade (2015), 
the Asian Tigers are among the only seven non-western countries that became 
developed since the industrial revolution2. It must be noted that the mainstream 
view, in particular amongst neoclassical economists, tends to ascribe the East Asian 
miracle simply to a market-conforming export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) and 
structural transformation. This viewpoint, however, is biased, as it, perhaps 
intentionally, neglects the fact that the material basis of East Asian countries' 
technology-intensive exports is the accumulation of technology and capability as a 
result of import substitution and that the East Asian model features developmental 
state and large manufacturing companies under oligopoly rather than perfect 
competition (Ocampo, 2003). Later studies, such as the famous report of "The East 
Asian Miracle" (World Bank, 1993), moderately and even trickily alter the earlier 
neoliberal interpretation of the East Asian model and recognise that the East Asian 
state is "market-friendly" interventionist, but this new viewpoint is just a distorted 
documentation of state intervention in East Asia and actually serves as a de facto 
defence of the neoclassical paradigm of industrialisation (Amsden, 1994; Kiely, 1998). 
The debate over the East Asian model echoes the fact that trade and industrial 
policies are the most contentious issues in development economics (Chang, 2003). 
 
The East Asian experience perfectly demonstrates the essential role of 
                                            
Caribbean (ECLAC), represented by Raúl Prebisch, was not an autarky development path, as 
misunderstood by many policy makers in Latin America. Instead, the ECLAC suggested to 
promote regional integration and to upgrade Latin America's position in the global labour 
division (Toye, 2003; Ocampo and Ros, 2011). Despite criticisms from ECLAC, policy makers in 
Latin America did not effectively correct their biased implementation of import substitution 
industrialisation (Love, 2005). 
2 The other three are Japan, Russia, and Israel. However, in a broad sense, Russia and Israel can 
be regarded as western countries. 
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industrialisation and trade in development, as well as an active role of the state. As 
suggested by Amsden (1980), export that is preceded by import substitution 
industrialisation, as shown by the East Asian case, is the core approach for 
developing countries to promote growth and expand employment. Johnson, Ostry, 
and Subramanian (2010) document the growth experience of twelve fast-growing 
countries, among which eight are in East and Southeast Asia, reaching a conclusion 
that what constrain economic growth are not those so-called "first-order problems" 
(e.g., institutions, macroeconomic stability, trade openness, education, and 
inequality) but manufactured exports. Almost all of the twelve benchmark countries 
in their study have adopted promotion policies for manufactured exports, and these 
countries have indeed experienced rapid growth in manufactured exports. This 
importance of export and its composition for developing countries has become even 
greater under the globalisation era (Lall, Weiss, and Zhang, 2006). 
 
Real-world experience has demonstrated the essential role of trade in the process of 
industrialisation. Limited size of domestic market restricts not only demand for 
manufacturing outputs but also the realisation of the externalities of manufacturing, 
especially for developing countries. Thus, trade policy has become a major 
component of industrial policy, and preferential policies for manufactured exports 
are necessary (Pack and Westphal, 1986; Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). In 
turn, developing countries' export performance is also closely associated with their 
manufacturing growth (Pacheco-López and Thirlwall, 2013). At the initial stage of 
industrialisation, demand for agricultural inputs (e.g., fertiliser and equipment) 
drives domestic industrial production, whereas at later stages exports take over the 
role of agriculture as the major source of demand for manufacturing (Thirlwall, 2003; 
Kaldor, 2007). However, if the scale of domestic agricultural production is limited, 
then agriculture's role as a contributor to early-stage industrialisation may be 
restricted. The problem of domestic market size is relevant to many developing 
countries. For example, Singer (1998) suggests that many Sub-Saharan African 
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countries are geographically too small to support their industrial development "on 
a national basis". Thus, foreign market is the only option for these countries, not only 
due to foreign demand but also due to the productivity-enhancing effect of 
exporting activities (Page, 2010 and 2012; Ajakaiye and Page, 2012). In brief, it is safe 
to argue that industrialisation and trade are closely interrelated and manufactured 
exports act as the intersection of these two pillars of development.  
 
Given its essential role in development process, it is of particular importance to 
understand the mechanism underlying the development of developing countries' 
manufactured export. Two issues thus arise: what developing countries export and 
where developing countries' exports go to. These two questions are relevant to two 
major trends in developing countries' trade over the recent decades, which have 
been well documented in the literature. Since the late 1970s, the earlier 
industrialisation strategy based on import substitution has been replaced by the 
strategy of export-oriented industrialisation (Milberg and Winkler, 2010). 
Contemporaneously, there has been a shift in many developing countries' export 
composition to become manufacture-dominant (Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Szirmai, 
2012). While developing countries' industrialisation efforts are a contributor to this 
shift, a more important and fundamental contributor is the structural and 
organisational change in the global capitalist labour division led by developed 
countries. In other words, the industrialisation of developing countries' exports in 
the post-import substitution period is largely a result of and a stage in the evolution 
of the global capitalism. Less skill-intensive industries have declined in developed 
countries during the process of technological progress and demographic change, 
and are then transferred to developing countries. Meanwhile, the emergence of 
multinational enterprises and global value chain during the globalisation era 
involves developing countries in the internationalisation of manufacturing 
production. Therefore, the 19th-century pattern that developed countries export 
manufactures and developing countries export primary commodities has come to 
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an end (Baer, 1972; Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1987).  
 
However, an important question comes: has the shift towards a manufacture-
dominant export pattern reversed developing countries' long-term plight in the 
unequal international exchange system (i.e., the centre-periphery system)? The 
answer seems to be negative. This issue has been well explored by Hans Singer in 
his revision of the original Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. During the post-war period, 
the advantageous position of developed countries in the global market does not 
stem from their role as suppliers of manufactures, which is different from the 
situation in the 19th and the early 20th century. Likewise, the disadvantageous 
position of developing countries in the global market is not simply due to their role 
as suppliers of primary commodities. Instead, developed countries' advantage and 
dominance in the global market stem from their capabilities of technological 
innovation. Kaplinsky (2006) summarise three aspects in this innovation-based 
explanation for the new logic of the global market (Singer, 1975). First, the 
determination of prices in the global market and countries' income growth is of a 
neo-Schumpeterian type, which means that capabilities in capturing the rents from 
innovation determine a country's competitiveness and power in the global market. 
Second, the capability and intensity of innovation are not evenly distributed across 
countries. The absolute majority of innovative activities take place in developed 
countries. This phenomenon implies the absolute advantages of developed 
countries over developing countries. These two points echo the world-system 
perspective that different country groups' positions in the global labour division are 
not just differentiated, but, more importantly, hierarchically stratified based on each 
country group's abilities to appropriate the surplus they produce (Evans, 1979). 
Third, manufactured exports of developing countries do not show favourable trend 
of net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis manufactures exported by developed countries 
(Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Maizels, Berge, Crows, and Palaskas, 2000). This 
unfavourable trend has further deteriorated after China's entry into the global 
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market as a major supplier of low-end manufactures (Villoria, 2009).  
 
Therefore, the shift from primary commodity-dominant export structure towards 
manufacture-dominant export structure has failed to reverse the disadvantageous 
position of developing countries in the unequal global exchange, which has its roots 
in the historical centre-periphery relationship. In the original Prebisch-Singer thesis, 
the world exchange system reflects the relationship between developing countries 
as suppliers of primary commodities and developed countries as suppliers of 
manufactures. However, in the post-war era, it is technology-based innovation that 
is the source of rents in the global market (Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino, 2005). 
Accordingly, the old relationship in the original Prebisch-Singer thesis has 
transformed into a new relationship between developing countries as suppliers of 
standardised products without innovation rents or Schumpeterian rents and 
developed countries as suppliers of innovative products. In the words of Kaplinsky 
(2006), this is a relationship between producers of low-income economy goods and 
producers of high-income economy goods. Therefore, the challenge facing 
developing countries is not merely the task of transforming from primary 
commodity producers into manufacturers, but the task of transforming from simple 
manufacturers into sophisticated manufacturers. This argument closely echoes the 
recent burgeoning literature on export sophistication, pioneered by Hausmann, 
Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). Roughly speaking, a country is supposed to have 
(relatively) high export sophistication, if it exports products that are also exported 
by high-income countries. Robust evidence has been found to support the positive 
association between export sophistication and economic growth. More sophisticated 
products tend to be those with higher intensity of skill and technology and lower 
intensity of unskilled labour. Although unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing 
may be pro-poor and lead to inclusive growth, it is skill- and technology-intensive 
manufacturing that has externalities beneficial to the country as a whole (Lederman 
and Maloney, 2012). Moreover, as more and more developing countries have entered 
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the world market of standardised manufactures as a result of low barriers to entry, 
there comes the problem of "fallacy of composition" (Sapsford and Singer, 1998; 
Mayer, 2002; Razmi and Blecker, 2008). Under such situation, developing countries 
have to choose to either cut their production costs, mostly wages (race to the bottom), 
or ascend the production ladder (Amsden, 1987). In this sense, the challenge facing 
developing countries' industrialisation comes from not only the innovative 
advantages of developed countries, but also price competition posed by other 
developing countries. This further urges developing countries to upgrade their 
export structure. 
 
Another trend in developing countries' trade over the post-war period, especially 
since the middle 1970s, is the growth in exports from developing countries in general 
and exports between developing countries, namely, South-South trade, in particular. 
By 2006, total exports from the Global South had amounted to $4.3 trillion, 
accounting for 37% of the total world exports, and South-South exports had 
exceeded $2 trillion, accounting for 17% of the total world exports. Early 
development economists, represented by two Nobel laureates, Gunnar Myrdal and 
Sir Arthur Lewis, emphasise the political-economic benefits of South-South trade as 
a way to reduce the South's dependence on the North and to establish "collective 
self-sufficiency". Myrdal (1956) promotes economic cooperation, especially in 
manufacturing, between underdeveloped countries, in order to provide sufficient 
market absorption capacity for potential outputs of their industrialisation. 
Otherwise, idle production capacities in newly-established industries due to 
underdeveloped countries' small domestic market may hinder their 
industrialisation. Based on his Nobel Prize lecture in 1979, Lewis (1980) highlights 
the close association of the North's economic downturn with the South's export and 
economic growth, and proposes South-South trade as a channel to transform the 
South to be an alternative growth engine for itself. 
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Supports for South-South trade can be found among more radical economic schools 
as well. Structuralists regard South-South trade as an alternative to North-South 
trade, because South-South trade is expected to lead to more equal distribution than 
North-South trade in which the North seizes more profits by its superior position 
and the worsening terms of trade facing primary commodities, as demonstrated by 
the Prebisch-Singer thesis (Greenway and Milner, 1990). This uneven exchange 
widens the North-South gap. Following the vision of the Prebisch-Singer thesis, the 
neo-Marxist dependency theory further claims that the history and the structure of 
the capitalist world system generate development in the centre and 
underdevelopment in the periphery (Frank, 1969). Thus, according to both 
dependency theory and world-system theory, "de-linking" with this uneven centre-
periphery relationship is the prerequisite for development in the periphery (Amin, 
1974).  
 
The later literature has shifted the focus from the political-economic benefits of 
South-South trade to its factor content. This shift took place along with the increase 
in the share of manufactures in South-South trade (Dahi and Demir, 2008). In the 
1980s, some studies pointed out that South-South exports tended to contain more 
capital and skill than exports from the South to the North (e.g., Amsden, 1980; 
Amsden, 1986; Havrylyshyn, 1985; Klinger, 2009). This phenomenon is 
conceptualised as the directionality of export (Amsden, 1987). Given that more 
sophisticated export basket has better growth prospect, South-South exports should 
have greater developmental effect than South-North exports (Amsden, 1987; Lall, 
1987). Thus, what matters for development is not only what a country exports, but 
also to whom it exports. Since the 1990s, the literature has focused on the technology 
appropriateness of South-South trade. Technology is context-embedded, instead of 
context-free. Acemoglu (2002) argues that the development of new technology is 
biased towards the optimal use of a country's abundant production factor; and thus, 
new technologies in developed countries, which are labour-scarce, tend to be more 
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skill-biased and labour-saving. Instead, technologies developed in other developing 
countries, which can be transferred through South-South trade, are more 
appropriate and cheaper for producers in developing countries (UNIDO, 2006; Fu, 
Pietrobelli, and Soete, 2011; UNDP, 2013). 
 
During the process of the industrialisation of developing countries' export basket, 
some countries have increasingly differentiated themselves from the rest of the 
developing world. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the first generation of Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) emerged in East Asia, namely, the Asian Tigers. By 
the 1990s, these countries had successfully joined the club of developed countries. 
Since the 1980s, the second generation of NICs has emerged, such as China, Thailand, 
and South Africa. These countries have formed a new group of emerging countries3. 
This phenomenon has transformed the traditional dichotomous division of the 
global economic hierarchy with developed countries and developing countries into 
a new trichotomous hierarchy with developed countries, emerging countries, and 
developing countries.  
 
The majority of emerging countries differentiate themselves from developing 
countries in terms of higher income level, higher level of industrialisation, and the 
dominance of manufactures in exports. Thus, in studying developing countries' 
industrialisation and trade, it is of critical importance to separate these emerging 
countries and the Asian Tigers from the conventionally-defined developing 
countries. Otherwise, analysis of developing countries' manufacturing and trade 
performance will be subject to an upward bias. This issue has tended to be neglected 
in the literature, but it will be specifically considered in this thesis by introducing 
the industrialisation-based country grouping system (UNIDO, 2013) to define 
                                            
3 It should be noted that the concept of "emerging countries" in this thesis is established based 
on industrialisation and export performance rather than business and investment. The latter is 
usually used outside of the academia (e.g., the FTSE list and the MSCI list) to define the so-called 
"emerging markets". Section 2.2.2 will provide further discussion on the concept of emerging 
countries. 
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country groups. Moreover, considering that emerging countries, particularly China, 
have become increasingly important trade partners for developing countries, their 
role in developing countries' industrialisation and development is of great interest. 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
Based on the premise that industrialisation and trade are of essential and decisive 
importance in development process, this thesis is concerned with developing 
countries' trade performance, especially manufactured exports, and 
industrialisation. It aims to provide the latest evidence on South-South trade, 
developing countries' export upgrading, the directionality of developing countries' 
export sophistication, and trends of developing countries' terms of trade under the 
new global economic hierarchy. More specifically, it addresses the following four 
research questions. 
 
Research Question 1: Clarifying the "South-South Trade Illusion"  
Conventional approaches towards South-South trade tend to be based on an 
outdated definition of the Global South, which produces a seemingly delightful 
picture of South-South trade, say, an "illusion". For one thing, some de facto advanced 
countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers and some former European socialist countries) tend 
to be included in South-South trade statistics. For another thing, conventional 
approaches fail to distinguish between developing and emerging countries. By using 
the UNIDO country classification, Chapter 2 aims to clarify the "South-South trade 
illusion" from these two aspects and highlight the trade performance of those real 
developing countries. Moreover, this chapter also provides an analysis of the 
composition and the trade potential of developing countries' exports at a 
disaggregated level. 
 
Research Question 2: Determinants of developing countries' export upgrading and 
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the role of China and productive investment 
Since the end of the World War Two, the challenges facing developing countries are 
not simply to industrialise their export basket, but to continuously upgrade their 
export basket. Chapter 3 examines what factors contribute to developing countries' 
export upgrading. In particular, as a response to the recent debate on China's 
globalisation, a special interest lies in a new hypothesis that developing countries' 
trade with China may serve as a source of productive investment for their export 
upgrading. This provides an alternative to view how China has influenced 
developing countries' industrialisation, besides the conventional arguments of 
crowding-out and re-primarisation.  
 
Research Question 3: The pattern of the directionality of developing countries' 
export sophistication and its determinants. 
Since the 1980s, economists have observed that developing countries' Southbound 
exports tend to be more sophisticated than their Northbound exports. However, 
recent evidence on the directionality of developing countries' export sophistication 
is quite limited, and existing studies are subject to the inappropriate inclusion of 
emerging countries and de facto advanced countries in the group of developing 
countries. Chapter 4, therefore, aims to provide the latest evidence on developing 
countries' export directionality. Firstly, it provides the observation on the 
directionality of developing countries' export sophistication between 1995 and 2014. 
Secondly, it examines the determinants of this directionality, say what lead to a 
country to have more sophisticated Northbound or Southbound exports. 
 
Research Question 4: Recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis 
developed countries, emerging countries, and China 
The recent rise of emerging countries as new global players has reshaped the global 
economic hierarchy. Developing countries' trade with emerging countries, in 
particular China, has experienced disproportionately high growth over the past two 
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decades, especially in primary commodities, known as the commodity boom. This 
leads to great differences in export composition between developing countries' trade 
with emerging countries and that with developed countries. Furthermore, 
developing countries with different patterns of export specialisation have distinct 
trade performance in the global market. Given that export composition dominantly 
determines the behaviour of terms of trade, Chapter 5 comparatively examines the 
recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries, 
emerging countries, and China, respectively. This will provide the latest evidence to 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis under the new global economic hierarchy. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
This thesis features an empirical and quantitative orientation. Chapter 2 on the 
"South-South trade illusion" relies on descriptive analysis. Chapter 3 on the 
determinants of developing countries' export upgrading, measured by export 
sophistication, uses dynamic linear panel model by System GMM (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The sophistication of a country's export basket is measured by the EXPY 
index (Hausmann et al., 2007), which associates the technological and productive 
level of a country's export basket with the income level of its exported products. 
Chapter 4 on the determinants of the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication uses static panel logit model, dynamic panel logit model (Heckman, 
1981; Wooldridge, 2005), and dynamic linear panel model (dynamic linear 
probability model) by System GMM. Chapter 5 uses trend-stationary model, 
difference-stationary model, and autoregressive model to carry out time series 
analyses on the recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade.  
 
This thesis uses two sources of export data. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 
uses UNCTAD data at the level of pre-defined UNIDO country group from 1995 to 
2014. Econometric analyses in Chapter 3, 4, and 5 use country-level data from the 
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BACI database at the Harmonised System (HS) 92 6-digit level, covering 5018 
product categories from 1995 to 2014. The BACI database by CEPII adopts an 
original and unique statistical method to reconcile export and import data reported 
by around 150 countries in the UN COMTRADE database and expands the data 
coverage to more than 200 countries (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). The number of 
reporting countries varies from the minimum of 212 in 1995 and 1996 to the 
maximum of 221 in 2013 and 2014. The number of annual observations of bilateral 
exports (e.g., Kazakhstan's exports in the HS 92 NO. 271012 product category of 
petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals to Germany in 1998) ranges from 
4.4 million in 1995 to 7.36 million in 2014.  
 
In order to reflect the trichotomous global economic hierarchy as a result of the rise 
of emerging countries over the recent two decades and to correct the inappropriate 
country classification in previous studies, this thesis adopts the 2013 UNIDO 
country grouping, which uses a country's industrialisation level (Manufacturing 
Value Added/MVA per capita) as the classification criterion. Based on the UNIDO 
grouping, the world is divided into (corresponding UNIDO terminology in bracket): 
a. Developed Countries (Industrialised Economies) 
b. Emerging Countries (Emerging Industrial Economies) and China4 
c. Developing Countries (Other Developing Economies and Least Developed Countries).  
 
A telling comparison between the UNIDO country grouping and country groupings 
in previous studies is that the Asian Tigers and Russian Federation are classified 
under developed/industrialised countries, rather than developing countries, in the 
UNIDO grouping. Details of the UNIDO country grouping are provided in Chapter 
2. Chapter 2 uses the original UNIDO country grouping, because it uses export data 
on pre-defined UNIDO country groups from the UNCTAD database rather than 
                                            
4 According to the absolute threshold of MVA per capita, China belongs to EIEs, but in the 
UNIDO statistics China is separately listed due to its size. 
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country-level data. Chapter 3 also uses the original UNIDO grouping, despite its use 
of the country-level BACI export data. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 use a slightly 
modified version of the UNIDO grouping. The modification is mostly concerned 
with moving some countries from Emerging Industrial Economies to Industrialised 
Economies (i.e., some advanced former European socialist countries, advanced 
former Soviet Republics, advanced constituent republics of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Southern Cone, and Brunei). Montenegro is 
moved away from the group of Other Developing Economies to Emerging Industrial 
Economies, in order to be consistent with Serbia. Moreover, Angola, Cape Verde, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Maldives are moved away from the group of Other 
Developing Economies to Least Developed Countries, following the original UN 
definition. This modification is irrelevant to Chapter 3, because Chapter 3 is 
exclusively concerned with the group of developing countries and China and 
because it differentiates between different sub-groups within the group of 
developing countries based on export specialisation pattern rather than 
development level. Detailed explanations for this modification are documented in 
Appendix A of Chapter 4. 
 
1.4. Theoretical Views 
This section discusses the theoretical standpoint of this thesis and its position in the 
development economics literature. A question lying in the very core of research on 
development is "what development is". This question may seem to be too 
fundamental or philosophical to be part of the consideration in studies of specific 
development issues, either theoretical or empirical. However, this does not imply 
that it is not an important question, because the perception of "what development 
is" determines the direction of both theoretical and empirical research of 
development economics. Since the late 1960s, there has been a paradigm shift in the 
perception of development. Prior to that, classical development theories in the 1940s 
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and the 1950s, which are represented by modernisation theory (e.g., the stage theory 
and the big push theory), equated development with the increase in industrial 
output and treated industrialisation to be synonymous with development. On the 
left side of the political spectrum, radical political economy represented by the 
structuralist school and dependency theory further consider industrialisation as the 
only way of upward mobility in the global division of labour. However, since then, 
the industrialisation-centred orthodoxy has been challenged by those who define 
development as improvement in the satisfaction of the basic needs of human being, 
such as education, nutrition, health, and environment, which is the modern variant 
of the so-called "neo-populism" or the "basic needs" approach in development theory 
(ILO, 1977; Streeten and Burki, 1978; Kitching, 1982; Kiely, 1998; Nielsen, 2011). This 
echoes the humanist perspective in the philosophical terms, represented by Aristotle 
in ancient times and Amartya Sen and his capability approach in the recent economic 
literature (Phelps, 2008). Practically, this shift has induced the emergence of a new 
strand of measures on development, represented by the Human Development Index, 
which contradicts the classical view on the relationship between 
industrialisation/growth and development (Kiely, 1998).  
 
The paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of development in development theory 
has its counterpart in development economics, in the conceptual and analytical 
terms 5 . Since the late 1970s, the neoclassical paradigm shift in development 
economics has replaced the industrialisation-centred and developmentalist classical 
development economics by laissez faire, production homogeneity, and trade regime 
neutrality. The attention of mainstream development economic research has been 
redirected to "tiny" but analytically and technically sophisticated issues (Skarstein, 
1997). Holistic and historical approaches towards underdevelopment problems have 
                                            
5 Admittedly, the "basic needs" approach features some major differences in comparison with 
orthodox neoclassical economics (e.g., challenging the use of utility as the measure of welfare). 
However, it shares fundamental similarity with neoclassical economics in terms of analytical 
framework (e.g., individualistic rather than holistic view and, thus, emphasis on consumption, 
exchange, and allocative efficiency rather than production and employment). 
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largely disappeared. Mainstream development economists tend to biasedly 
emphasise issues at the micro and individualistic level (e.g., poverty, health, 
nutrition, migration, and education), but ignore the social and historical background 
underlying underdevelopment and the importance of production and structural 
issues. As pointed out by Amin (1974, p. 6):  
 
Current university economics......forbids itself from the outset to raise the question of the 
dynamic of systems (the transformation of structures)......calling it for a matter of historians.  
 
As a result, mainstream development practice based on the individualistic approach 
has led to the so-called "Grass Root War on Poverty", which relies on "grass-root" 
poverty alleviation measures under the spirit of the capability approach, such as 
microfinance (Amsden, 2010 and 2012). This approach pins its anti-poverty hope on 
the supply of well-endowed individuals in terms of education, health, finance, and 
so on, all of which reside in the consumption side. The underlying rationale is Say's 
Law that supply automatically creates its own demand. However, it neglects that the 
fundamental cause of poverty falls within the demand side, say, the lack of jobs, 
especially productive jobs. The creation of (productive) jobs can be realised only 
through structural transformation from agriculture to manufacturing, which 
requires investment and industrial policy. Therefore, the spotlight has returned to 
industrialisation and production upgrading. 
 
By definition, the concerns on the human aspects of development held by the basic 
needs-based development theorists are by no means wrong. However, what they 
neglect, intentionally or unintentionally, is that in order to make the cake tastier and 
to distribute it more equally, the first thing is to produce it and make it bigger and 
bigger. Without enough material basis, it does not make much sense to talk about 
human needs. In other words, what is essential is growth. As pointed by Kitching 
(1982), industrialisation is the most effective way to achieve growth and 
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development because sustainable development needs technological progress and 
sectoral linkages, which are mostly generated by manufacturing sectors. By contrast, 
service and agriculture generate few backward and forward linkages in the sense of 
Albert Hirschman's linkage theory. Just as those new development theorists' bias in 
favour of how to distribute the "cake" and their neglect of how to make the "cake" 
bigger, mainstream economists have a bias in favour of how to allocate production 
factors and a neglect of how to produce them. Baer (1972) sharply points out that 
most energies of economists, including those focusing on developing countries, have 
been devoted to studying how to efficiently allocate production factors, and 
economists have hardly paid attention to how to make these production factors. For 
developing countries, it is safe to say that how to make production factors is more 
important than how to allocate them. With the example of the Latin American 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI), Baer (1972) argues that inefficiencies 
generated by the market-unfriendly ISI model indeed led to some negative 
outcomes in short term, but the long-term development effects brought about by 
import substitution industrialisation outweigh those short-term problems. On the 
contrary, ILO's neo-populist development strategy in the 1970s, as a counterexample 
to the ISI model, refused to sacrifice short-term static efficiency (e.g., creating 
employment through developing labour-intensive industry) for long-term dynamic 
efficiency through developing capital- and technology-intensive industry (Kiely, 
1998). Amsden (1997) also criticises the bias of neoclassical economics in favour of 
"exchange" and its neglect of "production". Attentions have been exclusively paid to 
how to "get the prices right" rather than how to make production expand. For 
instance, new institutionalism ascribes problems of growth to high transaction costs 
and neglects production costs; and international trade studies focus on relative 
exchange prices between domestic and foreign markets and neglect how to generate 
production capacity based on which goods traded on domestic and foreign markets 
are produced. All in all, what neoclassical (development) economics pursues is an 
"allocative efficiency" on the exchange side rather than efficiency on the technical 
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and productive side as emphasised in classical development economics (Nayyar, 
2003).  
 
What underlies the industrialisation-centred development economics is a sectoral 
approach towards development process: development is driven by those dynamic 
sectors, mostly manufacturing (Thirlwall, 2003). This is a vision of production 
heterogeneity. Marshallian externalities justify the superiority of specialising in 
manufacturing over specialising in others (Lederman and Maloney, 2012). In 
particular, manufacturing as the driving force of research and development spreads 
knowledge and technology to the rest of the economy through its strong forward 
and backward linkages (Cornwall, 1977; Kaplinsky, 2008; Lavopa and Szirmai, 2012). 
Thus, what matters is growth pattern or sectoral composition rather than simply 
growth rate (Singer, 1998). By contrast, neoclassical economics holds a production-
homogeneity vision on development, assuming that all production activities have 
homogenous effects on growth and development. It ignores the difference between 
dynamic sectors (e.g., manufacturing) and static sectors (e.g., agriculture and 
mining). In the words of Amsden (1987), this is a "commodity blindness".  
 
Consequently, since the late 1970s, comparative advantages have been enshrined 
again as a guidance to developing countries. Without the need of state intervention 
and industrial development, developing countries can achieve development by 
simply following the predetermined world labour division and export primary 
commodities and labour-intensive manufactures. In this regard, neoclassical 
economics excludes the space for late industrialisation. Put it differently, the conflict 
between the classical sectoral/production-heterogeneity approach and the 
neoclassical production-homogeneity approach is a conflict between (dynamic) 
technical efficiency and (static) allocative efficiency. The neoclassical production-
homogeneity approach highlights the maximisation of a country's allocative 
efficiency with respect to the world-level resource endowment, which inevitably 
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leaves developing countries at the bottom of the global labour division as exporters 
of primary commodities and standardised manufactures. Allocative efficiency of 
resource or endowment thus lies in the core of gains from trade in the neoclassical 
perspective. By contrast, the classical sectoral/production-heterogeneity approach 
emphasises developing countries' gains of technical efficiency generated by learning 
by doing and spillovers from dynamic sectors. As argued by Nayyar (1997), 
neoclassical economics biasedly emphasises allocative efficiency and has a 
"conspicuous silence" on technical efficiency. 
 
Fundamentally speaking, the neoclassical approach towards development is 
established on the premise that there is equal and perfect competition between 
developing and developed countries on the global scale. The implicit, built-in logic 
is that countries are differentiated, rather than hierarchically stratified, within the 
global division of labour. That is to say, development can be realised through 
exercising endowed comparative advantages, no matter what they are, rather than 
upgrading to more sophisticated and value-added production. However, as 
emphasised by the structuralist school and the world-system theory, the world 
economy features structural inequality and different country groups' positions in the 
global labour division are not just differentiated, but, more importantly, 
hierarchically stratified based on each country group's abilities to appropriate the 
surplus they produce (Evans, 1979). Production, technology, and infrastructure 
concentrate in the Global North, which results in barriers to entry and unequal 
competition faced by developing countries in both global and domestic market 
(Kiely, 1998). In particular, since the end of the World War Two, the determination of 
prices in the global market has featured a neo-Schumpeterian type, and thus the 
capabilities of capturing the rents from innovation determine a country's 
competitiveness and power (Singer, 1975; Kaplinsky, 2006). The highly uneven 
global distribution of innovation implies the absolute advantages of developed 
countries over developing countries. As a result, in a structurally unequal world 
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system, the neoclassical approach based on allocative efficiency, laisser-faire, and 
trade regime neutrality will not lead to global convergence but divergence. This 
global structural inequality implies that development can be realised only through 
upward mobility in the global division of labour and a certain level of state 
intervention is a must6. 
 
Recently, the industrialisation-centred development paradigm, also known as pro-
manufacturing vision, has regained attention, especially since the financial crisis. 
This is a worldwide "manufacturing renaissance" (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013). 
Amongst others, Szirmai (2010) and Szirmai and Verspagen (2015) find that 
manufacturing is still the primary contributor to economic growth. In the recent 
literature on manufacturing development and structural transformation, export 
composition has become a spotlight. Some measures on the technological level of a 
country's exports have been developed (e.g., EXPY and Product Space) and have been 
increasingly used to examine developing countries' export composition and growth 
potential. A core argument of the recent literature is that a country will become what 
it produces and exports (Hausmann et al., 2007). The dynamic feature of 
manufacturing suggested in the early development literature now shows its 
relevance again, and developing countries are suggested to actively upgrade their 
export and economic structure, instead of strictly following comparative advantages. 
Higher export sophistication, mostly implying more manufactured exports, has 
been found to be robustly associated with higher economic growth. What underlies 
the growth-enhancing effect of manufactured exports is not only manufactured 
products' higher value added, but also externalities generated by manufacturing per 
se, such as learning by doing, spillovers, and linkages. In order to obtain these 
externalities, deviation from policy neutrality is necessary. Otherwise, market forces 
                                            
6 Although industrialisation is at the core of policy implications of the leftist radical political 
economy, it is also emphasised by politically rightist or central-rightist schools, such as 
modernisation theory (Kiely, 1998). Therefore, it should be avoided to generate an illusion that 
industrialsiation is the "patent" of the left. 
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have a tendency to induce developing countries to specialise in sectors without 
sufficient externalities, due to the uneven distribution of productivity, technology, 
and power between developed and developing countries (Amsden, 1994; Kiely, 1998; 
Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). A telling example is the production 
downgrading in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa after the shift in 
development paradigm from the state-led import substitution industrialisation to 
the market-led liberalisation. This justifies the role of industrial policy and state 
intervention in promoting manufacturing, which echoes the statement of classical 
development economists and goes against the neoclassical "trade regime neutrality".  
 
The economic literature emphasises industrialisation as a sustainable source to 
increase productivity and welfare, but its role in development is not confined within 
the economic sphere. Wield, Johnson, and Hewitt (1992) define industrialisation in 
three ways, as the production of materials without directly involving land, as 
economic sectors of manufacturing and mining, and finally as a particular way to 
organise production that is associated with technological and social changes. While 
the first two definitions concern the technical and economic aspects of 
industrialisation, the third one highlights its social aspect. The social relevance of 
industrialisation entails two issues, say how industrialisation is socially determined 
and how industrialisation socially matters.  
 
In order to answer these two questions, we should go beyond the economistic or 
technical approach towards industrialisation. That is to say, industrialisation should 
be considered as not only a technical or economic process but also a social process. 
In this sense, industrialisation and the associated technological changes are not 
neutral, as implied by the technical determinism, but are embedded in particular 
social and political contexts, which are established in historical process. Classical 
political economy and classical development theories recognise the role of social 
change and state intervention (e.g., the role of businessmen in the Smithian political 
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economy, changes in social attitudes and structure in Rostow's stage theory, and the 
state's initial push in the big push model), but their analytics are focused on the 
technical and economic side of industrial development (e.g., structural change, 
employment, investment, and consumption), rather than the social and political side. 
More importantly, classical political economy and classical development theories 
implicitly assume the ex-ante existence of conditions for industrial development, 
such as investment and agricultural development. But this assumption may not hold, 
as particular political and social contexts have to be in place for such conditions to 
be established. This entails the role of agents in inaugurating industrialisation. Kiely 
(1998) proposes an agent-centred approach towards examining the determinants of 
industrialisation, focusing on the interests and motivations of social and political 
agents (e.g., entrepreneurs and the state) who inaugurate and sustain the actual 
process of industrialisation. The conditions for industrial development to be realised 
(e.g., investment, economies of scale, and work organisation) are not primarily 
technical or economic issues. Rather, they are largely the products of agents' 
decisions and motivations which are embedded in particular social and political 
contexts.  
 
The social and political basis of industrialisation justifies the positive role of the state 
in late industrialisation, because, for late industrialisers, free market economy might 
not always be the condition for industrialisation to start and develop. Rather, free 
market economy might be the outcome of industrial development and the associated 
overall economic growth. The Asian Tiger's transition from oligopoly led by 
developmental state in the 1960s and the 1970s to free market economy since the 
1980s offers perfect evidence. In particular, the state-business relation is an 
important aspect in implementing industrial policy and balancing short-term 
sacrifice and long-term efficiency. A principle is that the state should develop and 
maintain effective control of and intervention in the economy, especially in an 
autonomous way, and appropriately manage and coordinate interests of different 
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social groups (Seddon and Belton-Jones, 1995). The state-business relations in the 
Asian Tigers demonstrate this principle, in contrast to the cases of South Asia and 
Latin America where weak industrial capitalists are constrained by the close 
relations between the state and landowning class (Kiely, 1998). However, as 
suggested by Kiely (1998), the Asian Tiger's experience cannot be transplanted to 
other countries, because of the special social, political, and historical contexts (e.g., 
the successful land reform). Therefore, the problem has returned to the 
aforementioned argument that agents' powers and roles and their social 
embeddedness should be the primary concern for research on industrialisation.  
 
The second issue is how industrialisation influences the society. As argued by 
Kuznets (1973), changes in economic structure induce changes in a wide range of 
aspects of a society, such as mentality, mind-set, forms of family, and mode of life. 
This argument echoes the essence of the Marxist historical materialism that a given 
social formation is determined by the underlying material basis, say, productive 
forces and relations of production. Accordingly, industrial production has its 
resulting and compatible social form, which is different from that generated by 
agrarian production. In the UNIDO Constitution, industrialisation is defined as "a 
dynamic instrument of growth essential to rapid economic and social development" 
and "a multi-dimensional task". Industrialisation is a way to organise production, 
which is associated with continuous technological, organisational, and social 
changes and expansion of a society's production capacities (Hewitt, 1992; Pasinetti, 
2007). The operation of modern manufacturing requires disciplined and responsible 
labourers, which are lacking in agrarian society. It is industrialisation that can 
transform poorly-organised and slack agricultural labour force into disciplined and 
responsible industrial labour force (Swianiewicz, 1965). Importantly, people's mind-
set and behaviour undergo a modernisation during this industrialisation process as 
well. Thus, industrialisation can be regarded as a driver of social changes to address 
the social and cultural backwardness underlying underdevelopment. The 
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transformation of Central Asia from a typical underdeveloped and 
agrarian/nomadic society into a relatively industrialised and modern society during 
the Soviet era provides an example of the social effect of industrialisation, which is 
systematically documented in the book The Soviet Model and Underdevelopment 
(Wilber, 1969).  
 
Industrialisation can also generate social development in terms of political economy. 
Johnson et al. (2010) propose a possibility that industrialisation or, more specifically 
speaking, manufactured export benefits a society by creating and enlarging the 
middle class who has the strongest incentive to modernise institutions and politics 
and by adjusting the distribution of political power. Here, the role played by 
industrialisation lies in its enhancing effects on living standards. For developing 
countries, the pre-condition for the emergence and development of democracy is 
that the majority of the population should be politically and intellectually conscious, 
which has to be established on a certain level of material conditions (Kiely, 1998). 
Industrialisation is the most effective and efficient, if not the only, way to achieve 
this goal.  
 
1.5. Organisation of Thesis 
This thesis is organised in line with the aforementioned four research questions. 
Chapter 2 clarifies the "South-South trade illusion" and analyses the composition 
and the trade potential of developing countries' exports. Moreover, this chapter aims 
at providing a general picture of developing countries' trade, and thus its 
organisation is somewhat different from a standard quantitative paper and slightly 
resembles a report. Some findings on developing countries' trade in this chapter also 
serve as empirical basis for some discussions and arguments in the following 
chapters. Chapter 3 examines the determinants of developing countries' export 
upgrading with a particular interest in the role of productive investment and China. 
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Chapter 4 deals with the pattern and determinants of the directionality of 
developing countries' export sophistication. Chapter 5 examines the recent trends of 
developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries, emerging 
countries, and China. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
This thesis aims at providing the latest evidence on the mechanism and 
determinants of developing countries' trade and industrialisation, centring on 
South-South trade, export upgrading, export directionality, and terms of trade. Each 
of the four topics is addressed in one of the four chapters from Chapter 2 to Chapter 
5. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that the delightful 
picture of South-South trade highlighted in the literature is actually an "illusion", 
which is a result of inappropriate country classification. More importantly, it is an 
illusion of not only the size of South-South trade, but also the technological and 
manufacturing capabilities of the so-called "Global South". The illusion has two 
sources. First, the inclusion of de facto advanced countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers and 
advanced former European socialist countries) in the group of developing countries 
strongly inflates the size of South-South trade by more than doubling it. This 
inflation effect particularly comes from the strong performance of the Asian Tigers 
in skill- and technology-intensive manufactured exports. The second source of the 
illusion is the inclusion of emerging countries, especially China, in South-South 
trade statistics. If South-South trade is defined exclusively as trade between real 
developing countries, then its size becomes quite small. This chapter also analyses 
the composition and the trade potential of developing countries' exports. It 
highlights the great difference in composition between developing countries' 
exports to developed countries and those to emerging countries. While 
manufactures take a major share in the former, they only account for a minor share 
in the latter. Moreover, developed and emerging countries show high trade 
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complementarity with developing countries, whereas developing countries' trade 
complementarity with developed and emerging countries is low. In other words, the 
needs of developing countries for the rest of the world are larger than the needs of 
the rest of the world for developing countries, which implies the disadvantageous 
and inferior position of developing countries in the world economy. 
 
Chapter 3 examines determinants of developing countries' export upgrading. 
Amongst general factors, this chapter highlights the role of access to sea, human 
capital, productive investment, and trade openness. Landlocked countries are 
doomed to be at a disadvantageous position of export upgrading, a "curse of 
geography". On the other hand, efforts in improving human capital, accumulating 
productive investment, and promoting openness are definite ways to stimulate 
export upgrading. Particularly, the influence of motivations of political and social 
agents for industrialisation, which is the social determinant of export upgrading, is 
captured by the great and robust positive effect of productive investment. Higher 
productive investment reflects greater motivations of political and social agents to 
promote industrial production, either for economic profits or for political benefits. 
This finding also reflects the influence on export upgrading of endemic political-
economic embeddedness that shapes the motivations of various agents, which 
echoes the centrality of strong and developmentally-oriented elites in the 
developmentalist model of industrialisation and development (Leftwich, 1995). 
Moreover, developing countries' absolute gains from trade with China, reflected by 
significant improvement in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis China, promote their 
export upgrading. The absolute gains are a result of the commodity boom, great 
growth in the volume of developing countries' exports to China, and cheap 
manufactures from China. Mediation analysis shows that this export-upgrading 
effect largely works through the role of trade with China in enhancing developing 
countries' productive investment. This effect is stronger and more robust in the 
period of 2002-2014 than 1995-2014, which is consistent with the growing role of 
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China in the global economy since the early 2000s, especially China's commodity 
boom and its strong performance in manufactured exports. This finding provides an 
alternative perspective to view the influence of China on developing countries' 
industrialisation through the role of trade with China as a source of productive 
investment. It suggests that, for developing countries, China serves more as a 
stimulator of capital accumulation than a competitor in manufacturing market or a 
predator of natural resources. Therefore, the priority for developing countries is the 
appropriate use of gains from trade for productive purpose.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the evidence of the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication and examines the determinants of this directionality. It shows that, 
between 1995 and 2014, more than half of developing countries tended to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports on average, and the 
opposite is true for the others. A country's productive capabilities are found to be a 
major and robust determinant of the directionality of its export sophistication. 
Developing countries that have higher productive capabilities are less likely to have 
more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports, whereas the 
reverse is true for those with lower productive capabilities. This finding may be 
explained by the technological and productive gap between exporting country and 
importing country. Productively more advanced developing countries are able to 
export relatively sophisticated products to the more competitive market of 
developed and emerging countries and/or enter the downstream value chains. 
Those with lower productive capabilities are not able to enter developed and 
developing countries' markets and/or the downstream value chains with their 
relatively sophisticated products, if any. Instead, they have to export less 
sophisticated products to these markets, and markets of other developing countries 
are an outlet for their relatively sophisticated products. In this sense, the 
conventional argument that South-South trade is more beneficial to developing 
countries than North-South trade should be treated conditionally, because, for those 
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productively more advanced developing countries, Northbound exports tend to be 
more sophisticated. Another important contributor to the directionality of export 
sophistication is distance.  
 
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade, 
which provides the latest evidence to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis under the new 
global economic hierarchy. It shows significant differences between developing 
countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries and vis-à-vis China and other 
emerging countries on the one hand, and differences between terms of trade of 
different groups of developing countries on the other. Developing countries' net 
barter terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries tends to show significant positive 
trends, which is stronger for those specialising in fuels or minerals and weaker for 
those specialising in agricultural products or manufactures. This trend may be 
explained by the large share of manufactures in developing countries' exports to 
developed countries, developed countries' diverse demand for primary 
commodities from developing countries, and the commodity boom led by emerging 
countries. This improvement, however, is likely to be a period-specific phenomenon. 
Importantly, it may not intrinsically contradict the core of the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis, which lies in factoral terms of trade rather than simply net barter terms 
of trade. Given the great and persistent gap in productivity between developed and 
developing countries, the delightful picture drew from the positive trends of net 
barter terms of trade is likely to be weakened or even reversed. 
 
On the other hand, developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China 
tends to show negative or trendless behaviour, except those specialising in fuels. 
This finding may be explained by three factors: the concentration of China's fast-
growing demand on fuels and metals, cheap manufactured exports from China, and 
the marginalisation of manufactures in developing countries' exports to China. 
Developing countries specialising in "soft commodities" (e.g., agricultural products), 
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rather than "hard commodities" (e.g., fuels and minerals), tend not to benefit from 
China's commodity boom, at least in relative terms. Furthermore, developing 
countries specialising in manufactures have experienced the greatest deterioration 
in their net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China. This phenomenon indicates these 
countries' relatively disadvantageous position in the trade relationship with China, 
because they may directly compete with China in manufactures and tend not to 
benefit from China's commodity boom. However, developing countries' income 
terms of trade vis-à-vis China shows great positive trends due to great growth in 
export volume, regardless of export specialisation. This is a signal of their absolute 
gains from trade with China. Developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-
vis other emerging countries shares a similar unfavourable situation with that vis-à-
vis China, but to a lesser extent. In brief, on a global scale, developing countries 
specialising in agricultural products or manufactures are at a much weaker position 
in the current global market than those specialising in fuels or minerals, in terms of 
the distribution of gains from trade. 
 
Improvement in income terms of trade as a result of trade growth, however, tends 
not to lead to global (North-South) convergence or effectively mitigate the unequal 
structure of the world economy, because developed and emerging countries have 
comparable improvement as well. As a result, developing countries have to mobilise 
more resources to maintain the favourable income terms of trade, which may 
impede their domestic investment and consumption. This points to the necessity for 
developing countries to upgrade production structure through industrialisation, if 
they want to climb to a more favourable position in the global division of labour. 
However, although absolute gains from trade due to trade growth cannot lead to 
global convergence, they provide a kind of material condition for developing 
countries to industrialise. As found in Chapter 3, absolute gains from trade promote 
export upgrading through their enhancing effects on productive investment. 
Therefore, the challenge faced by developing countries is whether and how they can 
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channel these gains to productive investment. How can this be realised? With both 
external constraints on a global scale and the lack of a development-conducive social 
and political context, developmentally-oriented elites (e.g., developmental states 
and entrepreneurs) should be in place to promote industrialisation. However, do 
developing countries have endogenous mechanism to generate such groups of social 
and political agents? This question relates to the political economy of social 
embeddedness. It may be a good point of reference for future research on the social, 
rather than the economistic or technical, determinants of industrialisation. 
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Chapter 2. The Size, Growth, and Composition of Developing 
Countries' Exports 
2.1. Introduction 
The rapid growth of South-South trade has been highlighted in the recent literature, 
serving as an opportunity for the Global South to realise development. However, the 
existing studies have tended to neglect a seemingly easy but always neglected issue 
that is which countries should be classified under the Global South and then 
included in South-South trade statistics. In the South-South trade literature, there is 
a tendency to treat the world in a dichotomous way as a North, which represents 
developed countries, and a South, which represents the rest of the world. 
Accordingly, South-South trade is naturally defined as trade between countries in 
this "rest of the world". This dichotomous approach, however, has become 
problematic since the 1990s, because several countries in this "rest of the world" have 
joined the club of developed countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers) and some emerging 
countries (e.g., China and Thailand) have increasingly differentiated themselves 
from other countries in the broad-sense Global South. That is to say, the so-called 
"rest of the world" is no longer homogenous. Instead, it comprises several largely, if 
not completely, distinct country groups. In this regard, defining South-South trade 
based on the commonly-used but problematic definition of the Global South 
certainly leads to misleading and distorted conclusions on trade performance of 
those real developing countries.  
 
Considering this problem, this chapter aims at providing an alternative picture of 
the so-called "South-South trade" by means of alternative definition of the Global 
South and South-South trade that better reflects the growingly divergent 
development trajectories. To this end, this chapter introduces the industrialisation-
based country grouping system by UNIDO (2013) and then divides the world into 
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the North (developed countries), the Emerging South (emerging countries), and the 
Developing South (developing countries)7. The Emerging South and the Developing 
South constitute the "broad-sense" Global South, which basically corresponds to the 
definition of the South in the existing literature, except that de facto advanced 
countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers) are excluded.  
 
Some previous studies have been conscious of the fact that those fast-growing 
emerging countries or richer developing countries have dominated the growth of 
South-South trade (e.g., Kowalski and Shepherd, 2006; UNCTAD, 2008; Dutt, 2012). 
However, those de facto developed countries (e.g., the Asian Tigers) have still tended 
to be classified under emerging countries or richer developing countries. For one 
thing, this is a conceptual inappropriateness of country grouping. For another thing, 
it is thus unclear whether and to what extent the exaggeration of South-South trade 
is contributed by de facto developed countries or emerging countries. This chapter, 
instead, defines these countries under developed countries, say the Global North. In 
this chapter, South-South trade is defined in various ways based on different 
definitions of the Global South. The particular interest is given to trade between 
countries in the Developing South, which is defined as the poorer half of the broad-
sense Global South. Moreover, this chapter also considers South-South trade in 
different product categories (e.g., primary commodities and manufactures). This 
treatment is important, as those de facto developed countries and emerging countries, 
which lead to the rapid growth of South-South trade highlighted in the literature, 
tend to be big players in manufactures but not primary commodities. 
 
The contrast between the traditionally-defined South-South trade and the 
alternatively-defined South-South trade sharply points out how the inappropriate 
                                            
7 In this thesis, the Emerging South and the Developing South are synonymous with emerging 
countries and developing countries, respectively. In order to better demonstrate South-South 
trade under different definitions, this chapter uses the terms of "the Emerging South" and "the 
Developing South". The following chapters, instead, use the terms of "emerging countries" and 
"developing countries". 
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inclusion of some de facto advanced and emerging countries in South-South trade 
statistics generates an "illusion" of a fast-growing South-South trade, especially in 
manufactured trade. In this sense, there is an illusion of not only the size and growth 
of South-South trade but also the technological and manufacturing capabilities of 
those real developing countries. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the 
marginalisation of the Developing South and the dominance of China in the broad-
sense South-South trade, which is defined as trade within the broad-sense Global 
South.  
 
Having drawn a holistic picture of the size and growth of South-South trade, another 
concern falls in the composition of exports from the Developing South and its 
changes in the recent two decades. This chapter shows that the composition of the 
Developing South's exports varies across different destinations. Their exports to the 
Emerging South are dominated by fuels and have a minor share of manufactures, 
which may indicate limited developmental effects of this export direction. Exports 
to the North and exports within the Developing South have relatively high share of 
manufactures, especially the latter. Other Developing Economies (ODEs) in the 
UNIDO terminology, which are defined as the better-off half of the developing 
world, perform significantly better than Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in terms 
of the diversification and technological level of manufactured exports8. Finally, this 
chapter demonstrates an asymmetrical trade potential between the Developing 
South and the rest of the world, namely, developed and emerging countries. The 
Developing South's exports concentrate on primary commodities and low-end 
manufactures with limited complementarity with the demand structure of the rest 
of the world, whereas developed and emerging countries export diversified 
manufactures, which have high complementarity with the demand structure of the 
Developing South. In other words, the needs of developing countries for the rest of 
the world are larger than the needs of the rest of the world for developing countries. 
                                            
8 Details of the UNIDO country grouping are introduced in Section 2.2.2. 
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This echoes the unbalanced North-South trade pattern suggested by classical and 
radical development economics.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the UNIDO country 
grouping and presents the "South-South trade illusion" by analysing South-South 
trade based on different definitions. Section 2.3 analyses the composition of the 
Developing South's exports to different destinations. Section 2.4 deals with trade 
potential of the Developing South with the rest of the world. Finally, Section 2.5 
concludes. All trade data in this chapter are from the UNCTAD database. 
 
2.2. The Illusion of South-South Trade 
The great size and rapid growth of exports from the Global South in general and 
South-South exports in particular have been widely highlighted in the literature. 
Accordingly, South-South trade has been seen by many as a path for developing 
countries' growth and structural transformation (Demir and Dahi, 2011). However, 
this observation is subject to two problems. First, previous studies tend to include in 
the group of developing countries some de facto advanced countries (e.g., the Asian 
Tigers and advanced former European socialist countries). This brings about great 
upward bias to statistics on the Global South's exports. That is to say, the delightful 
picture of exports from the Global South in general and South-South exports in 
particular is largely an "illusion". Second, even if those de facto advanced countries 
are excluded, the broad-sense Global South is still not homogeneous. Instead, it 
consists of groups of countries at different development levels, and some emerging 
countries (e.g., China) dominate exports of the broad-sense Global South. Thus, 
trade statistics that do not differentiate between different country groups within the 
broad-sense Global South are distorted by those emerging countries, especially the 
big players, and conceal the marginalised position of the real developing countries. 
This problem leads to another "illusion". This section aims to clarify the "illusion" of 
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South-South exports by adopting alternative country grouping and to highlight the 
position of the real developing countries, say, the Developing South. 
 
2.2.1. Conventional Definition of the Global South 
The Global South has become a spotlight in the recent trade literature. Shirotori and 
Molina (2009) report that in 2005 total exports from the Global South amounted to 
$3.7 trillion, accounting for 33% of the total world exports, and South-South exports 
took 15% of the total world exports, reaching $1.7 trillion. UNCTAD (2008) reports 
that in 2006 total exports from the South amounted to $4.3 trillion, accounting for 37% 
of the total world exports, and South-South exports exceeded $2 trillion, accounting 
for 17% of the total world exports. By 2012, the share of the Global South in the world 
exports had increased to 44% (Bernhardt, 2016). These cited numbers deliver an 
impression of a significant and growing share of the South in the global trade. This 
"positive" impression of trade achievement of the Global South becomes greater, if 
we move the attention away from general exports to manufactured exports. 
Kowalski and Shepherd (2006) point out that manufacturing is the largest sector in 
South-South trade. The share of manufactures in total South-South merchandise 
exports increases from 25% in 1965 to more than 60% in 2005, and the Southern share 
of skill-intensive manufactured exports in the total world skill-intensive 
manufactured exports grows by even more than 17 times from 2% to 35% from 1978 
to 2005 (Dahi and Demir, 2005).  
 
These seemingly delightful figures, however, conceal the huge geographical 
variation and concentration in the Global South's export performance. WTO (2003) 
and Dutt (2012) point out that Asia dominates both South-South and South-North 
exports. In particular, intra-regional trade within Asia contributes to the major part 
of South-South trade. UNCTAD (2008) classifies the Asian Tigers under developing 
countries and reports that Southbound exports from China, South Korea, Taiwan, 
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Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
accounted for 65% of total South-South exports in 2005. Such concentration is a result 
of not only these Asian countries' deep integration into the global value chain, but, 
more importantly, also their (relatively) high development level, especially the de 
facto advanced Asian Tigers. Just as what Kowalski and Shepherd (2006) argue, 
middle-income countries (e.g., developing Asian countries) dominate South-South 
trade, and low-income countries are only at a minor position, in terms of both size 
and growth.  
 
The concentration of South-South trade in Asian countries and the marginalised 
position of those real developing countries make it necessary to rethink the 
conventional approach to defining the Global South and South-South trade. Table 
2.1 lists country classifications used in some recent South-South trade studies. It is 
straightforward to see that the current literature tends to adopt a dichotomous vision 
by simply dividing the world into a Global North and a Global South without 
further disaggregation. Two major problems then arise: 1). inappropriate 
classification of some de facto advanced countries under Southern countries, and 2). 
simplified treatment of the broad-sense Global South as a homogeneous whole.  
 
Table 2.1. Country classifications in some recent South-South trade studies 
Paper The North The South 
Coe, Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (1997) 
21 OECD countries plus Israel9 
77 countries (incl. South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) 
WTO (2003) The rest of the world 
Latin America, Africa, the Middle 
East, Asia (excl. Japan) and Oceania 
(excl. Australia and New Zealand) 
UNCTAD (2005) 
OECD countries (excl. Mexico, South 
Korea, and Turkey), non-OECD new 
EU countries, South-East Europe and 
former Soviet Republics (incl. Russian 
Federation) 
The rest of the world (incl. South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore) 
                                            
9 The OECD membership of Israel started from 2010. Thus, in 1997 Israel was not an OECD 
member. 
 40 
Dahi (2006) 
North America, West Europe, Japan, 
Israel, Australia, and New Zealand 
The rest of the world (incl. South 
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Russian Federation, Czech Republic, 
and Hungary) 
Kowalski and Shepherd 
(2006) 
High-income countries in the World 
Bank grouping (incl. South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) 
Low- and (upper and lower) middle-
income countries in the World Bank 
grouping (incl. Russian Federation, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, and Hungary) 
Schiff and Wang (2006) 
15 countries in North America, West 
Europe, and Oceania plus Japan 
24 developing countries (incl. South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Cyprus) 
Akın and Kose (2008) 23 core OECD countries 
23 Emerging Southern countries (incl. 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Israel) 
60 Developing Southern countries10 
Dahi and Demir (2008) High-income OECD countries 
All middle- and low-income countries 
(incl. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, China, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Singapore)11 
Klinger (2009) 
GDP per capita above USD 10, 000 in 
2000 (incl. South Korea, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore) 
The rest of the world (incl. Russian 
Federation, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Hungary, and Poland) 
Shirotori and Molina 
(2009) 
Not applicable/specified 
Members of the Group of 77, China, 
and other developing countries 
according to WTO (incl. South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). 
There are no European countries. 
Athukorala (2011) WTO (2003)/UNCTAD (2005) WTO (2003)/UNCTAD (2005) 
Athukorala and Nasir 
(2012) 
WTO (2003)/UNCTAD (2005) WTO (2003)/UNCTAD (2005) 
Bernhardt (2016) 
Proxied by the United States and the 
Eurozone 
Proxied by China, Indonesia, India, 
South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
                                            
10 The classification of the Emerging South and the Developing South in Akın and Kose (2008) 
is based on the extent to which a country is integrated into the global economy rather than its 
development level, which renders it incomparable with the grouping of the Emerging South and 
the Developing South in this chapter. Thus, their group of Emerging South includes countries at 
very different development levels (e.g., Singapore and Pakistan). This issue is discussed in detail 
in Section 2.2.2.  
11 Dahi and Demir (2008) examine the period of 1978 to 2005. This may be the reason that Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Singapore are classified under middle-income countries. However, their 
paper does not give an explanation. 
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The first problem directly relates to the issue of which countries should be included 
in South-South trade statistics and which should not. Two groups of countries 
should definitely not be considered as part of the Global South, regardless of the 
broad-sense one or the narrow-sense one (i.e., only including the Developing South). 
The first group refers to some previous developing countries that have already 
achieved a high development level. The Asian Tigers (i.e., South Korea, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan) are the typical example12 . These countries have been 
usually included in South-South trade studies. A likely reason is historical continuity, 
as these countries were typical developing countries before the 1970s (the 1960s for 
Hong Kong). However, at least since the 1990s, they have reached comparable 
income and human development level with that of traditional developed countries, 
which is much higher than the level of not only other developing countries but also 
those newly emerging countries. The second group of countries refers to advanced 
former European socialist countries (e.g., Russian Federation), which possess 
advanced scientific and technological level and qualified human capital stock, as the 
heritage of the socialist period. These countries tend to be defined as transition 
economies13 in the literature, but, in some South-South trade studies, (part of) these 
countries are still included in the Global South. Figure 2.1 compares GDP per capita 
(development level) and industry value added (industrialisation level) between 
some de facto advanced countries, which are usually included in South-South trade 
studies (i.e., the Asian Tigers, advanced former European socialist countries, and the 
                                            
12 In addition to the Asian Tigers, the development status of the three Southern Cone countries 
(Argentina, Chile, and Uraguay) is also subject to debate (developed versus developing). 
However, since the three countries have lower development level and smaller trade size than 
the Asian Tigers, they are not seen as the most typical representative of the first group of 
countries. 
13 Normally, transition economies include both advanced European socialist countries (e.g., 
Czech Republic and Slovakia) and those less advanced ones (e.g., the Soviet Republics in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Moldova, and Albania). Here, the second group of countries 
only refers to those advanced ones: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine, the three Baltic countries, and constituent 
republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (except for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). 
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Southern Cone)14 , and other countries in the broad-sense Global South (China, 
Emerging Industrial Economies, Other Developing Economies, and Least 
Developed Countries according to the UNIDO country grouping). De facto advanced 
countries are positioned at a much higher level than other countries in terms of both 
income and industrialisation. This implies that these de facto advanced countries are 
structurally different from countries in the broad-sense Global South. 
 
Figure 2.1. GDP per capita and industrialisation: de facto advanced countries versus 
developing countries*  
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the WDI database. 
             *At 2010 constant US Dollars. 
 
The second problem concerns the growing heterogeneity within the broad-sense 
Global South. Even if those de facto advanced countries are excluded, this 
heterogeneity is still great. In 1995, GDP per capita (constant 2005 price) of China, 
Emerging Industrial Economies (in the UNIDO grouping), and Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) was $767, $2165, and $329, respectively. In 2014, China and 
Emerging Industrial Economies had GDP per capita of $3799 and $3449, whereas 
                                            
14 Since data on GDP per capita and industry value added are from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database, Taiwan is not included. 
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GDP per capita of LDCs was only $616. The gap in GDP per capita has been 
substantially enlarged over the past two decades, which reflects heterogeneity 
within the broad-sense Global South in not only living standards and productivity 
but also a wide range of socio-economic dimensions. This renders conventional 
South-South trade statistics that are based on a highly aggregate vision on the South 
inappropriate for the purpose of examining trade issues of those real developing 
countries. Therefore, as pointed out by Nielsen (2011), a classification system with 
multiple country groups, rather than a simple dichotomy of the North and the South, 
is needed to reflect the growingly divergent development achievements across 
country groups within the broad-sense South.  
 
2.2.2. Industrialisation-Based Definition of the Global South 
In response to the two problems aforementioned, this thesis adopts the UNIDO 
country grouping (UNIDO, 2013) based on a country's industrialisation level. In the 
UNIDO Constitution, industrialisation is defined as "a dynamic instrument of 
growth essential to rapid economic and social development" and "a multi-
dimensional task". A country's achievements in industrial development cover a wide 
range of social and economic changes. This clearly shows that industrialisation 
represents not only the development of manufacturing but also a process of overall 
socio-economic progress. In this regard, industrialisation level is a suitable indicator 
to differentiate between country groups for the purpose of examining development 
issues. Based on its own research, UNIDO uses PPP-adjusted MVA (manufacturing 
value added) per capita to measure a country's industrialisation level 15 . The 
thresholds to classify countries are shown in Table 2.2. In the UNIDO grouping, the 
world is divided into Industrialised Economies (IEs), Emerging Industrial 
Economies (EIEs), Other Developing Economies (ODEs), and Least Developed 
                                            
15 𝑀𝑉𝐴$%(𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 012(222)23$4567839 ×;<=012  (UNIDO, 2013).
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Countries (LDCs). IEs largely correspond to the North in the conventional sense, and 
EIEs, ODEs, and LDCs to the traditionally-defined South. It should be noted that, 
according to the absolute threshold of MVA per capita, China belongs to EIEs, but in 
the UNIDO statistics China is separately listed due to its size. As a matter of fact, 
besides the large size, the rapid growth, relatively great manufacturing capability, 
and highly comprehensive industrial system also make it reasonable to treat China 
separately. Otherwise, findings related to EIEs are likely to be distorted by China. 
This thesis follows this approach. Thus, from now on, EIEs do not include China. 
Appendix A lists all countries in the UNIDO grouping. 
 
In the UNIDO country grouping, those de facto advanced countries, which tend to 
be inappropriately tagged as "South" in the South-South trade literature (e.g., the 
Asian Tigers and advanced former European socialist countries), are mostly 
classified under Industrialised Economies (IEs), namely, the North/Developed 
Countries16. The rest of the world, namely, the broad-sense Global South, is divided 
into three groups (i.e., EIEs and China, ODEs, and LDCs), which represent three 
different development levels. Alternatively, the broad-sense South can also be 
divided into two broader groups: the Emerging South/Emerging Countries (EIEs 
and China) and the Developing South/Developing Countries (ODEs and LDCs). 
This dichotomous approach provides a simpler division of the Global South in terms 
of development level. The Emerging South represents the better-off half of the broad-
sense Global South, and the Developing South represents the worse-off half.  
 
 
                                            
16 An exception is that the Southern Cone countries are classified under Emerging Industrial 
Economies by UNIDO. 
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Table 2.2. The UNIDO country grouping1718 
Country Groups Statistical Thresholds Economies 
North Industrialised Economies (IEs) 𝑀𝑉𝐴$% 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≥ 2500  
            or 𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝑃𝑃𝑃) ≥ 20000  
57 
Emerging 
South 
(ES) 
Emerging Industrial Economies 
(EIEs) 
& 
China 
1000 ≤ 𝑀𝑉𝐴$%(𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 2500  
            or 𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝑃𝑃𝑃) ≥ 10000  
            or 
share in world 𝑀𝑉𝐴 ≥ 0.5% 
33 
Developing 
South 
(DS) 
Other Developing Economies 
(ODEs) 
All others (except LDCs) 82 
Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) 
Based on the official UN list 46 
   Source: Author's elaboration based on UNIDO (2013) 
 
Akın and Kose (2008) also divide the Global South into an Emerging South and a 
Developing South, but their approach and purpose are completely different from the 
grouping in this thesis. The grouping of Akın and Kose (2008) is based on the extent 
to which a country integrates itself into the global economy, instead of a country’s 
development level. They point that their Emerging South largely corresponds to the 
emerging markets listed in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index19. It is important to 
note that the concept of emerging markets, which has been commonly used outside 
of the academia (e.g., the FTSE list and the MSCI list)20, completely differs from the 
concept of Emerging South/Emerging Countries in this thesis. The 
conceptualisation of emerging markets primarily concerns a country's business and 
investment environment rather than economic development level, thus generating 
quite different country list. Table 2.3 shows that the Emerging South in Akın and 
Kose (2008) includes countries at three different income and development levels, 
                                            
17 Some countries are classified under the group of IEs based on their GDP per capita, instead 
of MVA per capita, because countries with GDP per capita higher than 20000 international 
dollars may have experienced a decline in manufacturing production (but this does not imply a 
reduction in industrial capability). The reason to use the share in the world MVA in identifying 
some EIEs countries is that these countries have reached the level of EIEs in absolute terms, but 
not in relative terms due to large population size, such as India and Indonesia (UNIDO, 2013). 
18 At 2005 current prices, international dollars in PPP. 
19 MSCI refers to the Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
20 FTSE refers to the Financial Times Stock Exchange. 
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from those among the richest countries in the world (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore) 
to those backward ones (e.g., the Philippines and Pakistan). Such great heterogeneity 
definitely invalidates their country grouping for the use in examining development 
issues. Thus, despite the same naming, the terms of "Emerging South" and 
"Developing South" in this thesis are intrinsically incomparable with those in Akın 
and Kose (2008). 
 
Table 2.3. Emerging Southern countries by income level in Akın and Kose (2008) 
Income Level (World Bank Standard) Emerging South (Akın and Kose, 2008) 
High-Income Economies Chile, Uruguay, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Israel 
Upper Middle-Income Economies Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, Thailand, Turkey, Jordan, and South Africa 
Lower Middle-Income Economies Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and 
Morocco 
  Source: Author’s elaboration based on Akın and Kose (2008). 
 
2.2.3. South-South Trade under Conventional Definition and Industrialisation-
Based Definition 
Figure 2.2 compares values of the broad-sense South-South exports in eight product 
categories 21  under the conventional definition of the South and under the 
industrialisation-based definition. The conventionally-defined South corresponds to 
the South in mainstream South-South trade studies. Since there is not a "unified" 
definition of the South in the literature, the term "conventional definition" is used to 
generalise several country groupings used in the literature, rather than representing 
any particular country grouping. Here, it is proxied by Developing Economies (incl. 
                                            
21 The eight product categories consist of three levels: the first level is "All Products"; the second 
level is divided into "Non-Fuel Commodities", "Fuels", and "All Manufactures"; and the third 
level refers to four subgroups by technological level under "All Manufactures", which are 
"Labour- and Resource-Intensive Manufactures", "Low Skill- and Technology-Intensive 
Manufactures", "Medium Skill- and Technology-Intensive Manufactures", and "High Skill- and 
Technology-Intensive Manufactures". 
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the Asian Tigers) plus (narrowly-defined) Transition Economies22 in the UNCTAD 
grouping system. The industrialisation-based definition of the broad-sense Global 
South includes Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs) 23 , China, Other Developing 
Economies (ODEs), and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the UNIDO country 
grouping. The Asian Tigers and Russian Federation are classified under 
Industrialised Economies rather than Southern countries, which is the major difference 
between the conventional definition and the industrialisation-based definition. This 
seemingly minor difference in grouping makes substantial difference to South-South 
trade statistics. 
 
For all the eight product categories, South-South export values under the 
conventional definition of the South are far larger than those under the 
industrialisation-based definition. In 2014, total South-South exports under the 
conventional definition are $5351 billion after deflation 24 , while this number 
decreases to only $2242 billion under the industrialisation-based definition. There is 
a great difference of $3109 billion ($5351 billion−$2242 billion). This difference is 
mostly accounted for by the Asian Tigers, which specialise in skill- and technology-
intensive manufactured exports and, to a much lesser degree, Russian Federation25. 
In terms of sectoral distribution, this difference is largely driven by manufactured 
                                            
22 In the UNCTAD database, Transition Economies only refer to those former European socialist 
countries that have not completed the so-called "transition process" (e.g., Russian Federation). 
In contrast, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia are defined as Developed Economies. 
23  Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine are 
classified under EIEs in the UNIDO grouping, instead of IEs. Thus, under the industrialisation-
based definition, their exports are included in exports of the broad-sense Global South. However, 
due to their relatively small export values, this does not generate a major upward bias to export 
values of the broad-sense Global South.  
24 All export values are deflated by corresponding price indexes from the World Bank (base 
year=2010). Total exports (all products) are deflated by the world GDP deflator. Manufactured 
exports (various technological levels and types) are deflated by the manufactures unit value 
index (MUV). Fuel exports are deflated by the energy price index. Exports in Non-Fuel 
Commodities are deflated by the non-energy commodity price index. 
25 As seen from footnote 23 and 24, Russian Federation is the only advanced former European 
socialist country that is classified under Industrialised Economies in the UNIDO country grouping, 
but under Transition Economies in the UNCTAD country grouping. That is to say, in Figure 2.2, 
the inflation effect of the second type of countries (advanced former European socialist countries) 
on South-South exports is reflected only through Russian Federation. 
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exports, which shrink from $3292 billion to only $1185 billion under the 
industrialisation-based definition. Within manufacturing, exports in high skill- and 
technology-intensive manufactures have the largest contribution to this difference. 
The value of this product category contracts from $1657 billion to only $373 billion 
under the industrialisation-based definition. If manufactures are classified by type, 
instead of by technological level, then exports in machinery and transportation 
equipment ($1724 billion versus $373 billion, not shown in Figure 2.2) account for 
the largest part of the difference. In contrast, the difference between exports in non-
fuel primary commodities under the conventional definition and under the 
industrialisation-based definition is quite small ($698 billion versus $457 billion). 
This is easy to understand, as the Asian Tiger hardly export non-fuel commodities. 
 
Figure 2.2. South-South exports under two definitions in 2014*2627 
 
                                            
26 Total exports refer to the category of "All Allocated Products (SITC 0 through 8+961+971)" in 
the UNCTAD database; non-fuel commodities refer to "Primary Commodities, excluding Fuels 
(SITC 0+1+2+4+68)" in the UNCTAD database; fuels refer to "Fuels (SITC 3)" in the UNCTAD 
database; and all manufactures refer to "Manufactured Goods (SITC 5 through 8 less 667 and 
68)" in the UNCTAD database. The sum of non-fuel commodities, fuels, and all manufactures is 
smaller than the value of all allocated products, because products of SITC 667 (pearls and 
precious stones), 961 (coin), and 971 (non-monetary gold) are not covered by the above three 
product categories but are included in "All Allocated Products". All data refer to merchandise 
trade. 
27 The sum of manufactured exports at the four skill and technological levels under conventional 
definition is 3293 billion, instead of 3292 billion, due to rounding. 
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             Source: Author's elaboration based on the UNCTAD database 
             *In billion of constant 2010 US Dollars 
 
The great difference between South-South trade under the two definitions clearly 
shows the inflation impact on South-South trade due to the inappropriate inclusion 
of de facto advanced countries. This impact works basically through de facto advanced 
countries' strong presence in skill- and technology-intensive manufactured exports. 
If these countries are not excluded, then the Global South's trade performance and 
production capability in skill- and technology-intensive manufactures will be 
heavily overestimated. In this sense, the conventional approach towards South-
South trade generates an illusion of not only trade performance of the Global South 
but also their technological and manufacturing capabilities.  
 
2.2.4. South-South Trade at Three Levels 
Section 2.2.3 has discussed the first source of the "illusion" of South-South trade, 
which is produced by inappropriate inclusion of de facto advanced countries in 
South-South trade statistics. This section deals with the second source of the 
"illusion", which is due to the great heterogeneity within the broad-sense Global 
South. In a broad sense, South-South exports are exports among all countries in the 
broad-sense Global South (the Emerging South and the Developing South). This is 
defined as "Broad-Sense South-South Exports". Given the differential development 
levels within the broad-sense South and the emphasis of this thesis on the 
Developing South, it is of importance to disentangle exports within the Developing 
South (DS) from the broad-sense South-South exports. This export flow is then 
defined as DS-DS Exports. Moreover, in order to exclude the bias due to the lion's 
share of China in the broad-sense South-South exports, "Non-China South-South 
Exports" are singled out by removing China-related parts (China's exports to other 
countries and other countries' exports to China) from "Broad-Sense South-South 
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Exports". In this way, South-South exports can be analysed at three levels, which is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3. South-South exports at three levels 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Country groups in the row are exporting countries, and those in the column are 
importing countries. The cell at the centre is empty, because (mainland) China does 
not export to itself. The summation of all the eight cells (crosses and triangles) 
represents "Broad-Sense South-South Exports". The summation of the four triangles at 
the four corner cells represents "Non-China South-South Exports". In particular, the 
triangle at the bottom right cell represents "DS-DS Exports", which are exports within 
the Developing South. The four crosses are China-related South-South exports. 
 
Appendix B shows the values of South-South exports at the three levels in 1995 and 
2014 for eight product categories28  and the corresponding annual growth rates 
derived from exponential trend function. The shares of Non-China South-South 
Exports and DS-DS Exports in Broad-Sense South-South Exports for each product 
category in 1995 and 2014 are also reported. Two observations should be highlighted. 
First, Broad-Sense South-South Exports have significantly higher growth rate than 
Non-China South-South Exports and DS-DS Exports for all product categories. Second, 
                                            
28  The eight categories include all products, non-fuel primary commodities, fuels, all 
manufactures, labour/resource-intensive manufactures, low skill/technology-intensive 
manufactures, medium skill/technology-intensive manufactures, and high skill/technology-
intensive manufactures. 
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the shares of Non-China South-South Exports and DS-DS Exports in Broad-Sense South-
South Exports substantially drop from 1995 to 2014. While, in 1995, Non-China South-
South Exports accounted for around 80% of Broad-Sense South-South Exports for all 
product categories, by 2014 the share had decreased to around 40%. The share of DS-
DS Exports decreases from around 10% or less in 1995 to negligible percentages in 
2014. 
 
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 visualise changes in the distribution of country-group share 
for overall exports and manufactured exports, respectively. The share of China-
related part in Broad-Sense South-South Exports increases from 15.4% in 1995 to 48.4% 
in 2014. The increase is even greater for manufactured exports, from 19.3% to 58.1%. 
By contrast, the share of DS-DS Exports in Broad-Sense South-South Exports decreases 
from 10.5% to 5.2%. The situation is similar for DS-DS manufactured exports, 
decreasing from 7.8% to 3.8%.  
 
Figure 2.4. Shares of country groups in broad-sense South-South exports 
 
             Source: Author’s elaboration based on the UNCTAD database. 
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Figure 2.5. Shares of country groups in broad-sense South-South exports in 
manufactures 
 
      Source: Author’s elaboration based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
The aforementioned facts clearly demonstrate the second source of "illusion" of 
South-South trade. After excluding those de facto advanced countries from South-
South export statistics, China takes over the position of the biggest player, especially 
in manufactured exports. If China is excluded, the growth of South-South exports 
becomes much less impressive. In particular, exports within the Developing South 
have been marginalised to a negligible position. In this regard, economic 
cooperation within the Developing South has not sufficiently developed, just as 
what was observed by Gunnar Myrdal in 1956. However, despite substantial 
reduction in shares, the absolute values of Non-China South-South Exports and DS-
DS Exports have considerably increased, which is shown in Appendix C.  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that China dominates both the size and growth of 
the broad-sense South-South exports. By contrast, other countries, especially the 
poorest countries in the world, have been marginalised. In this sense, including 
China in South-South trade statistics generates a strong inflation effect. However, in 
absolute terms, the Emerging South and, to a lesser extent, the Developing South 
19.3%
7.8%
72.9%
58.1%
3.8%
38.2%
1995 2014
China-Related South-South Exports Intra-DS Exports
Intra-ES (Non-CHN) Exports & ES (Non-CHN)-DS Exports
Country Group's Share in General Manufactured South-South Exports
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have experienced great growth in export values.  
 
2.2.5. South-South Trade in a Multi-Tier World 
Having clarified the two sources of "illusion" with respect to South-South trade, it is 
of interest to show the dynamics and position of each country group in the overall 
global trade. Appendix C presents eight export matrices for the aforementioned 
eight product categories. Country groups in the row are exporting countries, and 
country groups in the column are importing countries. Each cell in the export 
matrices contains three numbers. The number at the top is the value of exports in a 
particular product category from country group in the row to country group in the 
column in 1995. The number at the middle gives the corresponding export value in 
2014. The number at the bottom is the annual growth rate of the corresponding 
export flow between 1995 and 2014. For example, in Table C1, the third cell from the 
top left records the value of exports in all products from IEs (row country group) to 
EIEs (column country group) in 1995 and 2014 and the growth rate. Annual growth 
rate is derived from exponential trend function, namely, the coefficient b in 𝑦7 =𝑎𝑒Q7. This follows the method of the UNCTAD29. Exponential trend function takes 
into consideration all observations from the beginning year to the ending year. This 
method is better than the commonly-used compound annual growth rate (CAGR), 
which only considers the starting year and the ending year. All export values are 
deflated by price indexes. Total exports are deflated by the world GDP deflator (the 
World Bank). Manufactured exports (various technological levels and types) are 
deflated by the manufacturing unit value index (MUV, the World Bank). Fuel 
exports are deflated by the energy price index (the World Bank). Exports in non-fuel 
primary commodities are deflated by the non-energy commodity price index (the 
World Bank). Base year of these price indexes is 2010. 
 
                                            
29 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/FAQ.html 
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Industrialised Economies (IEs), namely, the Global North, are the largest source of 
imports for all country groups (IEs per se, EIEs, China, ODEs, and LDCs) in all 
product categories, even in fuels 30 , non-fuel primary commodities, and labour-
intensive manufactures. IEs are also the largest destination for exports from other 
country groups in all product categories. However, the growth rates of exports from 
IEs tend to be much lower than the growth rates of exports from other country 
groups, and each country group's exports to IEs grow more slowly than their exports 
to other destinations. Intra-IEs exports are considerably greater than IEs' exports to 
other country groups in all product categories. In other words, North-North trade is 
the single largest part in the global trade. This is consistent with the stylised fact 
highlighted in the intra-industry trade literature.  
 
Amongst all country groups, China has registered the highest export growth rates 
in almost all product categories, except fuels. The annual growth rates in all sub-
groups of manufactures are spectacular, ranging from 15% to 20%. China's 
manufactured exports were much less than those from EIEs countries in 1995, 
whereas by 2014 China had outnumbered EIEs countries in manufactured exports 
at all technological levels, especially labour- and resource-intensive manufactures 
and high skill- and technology-intensive manufactures. Interestingly, with 
exceptions of labour- and resource-intensive manufactured exports and low skill- 
and technology-intensive manufactured exports, all country groups' exports to 
China register higher growth rates than their exports to other destinations. By 
contrast, each country group's exports to IEs tend to grow more slowly than their 
exports to other destinations. In this regard, China has become the most dynamic 
part in the global trade, and IEs are the largest but the least dynamic one. 
 
The export growth rates of EIEs, ODEs, and LDCs fall between the growth rates of 
IEs and of China. LDCs have quite limited export values in all product categories. 
                                            
30 Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arabic Emirates are classified under IEs by UNIDO. 
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ODEs' exports are much more than LDCs', but are still at quite a low level. More 
importantly, given that the majority of ODEs' and LDCs' exports are in non-fuel 
primary commodities and fuels, their manufactured exports are even at a lower level. 
Amongst the limited manufactured exports from ODEs and LDCs, the majority go 
to IEs. Considering that manufacturing is the core driver of economic growth and 
the importance of manufactured exports has been demonstrated by those late 
industrialisers, the low manufactured exports from the Developing South are a bad 
signal for their development prospect. However, a consolation is that ODEs' and 
LDCs' manufactured exports at various technological levels grow faster (around 
10%) than their exports in non-fuel primary commodities and fuels (around 5%).  
 
2.3. Composition of Developing Countries' Exports 
From the quantity side, Section 2.2 demonstrates two sources of "illusion" of South-
South trade and highlights the dominance of China and the marginalisation of the 
Developing South in the broad-sense South-South trade. This section moves the 
focus to the quality side by analysing the composition of the Developing South's 
exports to various destinations and its change between 1995 and 2014. Section 2.3.1 
deals with the Developing South's exports to IEs and the Emerging South, and 
Section 2.3.2 deals with exports within the Developing South. 
 
2.3.1. Composition of Developing Countries' Exports to Developed and Emerging 
Countries 
Table 2.4 shows the share of each product category in total exports from ODEs and 
LDCs to IEs, respectively. In 1995, non-fuel primary commodities, fuels, and 
manufactures had similar shares. By 2014, the share of non-fuel primary 
commodities had declined to 18.7% for ODEs and 18.2% for LDCs. It should be noted 
that the reduction in export share has accompanied increase in absolute export 
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values, as shown in Table C2. By 2014, the share of fuels had amounted to 42.1% for 
ODEs, accounting for the largest part in their total exports to IEs, and to 36.4% for 
LDCs. The shares of manufactures in total exports from ODEs and LDCs to IEs 
increase from 28.2% and 24.9% in 1995 to 34.9% and 40.1% in 2014, respectively. In 
2014, manufactures even took the largest share in LDCs' exports to IEs. However, 
manufactured exports from LDCs to IEs have always concentrated on labour- and 
resource-intensive manufactures (36.1% of LDCs' total exports to IEs in 2014), mostly 
textile, garment, and footwear. Other manufactures have negligible shares. In 2014, 
textile, garment, and footwear accounted for 35.8% of LDCs' total exports to IEs, 
accounting for 89.3% of LDCs' total manufactured exports to IEs. The situation in 
1995 was the same. One explanation for the dominant share of textile, garment, and 
footwear is preferred trade agreement between some LDCs countries and developed 
countries, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), but a more 
fundamental reason is that LDCs countries barely have manufacturing capabilities 
outside of labour- and resource-intensive manufacturing. 
 
ODEs' manufactured exports to IEs are more diversified. The share of high skill- and 
technology-intensive manufactures almost doubles from 6.1% in 1995 to 11.8% in 
2014, and the share of medium skill- and technology-intensive manufactures 
increases from 2.7% to 5.6%. In particular, within the general category of 
manufactures, the share of machinery and equipment soars from 5.0% to 13%. In 
contrast, the share of labour- and resource-intensive manufactured exports slightly 
declines from 17.6% in 1995 to 15.4% in 2014. This category of exports is dominated 
by textile, garment, and footwear. It is easy to see that ODEs’ manufactured exports 
to IEs have experienced an improvement in both technological level and 
diversification. This may preliminarily shed lights on the progress in manufacturing 
capability and even structural transformation of ODEs. However, LDCs’ 
manufactured exports have always stuck at the low end. Despite a significant 
growth in the share of manufactured exports, the specialisation pattern has not been 
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improved, still concentrating on labour- and resource-intensive manufactures. 
 
Table 2.4. Composition of LDCs' and ODEs' exports to IEs31 
Product Category 1995 2014 
(Percentage) ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 30.3 37.2 18.7 18.2 
Fuels 38.0 26.1 42.1 36.4 
All Manufactures 28.2 24.9 34.9 40.1 
   Labour/Resource-Manu. 17.6 21.5 15.4 36.1 
   Low Skill/Tech-Manu. 1.8 0.9 2.2 1.0 
   Medium Skill/Tech-Manu. 2.7 0.9 5.6 0.7 
   High Skill/Tech-Manu. 6.1 1.6 11.8 2.3 
      Machinery & Equipment 5.0 1.5 13.0 1.6 
      Textile, Garment & Footwear 16.0 21.0 12.8 35.8 
  Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
The composition of exports from ODEs and LDCs to EIEs is quite different from that 
of their exports to IEs, as shown in Table 2.5. In 1995, fuels accounted for 42.7% and 
15.0% in ODEs' and LDCs' total exports to EIEs, while by 2014 the share of fuels had 
increased to 57.2% for ODEs and 53.2% for LDCs, much larger than the share of their 
fuel exports to IEs (42.1% for ODEs and 36.4% for LDCs in 2014). By 2014, the share 
of non-fuel primary commodities had declined from 32.7% and 71.3% to 17.5% and 
24.6% for ODEs and LDCs, respectively. It should be noted again that reduced export 
share has accompanied increase in export value, as shown in Table C2 in Appendix 
C. The share of manufactured exports maintains at a low level during the 20 years 
(around 24% for ODEs and around 15% for LDCs), in comparison with their 
manufactured exports to IEs (34.9% for ODEs and 40.1% for LDCs in 2014). While 
ODEs' manufactured exports to EIEs concentrate on medium and high skill- and 
                                            
31 Total exports refer to the category of "All Allocated Products (SITC 0 through 8+961+971)" in 
the UNCTAD database; non-fuel commodities refer to "Primary Commodities, excluding Fuels 
(SITC 0+1+2+4+68)" in UNCTAD database; fuels refer to "Fuels (SITC 3)" in UNCTAD; and all 
manufactures refer to "Manufactured Goods (SITC 5 through 8 less 667 and 68)" in UNCTAD 
database. The sum of the shares of non-fuel commodities, fuels, and all manufactures in total 
exports is smaller than 100%. This is because that the product categories of SITC 667 (pearls and 
precious stones), 961 (coin) and 971 (non-monetary gold) are not covered by the above three 
general categories, but they are included in "All Allocated Products".  
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technology-intensive manufactures, LDCs' manufactured exports to EIEs have 
increasingly specialised in labour- and resource-intensive manufactures. 
 
Table 2.5. Composition of LDCs' and ODEs' exports to EIEs 
Product Category 1995 2014 
(Percentage) ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 32.7 71.3 17.5 24.6 
Fuels 42.7 15.0 57.2 53.2 
All Manufactures 24.1 13.4 23.3 16.2 
   Labour/Resource-Manu. 8.2 4.3 5.8 10.0 
   Low Skill/Tech-Manu. 2.7 1.5 3.1 2.2 
   Medium Skill/Tech-Manu. 3.9 0.9 4.1 1.4 
   High Skill/Tech-Manu. 9.3 6.7 10.3 2.5 
      Machinery & Equipment 4.8 1.5 7.4 2.8 
      Textile, Garment & Footwear 5.8 3.4 4.1 9.6 
 Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
The composition of exports from ODEs and LDCs to China, as shown in Table 2.6, is 
basically similar to that of their exports to EIEs. Importantly, ODEs' and LDCs' 
exports to China show even a lower share of manufactures. Between 1995 and 2014, 
the share of manufactures increases from 11.0% to 19.1% in ODEs' exports to China, 
but it decreases from 4.6% to 2.5% in LDCs' total exports to China. More than half of 
ODEs' manufactured exports to China are high skill- and technology-intensive 
manufactures, whereas more than half of LDCs' manufactured exports to China are 
labour- and resource-intensive manufactures.  
 
Table 2.6. Composition of LDCs' and ODEs' exports to China 
Product Category 1995 2014 
(Percentage) ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 68.3 26.8 24.8 29.6 
Fuels 20.7 64.8 56.0 64.8 
All Manufactures 11.0 4.6 19.1 2.5 
   Labour/Resource-Manu. 2.3 2.5 4.6 1.3 
   Low Skill/Tech-Manu. 1.7 0.05 0.5 0.4 
   Medium Skill/Tech-Manu. 0.6 0.4 1.8 0.3 
   High Skill/Tech-Manu. 6.3 1.6 12.2 0.5 
      Machinery & Equipment 0.8 0.45 6.7 0.2 
      Textile, Garment & Footwear 1.9 1.6 4.3 1.2 
  Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
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In summary, the Developing South's exports to the Emerging South (EIEs and China) 
concentrate on primary commodities, especially fuels, and manufactures take a 
minor share. In contrast, manufactures have an increasing and large share in the 
Developing South's exports to the North. By 2014, manufactures and fuels had 
become two dominant parts in the Developing South's exports to the North. In the 
recent decades, it has been widely argued that developing countries have 
experienced a major shift in their export structure to a manufacture-dominant 
pattern (e.g., Singer and Sarkar, 1991). This section shows that this shift has been 
clearly reflected in developing countries' exports to developed countries, but 
developing countries' exports to emerging countries seem to duplicate the earlier 
North-South trade pattern in which countries in the South (the periphery) export 
primary commodities to countries in the North (the centre). Between 1995 and 2014, 
however, the Developing South's exports to the North and the Emerging South share 
common trends of the decline in non-fuel primary commodities and the rapid 
increase in fuels. Moreover, ODEs' manufactured exports are more diversified than 
LDCs', with a higher share of medium and high skill- and technology-intensive 
manufactures and a lower share of labour- and resources-intensive manufactures. 
 
2.3.2. Composition of Exports between Developing Countries 
The composition of exports within the Developing South has largely remained 
unchanged between 1995 and 2014, with non-fuel primary commodities and 
manufactures being dominant. A sharp difference in comparison with the 
composition of their exports to the North and the Emerging South is the low share 
of fuels. As shown in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, fuels took 11.1% and 16.8% in LDCs' 
total exports to ODEs in 1995 and 2014, and the shares of fuels in ODEs' exports to 
LDCs are 24.1% and 22.9%. The corresponding shares are 8.8% and 14.6% in intra-
LDCs exports. Only in intra-ODEs exports, fuels have relatively high share (30.4% 
and 34.0% in 1995 and 2014). 
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The share of manufactured exports in total exports within the Developing South is 
comparable with the share in their exports to the North (around 40%), except in the 
case of LDC's exports to ODEs. ODEs' manufactured exports to other Developing 
Southern countries are basically as diverse as their exports to the North and the 
Emerging South. High skill- and technology-intensive manufactures take a 
significant share. LDCs' manufactured exports to other Developing Southern 
countries are obviously more diverse than their manufactured exports to the North 
and the Emerging South. Labour- and resource-intensive manufactures are still 
important, but not in an absolutely dominant position. Instead, medium and high 
skill- and technology-intensive manufactures have much larger shares. High skill- 
and technology-intensive manufactures even have the largest share in intra-LDCs 
manufactured exports (13.3% in 1995 and 12.3% in 2014 in total intra-LDCs exports). 
Textile, garment, and footwear only take a small share (2.1% in total intra-LDCs 
exports in 2014) in total labour- and resource-intensive manufactured exports within 
LDCs (11.7% in total intra-LDCs exports in 2014). This pattern is consistent with the 
observation in the South-South trade literature that South-South trade tends to be 
more diverse and more sophisticated than South-North trade. Provided that diverse 
and sophisticated exports imply greater developmental effect, it may be tentatively 
argued that exports to other Southern countries have the greatest developmental 
effect, followed by exports to the North. By contrast, exports to the Emerging South, 
given its minor share of manufactures, are least development-enhancing, if not 
development-impeding. 
 
Table 2.7. Composition of LDCs' and ODEs' exports to ODEs 
Product Category 1995 2014 
(Percentage) ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 31.9 63.4 27.1 57.6 
Fuels 30.4 11.1 34.0 16.8 
All Manufactures 36.6 18.4 37.5 22.4 
   Labour/Resource-Manu. 13.4 9.6 8.8 8.8 
   Low Skill/Tech-Manu. 4.7 1.3 5.7 3.8 
   Medium Skill/Tech-Manu. 6.6 2.7 9.0 4.8 
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   High Skill/Tech-Manu. 12.0 4.8 13.9 5.0 
      Machinery & Equipment 5.7 3.1 10.6 6.6 
      Textile, Garment & Footwear 8.5 8.4 4.4 6.8 
  Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table 2.8. Composition of LDCs' and ODEs' exports to LDCs 
Product Category 1995 2014 
(Percentage) ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 26.5 56.8 30.0 49.8 
Fuels 24.1 8.8 22.9 14.6 
All Manufactures 49.3 34.3 47.2 35.6 
   Labour/Resource-Manu. 15.8 11.0 15.4 11.7 
   Low Skill/Tech-Manu. 12.1 3.0 8.9 5.0 
   Medium Skill/Tech-Manu. 7.4 7.1 8.6 6.6 
   High Skill/Tech-Manu. 13.9 13.3 14.3 12.3 
      Machinery & Equipment 6.2 6.3 8.2 6.1 
      Textile, Garment & Footwear 8.5 5.7 8.2 2.1 
  Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
2.4. Trade Potential of Developing Countries 
Having presented the quantity and the quality aspect of the Developing South's 
exports at various levels, this section deals with trade potential of the Developing 
South. As the first step, Trade Complementarity Index (TCI) is used to measure the 
match between exports (supply) from the Developing South and imports (demand) 
by the rest of the world. Second, Export Intensity Index (EII) is adopted to shed lights 
on the degree to which trade potential of the Developing South with the rest of the 
world has been actually exploited.  
 
2.4.1. Trade Complementarity of Developing Countries 
Trade Complementarity Index (TCI) measures the extent to which a country's export 
(supply) structure matches another country's import (demand) structure. A higher 
value implies greater export potential of the exporting country with respect to the 
importing country. Trade complementarity of country i (exporting country) with 
country j (importing country) is defined as: 
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𝑇𝐶𝐼8U = 	100× 1 − 𝑚UW − 𝑥8W2W  
where 𝑚UW is the share of good k in total imports of country j from the world, and 𝑥8W is the share of good k in country i's total exports to the world. The value of TCI 
ranges from 0 to 100. A value of zero means that country j does not import any goods 
that are exported by country i. In other words, country i does not supply any goods 
that country j demands. A TCI value of 100 means full match between country j's 
import (demand) and country i's export (supply). It should be noted that higher TCI 
does not necessarily imply that country j imports more goods from country i, 
because country j may import from other countries.  
 
Figure 2.6 shows TCI of ODEs and LDCs with other country groups. The most 
striking finding is that IEs', EIEs', and China's TCI with ODEs and LDCs (around 80) 
is significantly higher than ODEs' and LDCs' TCI with IEs, EIEs, and China (between 
40 and 50). This implies that the match between the supply of IEs, EIEs, and China 
and the demand of ODEs and LDCs is much higher than the match between the 
supply of ODEs and LDCs and the demand of IEs, EIEs, and China. In other words, 
the extent to which the North and the Emerging South need the Developing South 
is lower than the extent to which the Developing South needs the North and the 
Emerging South. Thereby, it can be argued that the North and the Emerging South 
have higher export potential with the Developing South than the reverse direction. 
The deeper reason for this mismatch between the Developing South's supply and 
the demand of the rest of the world may fall within the Developing South's economic 
structure. The Developing South's exports concentrate on less elastic primary 
commodities and low-end manufactures, which have limited growth in demand. In 
contrast, the North and the Emerging South have diverse exports across a wide 
range of manufactures for which the Developing South may have irreplaceable 
demand. This is consistent with the argument of the unbalanced North-South 
relationship in classical development economics. As the mismatch is a structural 
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problem, the only solution seems to be structural transformation, especially export 
diversification and upgrading. Unfortunately, trade complementarity between the 
Developing South and the rest of the world maintains basically unchanged from 
1995 to 2014. This phenomenon implies that during this period the Developing 
South did not make their production structure more compatible with demand from 
the rest of the world, which further makes the trade prospect of the Developing 
South less promising. 
 
Figure 2.6. Trade complementarity of ODEs and LDCs 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
2.4.2. Export Intensity of Developing Countries 
The extent to which trade complementarity between two countries has been actually 
exploited can be measured by Export Intensity Index (EII), which shows whether 
trade value between two countries is larger or smaller than would be expected based 
on their importance in the world trade. Export intensity of country i (exporting 
country) with respect to country j (importing country) is defined as: 
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𝐸𝐼𝐼8U = 𝑥8U 𝑋8𝑥[U 𝑋[  
where 𝑥8U is the value of exports from country i to country j, 𝑋8 is country i's total 
export value, 𝑥[U is the value of total exports from the rest of the world to country 
j, and 𝑋[ is total world export value. This index is the ratio of the share of exports 
going to country j in country i's total exports (𝑥8U 𝑋8) to the share of exports going to 
country j in the world total exports (𝑥[U 𝑋[). The value of this index ranges from 0 
to infinity. One is the threshold level. A value above one implies that the actual value 
of exports from country i to country j is larger than the expected level, given the 
importance of country j (importing country) in the total world exports (𝑥[U 𝑋[).  
 
If country i's Trade Complementarity Index with country j is high and its Export 
Intensity Index with country j is higher than one, then trade potential of country i 
with country j has been well exploited. In comparison, if a combination of high trade 
complementarity and low export intensity is observed, then trade potential has not 
been sufficiently utilised. In this case, there could be space for potential trade 
expansion. However, another possibility is the combination of low trade 
complementarity and low export intensity. In this case, there is hardly trade potential 
between the two countries for exploitation. 
 
Figure 2.7 shows Export Intensity Index of ODEs and LDCs with other country 
groups. LDCs' export intensity with ODEs has been smaller than one since 2000, and 
it has tended to decrease over years. This phenomenon implies that since 2000 
exports from LDCs to ODEs have been lower than would be expected based on 
ODEs' importance in the world trade, and the gap between the actual export value 
and the expected export value increases. This lower-than-expected export intensity 
seems to be consistent with the low trade complementarity of LDCs with ODEs 
(around 40). In comparison, ODEs' export intensity with LDCs, despite a decreasing 
trend, has always been larger than one and is even larger than two in some years. 
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Given that ODEs' trade complementarity with LDCs is relatively high (around 60), 
it can be argued that ODEs' trade complementarity with LDCs has been relatively 
well exploited.  
 
Bilateral export intensity between ODEs and IEs has always been slightly below one 
(around 0.9) from 1995 to 2014, whereas bilateral trade between ODEs and EIEs has 
always been slightly higher than expected. Interestingly, despite the low trade 
complementarity with China, ODEs' export intensity with China shows a 
continuous increase from 0.51 in 1995 to almost 1.5 in 2014. The threshold of one has 
been surpassed since 2011. The relatively low trade complementarity of ODEs with 
China reflects that ODEs' exports to China concentrate on limited product categories, 
mostly primary commodities. However, this concentration has not impeded their 
exports to China. Instead, the increasing export intensity indicates the growth in 
ODEs' exports to China. China's fast-growing import demand for primary 
commodities, especially fuels and minerals, from ODEs may be the driver behind 
this paradoxical combination of steadily low trade complementarity but increasing 
export intensity. This phenomenon demonstrates a situation that great demand-side 
force may partly overcome weak trade complementarity on the supply side. 
However, is such a growing export intensity with China a good news? This is an 
empirical question, because different forces coexist. Chapter 3 will provide a further 
discussion and examination on this issue. 
 
Bilateral trade between LDCs and IEs has always been lower than would be 
expected. However, export intensity between LDCs and EIEs has always been above 
one, despite the low trade complementarity of LDCs with EIEs (around 40). LDCs' 
export intensity with China has increased significantly over the past two decades, 
amounting to more than three for the recent ten years. Since 2000, LDCs' export 
intensity with China has been much higher than China's export intensity with LDCs. 
This situation seems to be against expectation, because LDCs' trade 
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complementarity with China is approximately half of China's trade 
complementarity with LDCs. The most likely explanation is China's growing 
demand for primary commodities from LDCs, just as the aforementioned case of 
ODEs' paradoxical trade complementarity and export intensity with China. Strong 
forces on the demand side reverse the weakness on the supply side. ODEs and LDCs 
also have low trade complementarity with IEs, the same as that with China. 
However, unlike their high and increasing export intensity with China, their export 
intensity with IEs has always been below one without a positive trend. A likely 
reason is that IEs' demand for primary commodities from the Developing South is 
stable, in contrast to China's fast-growing demand. 
 
Figure 2.7. Export intensity of ODEs and LDCs 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on UNCTAD database. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The great size and rapid growth of exports from the Global South in general and 
South-South exports in particular have been highlighted in the recent literature, and 
South-South trade has been seen as a promising approach towards development. 
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However, this chapter demonstrates that the spectacular trade achievement of the 
Global South recorded in the literature is largely an "illusion". The first source of this 
"illusion" is the inappropriate inclusion of some de facto advanced countries (e.g., the 
Asian Tigers and advanced former European socialist countries) in South-South 
trade statistics. By comparing South-South exports under conventional definition of 
the South and industrialisation-based definition, this chapter shows that including 
these countries in the Global South leads to a great upward bias (more than doubling) 
to South-South trade values. This upward bias is largely driven by exports in 
manufactures, in particular high skill- and technology-intensive manufactures, from 
the Asian Tigers. If these countries are not excluded, the Global South's trade 
performance and production capabilities in medium- and high-end manufactures 
will be heavily overestimated. In this regard, the conventional approach to defining 
the Global South generates an illusion of not only the size and growth of South-
South trade but also the technological and manufacturing capabilities of the Global 
South. The second source of the "illusion" is the great divergence in development 
level and trade performance across different country groups within the broad-sense 
Global South. In response to this problem, this chapter divides the broad-sense 
Global South into the Emerging South (including China) and the Developing South. 
Accordingly, South-South exports are treated at three levels as broad-sense South-
South exports, non-China South-South exports, and intra-Developing South exports. 
Data show that China dominates the size and growth of the broad-sense South-
South exports. If China is excluded, the size and growth of South-South trade 
significantly decrease. On the other hand, the Developing South, which is the 
poorest part of the world, has been marginalised with declining and quite limited 
trade share. However, it should be noted that the declining share has still 
accompanied increase in absolute trade values. Thus, the marginalisation of the 
Developing South should be interpreted in relative terms. 
 
This chapter is also concerned with the quality side of the Developing South's export 
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performance. The Developing South's exports to different destinations have quite 
different compositions. Their exports to the North have been dominated by fuels 
and manufactures, and their exports to other Developing Southern countries show 
comparably high share of manufactures. On the other hand, their exports to the 
Emerging South are dominated by fuels, and manufactures take a minor share, 
especially in the case of exports to China. From 1995 to 2014, ODEs' manufactured 
exports experienced an improvement in both technological level and diversification, 
while LDCs' manufactured exports stick at the low end. This may preliminarily 
reflect the progress in manufacturing capabilities and structural transformation for 
ODEs and the stagnation for LDCs. Given that more sophisticated and more 
diversified exports are associated with greater developmental effects (Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik, 2007; Parteka and Tamberi, 2013; Felipe, Kumar and Abdon, 
2014), exports to the Emerging South seem to be less development-enhancing than 
intra-Developing South exports and exports to the North. 
 
Another problem facing the Developing South is the limited trade potential with the 
rest of the world, due to the mismatch between the product structure of their exports 
and the structure of demand by the rest of the world. Trade complementarity 
analysis shows that trade potential of the Developing South with the North and the 
Emerging South is much lower than that of the reverse. In other words, the 
Developing South's concentrated export structure in primary commodities and low-
end manufactures restricts further development of their exports to the rest of the 
world, except to China. They act as suppliers of those low income-elasticity products, 
and miss the opportunity from the growing demand for diversified and 
differentiated medium- and high-end manufactures by the rest of the world. In 
contrast, the high complementarity between the Developing South's import 
structure and the rest of the world's export structure implies that the Developing 
South may have irreplaceable needs to import manufactures from the rest of the 
world, namely, those advanced countries. This echoes the bleak picture of the 
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unbalanced North-South relationship suggested by classical and radical 
development economics. The need of the Developing South for the rest of the world 
is greater than the need of the rest of the world for the Developing South. What is 
more unfortunate is that, between 1995 and 2014, the Developing South generally 
did not make their production structure more compatible with the demand from the 
rest of the world. Finally, within the Developing South, ODEs show high trade 
complementarity and export intensity with LDCs, whereas LDCs' trade 
complementarity and export intensity with ODEs are quite low. Therefore, LDCs, 
the least developed part of the world, are not only marginalised in the general global 
trade, but they also have a risk of being marginalised in intra-Developing South 
trade. In order to mitigate this risk, structural transformation is necessary. 
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Appendix A. The UNIDO Country Grouping 
Table A1. Country list of the UNIDO grouping 
Industrialised Economies 
(IEs) 
Austria 
Belgium   
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Estonia  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Hungary  
Ireland  
New Zealand 
Italy  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg  
Emerging Industrial 
Economies (EIEs) 
Brazil 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
India 
Indonesia 
Kazakhstan 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Oman 
Saudi Arabia 
Serbia 
South Africa 
Suriname 
Other Developing 
Economies (ODEs) 
Albania  
Algeria 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Cameroon  
Congo 
Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) 
Afghanistan 
Angola  
Bangladesh  
Benin  
Bhutan  
Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cambodia 
Cape Verde  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Comoros  
Democratic Rep of the 
Congo  
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Malta  
Netherlands 
Portugal  
Slovakia 
Slovenia  
Spain  
Sweden  
United Kingdom  
Iceland 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Russian Federation 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
Latvia 
Bulgaria 
Poland 
Romania 
Croatia 
Switzerland 
China (Hong Kong SAR) 
China (Macao SAR) 
China (Taiwan Province)  
Japan  
Malaysia  
Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) 
Singapore 
Brunei Darussalam  
Bahrain  
Kuwait  
Qatar 
United Arab Emirates 
Bermuda 
Canada 
Greenland 
United States of America 
Aruba 
Australia 
British Virgin Islands 
Curaçao 
French Guiana 
French Polynesia 
Guam 
New Caledonia 
Israel 
Puerto Rico 
United States Virgin 
Islands 
Argentina 
Chile 
Uruguay 
 
 
Thailand 
TFYR Macedonia 
Tunisia  
Turkey 
Venezuela  
 
Cook Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
D.P.R. Korea (North 
Korea)* 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Gabon  
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guadeloupe  
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Iran  
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Micronesia 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Montserrat 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Palestine 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Republic of Moldova 
Réunion 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Seychelles 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tonga 
Djibouti  
Eritrea 
Equatorial Guinea  
Ethiopia  
Gambia  
Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  
Haiti  
Kiribati  
Lao People's Dem Rep  
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Sudan 
Sudan 
Samoa 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
Vanuatu 
Yemen 
Zambia 
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 Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
Source: UNIDO (2013) 
 
Appendix B. Values and Growth of South-South Exports at Three Levels  
Table B1. Values and growth of South-South exports in all products 
All Products 1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 289.4 1958.8 12.6% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
244.8 
(84.6%) 
1010 
(51.6%) 
9.7% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
30.3 
(10.5%) 
101.1 
(5.2%) 
8.8% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B2. Values and growth of South-South exports in non-fuel primary 
commodities 
Non-Fuel Commodities 1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 94.3 471.4 8.8% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
81.4 
(86.3%) 
286 
(60.7%) 6.6% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
11.6 
(12.3%) 
37.4 
(7.9%) 
 
6.5% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B3. Values and growth of South-South exports in fuels 
Fuels 1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 156.8 491 6.4% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
143.5 
(91.5%) 
309.5 
(63%) 4.3% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
21.9 
(14%) 
28.5 
(5.8%) 
 
1.0% 
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   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B4. Values and growth of South-South exports in all manufactures 
All Manufactures 1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 101.5 1114.8 14.2% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
81.9 
(80.7%) 
467.6 
(41.9%) 10.6% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
7.9 
(7.8%) 
41.9 
(3.8%) 
 
10.8% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B5. Values and growth of South-South exports in labour/resource-intensive 
manufactures 
Labour and Resource-intensive 
Manufactures 
1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 28.9 264.7 12.9% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
22.3 
(77.2%) 
90.2 
(34.1%) 8.3% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
2.9 
(10%) 
11.3 
(4.3%) 
 
9.2% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD Database 
 
Table B6. Values and growth of South-South exports in low skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
Low Skill and Technology-intensive 
Manufactures 
1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 18.7 167.6 13.8% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
14.6 
(78.1%) 
72.4 
(43.2%) 10.9% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
1.2 
(6.4%) 
6.7 
(4%) 
 
12.7% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B7. Values and growth of South-South exports in medium skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
Medium Skill and Technology-intensive 
Manufactures 
1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 24.6 331.8 15.4% 
Non-China South-South Exports 20.4 150.4 11.9% 
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(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
(82.9%) (45.3%) 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
1.4 
(5.7%) 
9.2 
(2.8%) 
 
12.1% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table B8. Values and growth of South-South exports in high skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
High Skill and Technology-intensive 
Manufactures 
1995 2014 Annual Growth Rate 
by Exponential Function 
Broad-Sense South-South Exports 29.4 350.7 14.5% 
Non-China South-South Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
24.5 
(83.3%) 
154.6 
(44.1%) 
10.8% 
DS-DS Exports 
(percentage in Broad-Sense South-South 
exports) 
2.5 
(8.5%) 
14.6 
(4.2%) 
 
10.7% 
   Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Appendix C. Values and Growth of Exports by Country Group and Product Group 
Table C1. Values and growth of the world exports in all products 
All Products IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs       1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
4992.9 
7134.6 
2.6% 
641.8 
1533.1 
 
6.0% 
201.5 
1067.1 
 
11.1% 
352.8 
679.1 
5.3% 
38.3 
96.1 
6.7% 
6227.4 
10510.1 
3.8% 
EIEs      1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
603.4 
1593.5 
6.5% 
96.3 
391 
 
9.7% 
13.2 
207.8 
18.2% 
 
 
66.4 
251.6 
9.2% 
12.8 
66.1 
10.6% 
792.2 
2510 
7.7% 
China     1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
200 
1472.5 
12.5% 
13.3 
296.9 
 
19.9% 
 9.8 
216.6 
18.7% 
3.4 
58.4 
17.5% 
226.6 
2044.4 
13.8% 
ODEs     1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
181.9 
488.7 
6.5% 
33.7 
172.1 
 
10.9% 
3.7 
115.1 
20.5% 
 
 
21.3 
66.2 
8.3% 
4.9 
20.7 
10.4% 
245.4 
862.7 
8.1% 
LDCs     1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
25.7 
83.8 
8.2% 
5.2 
28.1 
 
12.1% 
1.2 
53.9 
22.6% 
 
 
2.9 
5.7 
7.4% 
1.3 
8.5 
12.5% 
36.3 
180.1 
10.8% 
World    1995 
          2014 
    growth rate 
6003.9 
10773.1 
4.0% 
790.3 
2421.3 
 
7.6% 
219.6 
1443.9 
12.5% 
 
 
453.2 
1219.1 
7.1% 
60.8 
249.8 
9.4% 
7527.8 
16107.3 
5.2% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD Database 
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Table C2. Values and growth of the world exports in non-fuel primary 
commodities 
Non-Fuel 
Commodity 
IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
729.4 
1038 
0.9% 
81.9 
209.4 
4.4% 
29.8 
182.7 
10.9% 
 
69.9 
115.1 
2.4% 
8.4 
19.2 
3.5% 
919.5 
1564.3 
2.1% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
163.8 
335.4 
3.5% 
30 
100.2 
6.5% 
6.5 
102 
17.1% 
 
20.3 
81.1 
7.1% 
3.6 
23.5 
9.7% 
224.1 
642.2 
5.6% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
26.6 
76.1 
4.7% 
1.6 
15.5 
12.3% 
 
 
 
1.5 
12.9 
10.5% 
0.3 
2.5 
10.5% 
30 
107 
6.0% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
60 
107.5 
1.9% 
12 
35.6 
5.1% 
2.7 
33.7 
14.0% 
 
7.4 
21.1 
5.9% 
1.4 
7.3 
8.7% 
83.4 
205.3 
4.0% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
10.4 
18 
2.2% 
4 
8.2 
4.2% 
0.4 
18.8 
22.3% 
 
 
2 
3.9 
4.7% 
0.8 
5 
9.9% 
17.6 
53.9 
5.5% 
World 1995        
      2014 
 growth rate 
990.2 
1575.1 
1.6% 
129.4 
368.8 
5.2% 
39.3 
337.3 
12.9% 
 
101 
234.1 
4.3% 
14.6 
57.5 
6.8% 
1274.6 
2572.7 
3.1% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table C3. Values and growth of the world exports in fuels 
Fuels IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
661.3 
1073.4 
2.2% 
96.7 
193.9 
5.1% 
13.4 
67 
9.3% 
 
 
69.3 
180.2 
5.7% 
3.4 
19 
9.1% 
844.2 
1533.5 
3.2% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
316.9 
405.5 
1.6% 
45 
116.9 
5.2% 
6.2 
74.2 
14.0% 
 
 
32.2 
43.7 
1.8% 
3.2  
10.7  
6.9% 
403.5 
651 
2.8% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
19.1 
18 
-1.0% 
1.7 
3.5 
3.4% 
 
 1.2 
6.6 
9.5% 
0.1 
1 
12.7% 
22.1 
29.1 
0.98% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
187.3 
199 
1.2% 
39.1 
95.3 
5.4% 
2.1 
62.3 
17.3% 
 
 
17.6 
21.7 
0.43% 
3.2 
4.6 
2.8% 
249.1 
382.9 
2.7% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
18.2 
29.5 
3.9% 
2.1 
14.5 
10.8% 
2.1 
33.8 
14.9% 
 
 
0.86 
0.93 
1.9% 
0.3 
1.2 
6.2% 
23.6 
79.9 
7.5% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
1202.7 
1725.3 
1.9% 
184.5 
424 
5.3% 
23.8 
237.3 
12.7% 
 
121.2 
253.2 
4.2% 
10.2 
36.5 
7.1% 
1542.5 
2676.4 
3.1% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
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Table C4. Values and growth of the world exports in all manufactures 
All Manu. IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
2860 
5328.6 
3.1% 
371.8 
1164.9 
6.4% 
120.3 
841.2 
11.7% 
 
 
186.6 
418.8 
5.0% 
20.8 
64.6 
7.0% 
3559.6 
7818.1 
4.2% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
228.4 
911 
7.1% 
36.2 
197.5 
10.4% 
3.5 
47.8 
15.4% 
 
 
25.6 
142.9 
10.4% 
5.9 
37.2 
10.8% 
299.5 
1336.4 
8.1% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
119.4 
1492.6 
14.6% 
8 
301.6 
22.1% 
 
 
 5.7 
213.9 
20.8% 
2.2 
58.8 
19.2% 
135.3 
2066.9 
15.8% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
36.6 
183.5 
6.3% 
5.8 
43.2 
11.6% 
0.3 
23.7 
23.4% 
 
 
5.5 
26.7 
10.4% 
1.7 
10.5 
11.7% 
49.9 
287.6 
8.0% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
4.6 
36.2 
9.6% 
0.5 
4.9 
13.0% 
0.04 
1.5 
17.4% 
 
 
0.4 
1.4 
9.4% 
0.3 
3.3 
14.6% 
5.8 
47.2 
10.3% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
3248.9 
7951.9 
4.6% 
422.2 
1712 
8.1% 
124.1 
914.2 
12.0% 
 
 
223.8 
803.7 
7.6% 
30.9 
174.3 
 
10.3% 
4050 
11556.2 
5.7% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table C5. Values and growth of the world exports in labour/resource-intensive 
manufactures 
Labour/Res
ource Manu. 
IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
413 
515.4 
0.8% 
46.5 
98.1 
3.5% 
22.9 
35.4 
1.7% 
 
 
28.9 
44.3 
2.5% 
3.2 
7.2 
3.3% 
514.6 
700.3 
1.3% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
79 
162.3 
3.1% 
8.7 
30.5 
7.5% 
0.7 
5.9 
10.4% 
 
 
6.7 
26.8 
7.9% 
1.9 
7.7 
8.1% 
97.1 
233.2 
4.2% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
53.5 
328.8 
10.3% 
2.8 
70.8 
19.1% 
 
 
 2 
68.3 
20.1% 
1 
22.9 
18.0% 
59.3 
490.9 
12.0% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
22.8 
80.7 
5.2% 
2 
10.8 
10.2% 
0.1 
5.8 
21.8% 
 
 
2 
6.3 
8.1% 
0.5 
3.4 
11.5% 
27.4 
107 
6.3% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
3.9 
32.5 
9.7% 
0.2 
3 
16.3% 
0.02 
0.7 
14.6% 
 
0.2 
0.5 
7.2% 
0.1 
1.1 
13.6% 
4.4 
37.9 
10.1% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
572.3 
1119.8 
3.2% 
60.2 
213.3 
6.8% 
23.7 
47.8  
2.9% 
 
 
39.8 
146.3 
7.5% 
6.7 
42.3 
9.9% 
702.8 
1569.4 
4.0% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
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Table C6. Values and growth of the world exports in low skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
Low Skill 
Manu. 
IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
248.7 
511.8 
4.5% 
34.5 
124 
8.2% 
12.9 
34.9 
7.4% 
 
 
28.2 
62.3 
6.4% 
7.1 
12.1 
5.1% 
331.4 
745 
5.3% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
26.8 
106.8 
8.5% 
6.4 
26.9 
10.0% 
1.1 
3.4 
7.0% 
 
 
5.2 
25 
11.1% 
1.2 
7.3 
10.5% 
40.6 
169.4 
9.2% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
14.7 
136.5 
14.0% 
1.6 
41.6 
21.5% 
 
 
 0.9 
38.5 
21.1% 
0.4 
11 
20.9% 
17.6 
227.6 
15.9% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
2.4 
11.5 
8.6% 
0.7 
5.7 
13.3% 
0.04 
0.6 
18.6% 
 
0.7 
4.1 
12.5% 
0.4 
2 
11.6% 
4.2 
23.9 
10.7% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
0.2 
0.9 
6.0% 
0.1 
0.7 
13.7% 
0.0004 
0.2 
32.3% 
 
0.03 
0.2 
17.2% 
0.03 
0.5 
18.7% 
0.3 
2.5 
11.8% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
292.8 
767.6 
6.0% 
43.1 
199 
9.8% 
14 
39.1 
7.5% 
 
 
 
35.1 
130 
9.1% 
9.2 
32.8 
9.0% 
394.2 
1168.5 
6.9% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
Table C7. Values and growth of the world exports in medium skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
Medium 
Skill Manu. 
IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
1051.6 
2003.6 
3.1% 
159 
478.8 
6.4% 
38.6  
279.7 
12.5% 
 
 
58.9 
154.7 
6.2% 
6.2 
26.4 
8.5% 
1314.2 
2943.2 
4.3% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
63 
360.3 
8.6% 
10.3 
77 
11.9% 
0.5 
9.7 
18.3% 
 
 
6.1 
44.2 
11.8% 
1.6 
11.8 
12.0% 
81.6 
503.1 
9.5% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
22.1 
352.6 
15.3% 
1.6 
89.9 
24.4% 
 
 
 1.5 
63.3 
22.2% 
0.5 
16.1 
19.4% 
25.8 
521.9 
16.9% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
3.4 
29.3 
10.3% 
0.9 
7.6 
12.3% 
0.02 
2.2 
24.3% 
 
 
1 
6.4 
12.0% 
0.3 
1.9 
12.5% 
5.6 
47.5 
11.2% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
0.2 
0.7 
7.4% 
0.03 
0.4 
13.2% 
0.004 
0.2 
22.7% 
 
 
0.1 
0.3 
8.9% 
0.1 
0.6 
14.7% 
0.3 
2.2 
10.6% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
1140.3 
2746.5 
4.4% 
171.9 
653.7 
7.8% 
39.1 
291.9 
12.7% 
 
 
67.5 
268.9 
8.4% 
8.7 
56.9 
11.0% 
1427.6 
4017.9 
5.5% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
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Table C8. Values and growth of the world exports in high skill/technology-
intensive manufactures 
High Skill 
Manu. 
IEs EIEs China ODEs LDCs World 
IEs    1995 
       2014 
 growth rate   
1146.7 
2297.9 
3.4% 
131.8 
464 
6.9% 
46 
491.3 
13.9% 
 
70.6 
 
157.5 
4.0% 
4.2 
18.9 
8.6% 
1399.4 
3429.5 
4.7% 
EIEs   1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
59.5 
281.5 
8.0% 
10.7 
63 
10.7% 
1.2 
28.8 
19.1% 
 
7.6 
46.9 
10.4% 
1.2 
10.3 
12.4% 
80.2 
430.5 
9.0% 
China  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
29 
674.6 
18.2% 
2 
99.3 
23.3% 
 
 1.2 
43.9 
20.1% 
0.3 
8.8 
20.2% 
32.6 
826.6 
18.7% 
ODEs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
7.9 
62 
6.2% 
2.2 
19.1 
11.7% 
0.2 
15.1 
24.4% 
 
1.8 
9.9 
10.5% 
0.5 
3.2 
11.5% 
12.6 
109.2 
8.4% 
LDCs  1995 
       2014 
 growth rate 
0.3 
2 
11.6% 
0.2 
0.8 
6.8% 
0.01 
0.3 
22.4% 
 
0.1 
0.3 
7.0% 
0.1 
1.1 
13.9% 
0.8 
4.6 
10.6% 
World 1995 
      2014 
 growth rate 
1243.4 
3318 
5.0% 
147 
646 
8.3% 
47.3 
535.5 
14.2% 
 
81.4 
258.4 
6.1% 
6.3 
42.4 
10.9% 
1525.5 
4800.4 
6.1% 
Source: Author’s Calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
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Chapter 3. Determinants of Developing Countries' Export 
Upgrading: The Role of China and Productive Investment32 
3.1. Introduction 
By the 1970s, industrialisation had been at the core of development economics 
(Raffer & Singer, 2001; Ocampo & Ros, 2011). The Prebisch-Singer thesis and 
Thirlwall's law focus on the difference in income elasticity of demand between 
primary commodities and manufactures, pointing out the risk of specialising in 
primary commodities. Hirschman's unbalanced growth model and Kaldor's growth 
laws point out the special properties of manufacturing. After the neoclassical 
paradigm shift in development economics between the 1970s and the 1990s, which 
is represented by production homogeneity33, trade regime neutrality, and allocative 
efficiency, industrialisation has been re-emphasised by many economists over the 
recent two decades. Particularly, the sophistication of a country's export basket has 
often been discussed in the recent literature as a signal of industrial development 
and a driver of economic growth (Rodrik, 2006; Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007; 
Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Felipe, Kumar, Abdon, & Bacate et al., 2012; Spatafora, 
Anand, & Mishra, 2012). If a country's export basket has a higher share of 
technologically and productively more sophisticated or more value-added products, 
say "rich-country" goods (Hausmann et al., 2007), then this country is believed to 
have higher export sophistication. This has led to a change in the growth literature 
that the growth-enhancing effect of export is conditional on its product composition. 
                                            
32 This chapter has been co-authored with Dr Dic Lo (the second author) of the Department of 
Economics, SOAS University of London. Dr Dic Lo has contributed to part of Section 3.2.3 and 
part of Section 3.6, regarding the discussion on the distinction between local political-economic 
problems and institutions and the relationship between productive investment and local 
political-economic problems. I have contributed to the rest of this chapter.  
33 Production homogeneity refers to the view that all production activities/sectors are alike and 
generate the same effects on growth and development. The adoption of such view in trade 
theories leads to an argument that international trade is simply the exchange of labour hours 
without qualitative attributes such as skills and technology, which undermines the need of 
industrialisation and production upgrading (Reinert, 2006).  
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That is to say, exporting potato chips is seen as economically different from exporting 
micro-chips. Accordingly, upgrading export basket through increasing its 
sophistication has been considered as a core issue by many governments and 
international agencies (Harding & Javorcik, 2011; Zhu & Fu, 2013). 
 
Therefore, understanding what factors determine the sophistication of a country's 
export basket is of great importance and relevance. Interestingly, efforts to examine 
determinants of export sophistication have also been urged by sociologists of the 
school of world-system theory. In their terminology, the question is expressed as 
examining the determinants of a country's upward mobility in the world system or 
the international division of labour (Mahutga & Smith, 2011). Since the seminal work 
on export sophistication by Hausmann et al. (2007), a small number of studies have 
examined the determinants of countries' export sophistication, showing the positive 
effects of income level, human capital, investment, and FDI (Cabral & Veiga, 2010; 
Kemeny, 2010; Weldemicael, 2012; Spatafora et al., 2012; Zhu & Fu, 2013). However, 
explorations into the determinants of export sophistication are still insufficient, 
especially for developing countries, and need to be methodologically improved 
(Zhu & Fu, 2013).  
 
Developing countries encounter more difficulties in upgrading their export basket 
due to constraints of resource and capability (Harding & Javorcik, 2011). Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et al. (2007) demonstrate entrepreneurs' 
underinvestment in new production activities in developing countries as a result of 
uncertainty and externalities. Thereby, they suggest developing countries to use 
appropriate policy to protect entrepreneurship and stimulate investment. 
Accumulating productive investment is especially important for developing 
countries, because they have to inaugurate industrialisation at a low level of capital 
per worker (Szirmai, 2012). Lo (2016) further argues that the level of productive 
investment reflects particular political-economic embeddedness and that it is the 
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insufficient productive investment that leads to developing countries' poor 
manufacturing performance. This echoes the argument that industrialisation is a 
process driven by motivations and interests of various political and social agents 
(Kiely, 1998). These agents' conceptualisation and realisation of their roles in 
industrialisation are embedded in particular endemic political-economic context, 
reflecting on the level of productive investment. Therefore, productive investment 
should be understood as not only an economic determinant but also a socio-political 
determinant of export upgrading. 
 
A factor that has tended to be neglected in the export sophistication literature is the 
impact of China on developing countries. Since the late 1990s, China has become an 
increasingly important trade partner for developing countries. As a major buyer of 
primary commodities and a major supplier of manufactures, how China has 
influenced developing countries' industrial development has been a highly 
contentious topic. Existing studies tend to examine this influence by looking at how 
China's export supply and import demand have impacted on prices and supply in 
both the global market and developing countries' local market. This can be read as 
the direct impact of China on developing countries34. Many studies suggest that 
China has crowded out developing countries' manufacturing and re-primarised 
their economic structure. Lall and Weiss (2005) and Jenkins (2010) even argue that 
China's trade relationship with developing countries has reproduced the old centre-
periphery relationship. However, existing studies tend to neglect an indirect channel 
through which the monetary gains from trade with China may influence developing 
countries' capital accumulation and industrial production35. China's great import 
demand benefits many developing countries by the improvement in their income 
                                            
34 It should be noted that the direct channel and the indirect channel defined in this chapter are 
irrelevant to the direct impact (on home market) and the indirect impact (on third market) of 
China on developing countries defined by Kaplinsky (2009). 
35 Meyersson, i Miquel, and Qian (2008) show that natural resource exports to China increase 
Sub-Saharan African countries' investment. However, their study simply concerns developing 
countries' exports to China rather than changes in their terms of trade vis-à-vis China as a result 
of bilateral trade flows. 
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terms of trade vis-à-vis China, indicating absolute gains accruing to these countries 
as potential productive investment for export upgrading. Moreover, existing studies' 
emphasis on China's direct impact on developing countries through changes in 
prices and supply leads to a consequence that these studies tend to focus on the 
quantitative side of the story such as changes in the market share of developing 
countries' manufactures, but much less attentions have been paid to the qualitative 
side of the story, say how China has influenced the sophistication of developing 
countries' export basket. 
 
Therefore, this chapter aims to connect the literature on export sophistication and 
the literature on China's impact on developing countries, bringing the "China" factor 
to the former and bringing export sophistication to the latter. We examine the 
determinants of developing countries' export upgrading measured by export 
sophistication from 1995 to 2014. In addition to general contributors (e.g., geography, 
human capital, investment, institutions, and FDI inflow), a special interest lies in the 
hypothesis that developing countries' growing trade with China may serve as a 
source of productive investment for their export upgrading. The empirical analyses 
rely on disaggregated export data from the BACI database at the HS 6-digit level for 
62 developing countries. Emerging countries and developing countries that 
specialise in mineral fuels are excluded 3637 . Moreover, we use dynamic panel 
estimation based on System GMM to address the path dependence of export 
upgrading and endogeneity. 
 
We find that accumulating productive investment, improving education, and 
promoting openness can stimulate export upgrading. Moreover, absolute gains from 
                                            
36 We define emerging countries based on the UNIDO country classification (UNIDO, 2013). 
Countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Kazakhstan, India, South Africa, and Venezuela are 
classified under this category. 
37 Because we measure export sophistication by the EXPY indicator (Hausmann et al., 2007), the 
sophistication level of developing countries that specialise in mineral fuels is a special case, 
which does not reflect their productive and technological capabilities. Footnote 11 discusses this 
issue. 
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trade with China, reflecting on improvement in income terms of trade vis-à-vis China, 
also promote developing countries' export upgrading. Importantly, mediation 
analysis shows that this export-upgrading effect takes effect largely through the 
enhancing effect of trade with China on developing countries' productive 
investment. In this regard, China as a source of productive investment is a positive 
factor for developing countries' industrial development. Meanwhile, we find a slight 
export-downgrading impact of China's exports, mainly manufactures, on 
developing countries that specialise in manufactures, but no evidence for re-
primarisation has been found. Our findings provide a new perspective to 
understand how China has influenced developing countries' industrialisation. In 
contrast to the prevalent argument of crowding-out and re-primarisation, we 
suggest that, for developing countries, China serves more as a stimulator of capital 
accumulation than a competitor in manufacturing market or a predator of natural 
resources. Accordingly, the priority for developing countries is the appropriate use 
of gains from trade for productive purpose. To this end, we highlight the importance 
of developmentally-oriented political and social agents (e.g., the state and 
entrepreneurs). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses theoretical framework of 
export upgrading and its determinants as well as the impact of China. Section 3.3 
discusses the measure of export upgrading by export sophistication, and introduces 
data and country sample. Section 3.4 presents descriptive evidence of developing 
countries' export sophistication. Section 3.5 discusses empirical strategy for the 
estimation of the determinants of export upgrading and presents results. Section 6 
concludes this chapter. 
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3.2. Analytical Framework of Export Upgrading 
3.2.1. Export Upgrading and Development 
What underlies export upgrading is the transformation of a country's specialisation 
pattern towards more sophisticated products, namely, manufactures. In this regard, 
export upgrading, which can be measured by export sophistication, is intrinsically 
associated with industrialisation. Although export sophistication per se is a relatively 
young concept, its theoretical underpinnings can be traced back to the 
industrialisation-centred classical development economics prior to the 1980s. In the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 
1950) uncovers the unequal exchange between developing countries at the periphery 
as suppliers of inelastic primary commodities and developed countries at the centre 
as suppliers of elastic manufactures 38 . The positive trend of terms of trade for 
developed countries and the negative one for developing countries lead the latter to 
export more but gain less, which obstacles their development. Moreover, in 
developed countries, technological progress, basically in modern sectors, leads to 
higher wage, whereas in developing countries technological progress, mostly in 
traditional sectors, results in lower exporting prices of primary commodities and 
relatively lower wage. This factor acts as another channel through which specialising 
in primary commodities results in deteriorating terms of trade. Economists 
following the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis thus urge to industrialise developing 
countries. 
 
In the late 1950s, Albert Hirschman's unbalanced growth model (Hirschman, 1958) 
regards manufacturing as the driving force of economic growth through its great 
backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy. A given activity of 
                                            
38 At later stage, Hans Singer and others revisited the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis by considering 
the growing share of manufactures in exports from developing countries (e.g., Singer, 1975; 
Sarkar and Singer, 1991). They find that the declining terms of trade in the original Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis still holds true. 
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manufacturing production stimulates other production activities in both the two 
directions by purchasing outputs of upstream sectors as inputs and providing 
outputs to downstream sectors as inputs, while agriculture, which lies in the 
primitive production stage, tends not to be linked with other production activities. 
This is the so-called "production linkage" through input and output in the physical 
terms. Another form of linkage, which has become increasingly important, is 
"technological linkage". It is particularly concerned with spillovers of knowledge 
and technology from manufacturing to other sectors, because manufacturing is the 
major source of technological progress and innovation. In the 1960s, Nicholas 
Kaldor's growth laws (Kaldor, 1966 and 1967) point out the positive association of 
manufacturing growth with overall economic growth and productivity growth. The 
faster the growth of manufacturing is, the faster is the growth of the overall economy, 
manufacturing productivity, and the overall productivity. In the 1970s, Thirlwall's 
law (Thirlwall, 1979) relates developing countries' sluggish growth and the growing 
North-South divide to the income elasticity of demand for their exports and imports. 
The core argument is that a country's growth rate relative to that of the rest of the 
world depends on the ratio of the rest of the world's income elasticity of demand for 
this country's exports, 𝑒\[ , to this country's income elasticity of demand for its 
imports from the rest of the world, 𝑒6. Davidson (1990) suggests that, in the global 
free trade market, developing countries export primary commodities with low 𝑒\[ 
while import manufactures with high 𝑒6 from developed countries. Consequently, 
developing countries' growth rate is certainly slower than the rest of the world (]^_]` <1), and the North-South divide has a tendency to be increasingly widened. Therefore, 
it is relevant for developing countries to upgrade their export structure in order to 
achieve faster economic growth (Thirlwall, 2011).  
 
It is straightforward to see that classical development economics holds a sectoral 
approach towards development. That is to say, development is driven by those 
dynamic sectors, such as manufacturing (Thirlwall, 2003). The sectoral composition 
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of growth pattern, rather than simply growth rate, matters (Singer, 1998). In the late 
1970s and the 1980s, however, development economics experienced a paradigm shift 
in its theoretical basis, leading to a shift in research subject and methodology. The 
essential role of industrialisation and industrial policy in development process and 
the sectoral approach were abandoned. Instead, the new neoclassical paradigm 
holds a vision of "commodity blindness" on development (Amsden, 1987), which 
ignores the difference between dynamic sectors (e.g., manufacturing) and static 
sectors (e.g., agriculture and mining). Neoclassical economics puts allocative 
efficiency of resources and endowments at the core of gains from trade, instead of 
technical efficiency through learning by doing and spillovers. This is a "conspicuous 
silence" on technical efficiency (Nayyar, 1997). The maximisation of gains from trade 
is, in the neoclassical perspective, realised via the optimisation of the distribution of 
resources and endowments on a global scale. As a result, comparative advantages 
have been enshrined again as the "natural" path towards development. Accordingly, 
in the policy-making sphere, "trade regime neutrality" serves as the pillar of the 
policy proposal of outward-looking strategy by international agencies (Lo, 2004). 
According to the "trade regime neutrality", developing countries simply need to 
follow the predetermined world labour division and export primary commodities 
and low-end manufactures, without the need of state intervention and industrial 
policy.  
 
Over the recent two decades, however, the pro-manufacturing vision on 
development has experienced a revival (Andreoni, 2013; Andreoni and Gregory, 
2013). The transformation of production structure from low value-added production 
into high value-added production is regarded as the precondition of economic 
development (Spatafora et al., 2012; Fortunato and Razo, 2014). In particular, 
technological level of export basket has been growingly seen as a signal of the 
transformation of the overall production structure. Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest 
that a country will become what it exports. Different export structures have different 
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developmental effects: specialising in sectors or products that embody more human 
capital and technology has a larger positive effect on technological progress and 
economic growth (Lall, 2000; Rodrik, 2006). A key finding of Hausmann et al. (2007) 
is that higher export sophistication, which is a proxy for the technological and 
productive level of a country's export specialisation, is a robust predictor of higher 
subsequent economic growth. As a telling example, Hausmann (2006) demonstrates 
that China's export sophistication is disproportionately higher than its income level 
and China has experienced spectacular high growth rate. By contrast, low-end 
specialisation will block economic growth, because of the vicious spiral between 
trade specialisation and growth (Amable, 2000). Thus, a primary reason of being 
poor is low and narrow specialisation pattern (Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon, 2014), and 
it is the difference in technology or, more specifically speaking, the capability to 
produce more sophisticated products that generates the difference in countries' 
growth performance and income level (Gerschenkron, 1962; Saviotti and Frenken, 
2008; Felipe et al., 2012). This argument deviates from the conventional 
"fundamentals" approach towards the determinants of export structure, which 
argues that a country's comparative advantages in endowment determine what it 
should export.  
 
The pro-manufacturing vision also involves the issue of state intervention. For 
developing countries or late comers, market force may not be beneficial to the 
development of sophisticated and dynamic sectors. In fact, conforming to 
comparative advantages and pursuing allocative efficiency tend to lead to a 
technologically and structurally inferior specialisation pattern for developing 
countries in contrast to the pattern induced by state intervention, which is just 
opposite to the neoliberal assumption that market force will produce similar 
specialisation pattern as state intervention can (Amsden, 1994; Kiely, 1998). This is 
due to the uneven distribution of productivity, technology, and power between 
developed and developing countries. Thus, government policy has a positive role to 
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play in upgrading export structure (Hausmann et al., 2007). Theoretically, this echoes 
the appeal for state intervention in classical development economics. Some 
particular sectors feature greater Marshallian externalities with increasing returns 
and strong learning effect than others. Promoting such sectors in the way of 
protection or subsidy is welfare-enhancing (Nunn and Trefler, 2004; Lehmann and 
O'Rourke, 2008; Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). Practically, the pro-industrial 
policy vision in the export sophistication literature echoes the industrial 
protectionism implemented by South Korea and Taiwan during their early 
industrialisation stage (Raffer and Singer, 2001). Put the issue under a broader 
context, developing countries need to strategically integrate themselves into the 
global economy by utilising imported technology and capital goods to upgrade their 
export structure, rather than simply following trade regime neutrality by 
specialising based on comparative advantages (Lo, 2012). 
 
3.2.2. Determinants of Export Upgrading  
Traditional international trade theories use a "fundamentals" view of the world to 
explain a country's export composition based on its fundamentals or, alternatively 
speaking, endowments (Hausmann et al., 2007). In the early supply-side trade 
theories, such as the Ricardian model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, fundamentals 
refer to comparative advantages in productivity or abundance of endowment. A 
country should produce and export products that intensively use its most abundant 
or efficient production factors. Accordingly, countries with abundant natural 
resources are expected to export primary commodities, and those with abundant 
labour resources are expected to export labour-intensive products. The concept of 
fundamentals can also be extended to institutions, human capital, physical capital, 
and technology (Hausmann et al., 2007). For instance, countries with advanced 
technology and human capital, such as developed countries, should export 
technology- and skill-intensive products. Importantly, unlike natural and labour 
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resources, technology and skill are not completely predetermined. Instead, they can 
be endogenously created or imported through international trade and FDI 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Schiff and Wang, 2006; Wang and Wei, 2008; 
Harding and Javorcik, 2011). Imported foreign knowledge and technology have key 
roles to play in promoting income growth and productivity (Coe and Helpman, 1995; 
Lee, 1995). New international trade theories, represented by the Linder model and 
the Krugman model, provide a third strand of explanation for a country's export 
composition, which is based on preference (e.g., consumers' love of variety) and 
production (e.g., economies of scale). However, it should be noted that new 
international trade theories are established on a premise of trade between similar 
countries. In this sense, these theories explain export composition conditional on the 
relationship between trade partners rather than conditional on a country's 
endowment and capabilities. This renders them less relevant to the discussion of this 
chapter. 
 
The fundamentals-based international trade theories leave limited, if any, space for 
policy-directed export upgrading. In other words, changes in export specialisation 
are largely the passive outcome of changes in endowment (Hausmann and Klinger, 
2006). An exception may be the endogenous creation of knowledge and technology, 
which, however, applies more to developed countries than developing countries. In 
this regard, the "fundamentals" approach is intrinsically associated with the 
neoclassical "trade regime neutrality" and "commodity blindness", which ignores 
differential developmental effects of different sectors. In contrast, classical 
development economics and classical development theories follow the sectoral 
approach towards development, arguing that political and social agents, especially 
the state, can select particular dynamic sectors to stimulate industrialisation and 
development through, for example, industrial policy. This implies that a country can 
defy, rather than follow, its predetermined fundamentals and that defying the 
predetermined fundamentals and ascending the ladder of product sophistication are 
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beneficial to structural transformation. For example, Lectard and Rougier (2018) find 
that developing countries that deviate from their comparative advantages, say, those 
whose capital content in exports is higher than overall capital endowment of the 
economy as a whole, tend to export more sophisticated products. What fall in the 
core of "defying comparative advantages" are motivations of and commitments to 
industrialisation by political and social agents, such as the state and entrepreneurs. 
In particular, productive investment, amongst others (e.g., R&D and education), is 
central to the realisation of these agents' roles in industrialisation and structural 
transformation, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.3. 
 
Similar arguments can also be found in the capability theory of production, which 
treats a country's export structure as the reflection or outcome of its productive 
capabilities (Andreoni, 2011). Production activities can be conceptualised as a 
network of interrelated tasks through which materials are transformed into outputs 
according to particular capabilities with the constraints of scale and time (Andreoni, 
2010). Accordingly, productive capabilities, which are the major driver of structural 
transformation, can be defined as skills, knowledge, and experience embedded in 
agents and organisations that are needed by firms to perform various productive 
tasks and to undertake technological and organisational improvement (Andreoni, 
2011). This definition is at the micro/firm level, but can be generalised to the 
macro/country level. According to Andreoni (2011), productive capabilities reflect 
on both static and dynamic efficiency. The former refers to skills, knowledge, and 
experience required to perform particular productive tasks and a set of related 
activities, while the latter refers to technological capabilities needed to fulfil 
technological and organisational changes (e.g., R&D). Importantly, the realisation of 
the static efficiency is conditional upon a certain material basis (e.g., means of 
production), which is defined as production capacity. Investing in means of 
production enhances production capacity. In turn, enhanced production capacity 
transforms tangible and intangible productive capabilities into real productive 
 91 
outputs. This echoes the emphasis of Lo (2016) on the centrality of productive 
investment in manufacturing performance. Following this logic, Andreoni (2011) 
suggests that both "knowledge ingredient" (e.g., human capital, R&D, FDI inflow, 
and imports in capital goods) and production capacity (e.g., means of production) 
are determinants of productive capabilities, which reflect on a country's export 
structure. That is to say, a country's productive capabilities are a collective reflection 
of its static and dynamic capabilities and production capacity. Therefore, 
insufficiency in the building of productive capabilities and/or the investment in 
production capacity impedes the upgrading of a country's production and export 
structure.  
 
The determinants of developing countries' export sophistication can be derived from 
traditional fundamentals-based international trade theories on the one hand, and 
classical development economics, the recent export sophistication literature, and the 
capability theory of production on the other. The first set of determinants refers to 
fundamentals, which can be divided into uncontrollable factors and controllable 
factors. The former includes a country's geography and endowment, and the latter 
refers to human capital, institutions, trade, and FDI inflow. China's impact is 
considered as part of the impact of trade and will be discussed in Section 3.2.4. The 
second kind of determinant refers to productive investment, which reflects political 
and social agents' motivations of and commitments to industrialisation. It will be 
discussed in Section 3.2.3. 
 
Geography has been widely found in the literature to affect export performance. 
Access to sea may be one of the most important geographical variables for trade. 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that landlocked location reduces export quantity. 
Another geographical attribute is distance. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) find 
that distance reduces bilateral trade. Weldemicael (2012) finds that distance from 
major markets reduces export sophistication. Parteka and Tamberi (2008) and Regolo 
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(2013) demonstrates that larger bilateral distance reduces export diversification. 
Access to sea and remoteness can also be seen as proxy for trade costs. It is 
reasonable to argue that higher trade costs weaken a country's competitiveness in 
target markets and then reduce its export sophistication. Because developing 
countries are generally less competitive in sophisticated products, the impact of 
geography should be greater for them.  
 
Natural resources have been found to negatively affect a country's socio-economic 
performance, the so-called "curse of natural resources" (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 2001). In particular, abundant natural 
resources are likely to be associated with low motivation of production 
diversification and upgrading. Some econometric evidence, however, rejects the 
"curse of natural resources" and even shows positive effects of natural resources on 
economic growth (e.g., Manzano and Rigobón, 2001; Lederman and Maloney, 2007). 
In the export sophistication literature, Hausmann et al. (2007), Cabral and Veiga 
(2010), and Zhu and Fu (2013) use land per capita as a proxy for the abundance of 
natural resources and find negative impact. Cabral and Veiga (2010) also use the 
dummy of net oil exporting countries as an additional measure of natural resources 
and find insignificant impact.  
 
Human capital has been found to be an important contributor to export 
sophistication. In endogenous growth theory, human capital is a major source of 
knowledge creation and economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer 1990; Howitt and 
Aghion, 1992). Schott (2008) suggests that abundant human capital ensures 
developed countries' sophisticated export composition. Parteka and Tamberi (2008) 
argue that greater human capital is associated with more dynamic and 
heterogeneous economic environment, thus stimulating production diversification. 
Similarly, in the self-discovery model by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and 
Hausmann et al. (2007), human capital expands the portfolio of "discoverable goods" 
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and promotes new production activities. In addition to human capital, trade 
represents another channel of knowledge creation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997). Importing capital 
goods helps the importing country to directly access R&D made in the exporting 
country (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). Bell (2007) terms this channel as 
"international transaction-embedded" learning process and argues that international 
transactions are the only realistic way for developing countries to acquire foreign 
technology. Recent studies have gradually shifted the focus away from trade to FDI 
as a source of foreign knowledge. Weldemicael (2012) distinguishes between direct 
and indirect effects of FDI on export sophistication. The former refers to 
sophisticated exports by firms with FDI background, which tend to be more 
productive and more integrated into the global value chain. The latter refers to the 
spillover effect of FDI with respect to the rest of the economy through production 
linkages. Finally, institutions have been increasingly considered as a covariant in 
international trade studies, and better institutions are seen as a comparative 
advantage (Levchenko, 2007). Some goods are more institutionally dependent than 
others. They are the so-called "institution-intensive" goods. Such goods tend to 
feature multiple production stages, complex sourcing from different input suppliers, 
and higher technological contents. It can be argued that more sophisticated products 
require better institutions, and thus institutions are in theory a determinant of how 
sophisticated a country's export basket can be.  
 
3.2.3. The Role of Productive Investment 
Another determinant of export upgrading is productive investment. By definition, 
productive investment falls within the category of physical capital. In traditional 
trade theories, physical capital is defined as part of a country's endowments or 
fundamentals. However, this chapter conceptually treats productive investment as 
a proxy for a country's efforts to invest in industrial production rather than a 
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predetermined endowment. Higher commitment to industrialisation is expected to 
stimulate productive investment. This echoes the positive role of political and social 
agents, especially the state, in promoting industrialisation suggested in classical 
development economics and classical development theories. Lo (2016) demonstrates 
the great difference in productive investment between China and developing 
countries, suggesting that it is this difference in productive investment that leads to 
the great difference in manufacturing performance between China and developing 
countries. This viewpoint is in line with the argument in the seminal work of 
Monopoly Capital (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) that social surplus indicates the extent to 
which a country can accomplish its goal of growth and development and that 
investment is a core component of social surplus. 
 
Since the level of productive investment largely reflects the motivations and interests 
of political and social agents, which are embedded in given political-economic 
context, the insufficiency of productive investment is a reflection of endemic 
political-economic problems. Lo (2016) shows that, at the aggregate level, 
developing countries have experienced positive trends of terms of trade in the recent 
two decades, which implies gains from trade, but their manufactured exports have 
not performed well. Accordingly, he argues that developing countries' failure in 
translating gains from beneficial terms of trade into productive investment is the 
deep cause of their poor manufacturing performance and this failure can be ascribed 
to their "broader political-economic problems".  
 
Importantly, the term of "broader political-economic problems" (Lo, 2016) is not 
equivalent to the mainstream terminology of institutions. Aside from its political 
dimensions (e.g., accountability, democracy, political stability, and freedom), 
institutions in the mainstream terms tend to be interpreted as governmental 
efficiency and effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law, and 
enforcement of contract (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011), which reflects the 
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quality of the role played by the authorities in guaranteeing the functioning of the 
market and in promoting private sectors. The World Bank's 2002 World Development 
Report was even entitled Building Institutions for Markets. In this regard, institutions 
in the mainstream terms, as an indication of a country's market friendliness, are not 
necessarily relevant to motivations of political and social agents, especially political 
and economic elites, to promote industrialisation, partly because pro-
industrialisation measures may not always be market-friendly. For instance, 
industrial policy encourages the government to select and promote particular 
sectors, which clearly deviates from market-friendly institutions. More generally 
speaking, developmental state best exemplifies political and social agents' 
motivations and commitments. Leftwich (1995) summarises some stylised facts of 
developmental state that obviously "violate" the so-called "good institutions": 
concentrated and strong political power of the central government that can shape 
and pursue particular development goals and can direct and organise the economy, 
developmentally-oriented elites, relatively weak civil society, and relatively weak 
civil rights. However, it must be noted that relatively weak civil rights or civil society 
are not the sufficient condition for developmental state, because they may lead to 
predator/rentier state as well (Kiely, 1998). Instead, development state may be 
implicitly seen as the sufficient condition for relatively weak civil rights or civil 
society. Kiely (1998) reviews the literature on the state-society relationship, 
highlighting the key point that the state should develop and maintain effective 
control of and intervention in the economy, especially in an autonomous way, and 
appropriately manage and coordinate interests of different social groups (Seddon 
and Belton-Jones, 1995). 
 
Rather, both institutions in the mainstream terms and political and social agents' 
industrialisation motivations are largely determined by particular endemic political-
economic embeddedness. Kiely (1998) argues that industrialisation is a social 
process, because it is ultimately socially determined. That said, the process of 
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industrialisation and the innovation of technology along with industrialisation are 
rooted in specific social-political context and reflect the interests and motivations of 
particular groups of agents (Kitching, 1982; Kiely, 1998). This implies that the 
examination of the determinants of industrialisation should take into account, in 
addition to generic contributors (e.g., technology and human capital), those context-
specific factors that influence the conceptualisation and realisation of the 
government's and other social agents' roles in promoting industrialisation and 
development. These factors can be generalised as "broader political-economic 
problems" (Lo, 2016), which are embedded in local political, economic, and social 
context. The "broader political-economic problems" determine social agents' 
motivations of industrialisation via, at least, their influence on productive 
investment. Because it is difficult to quantitatively measure these context-embedded 
factors, productive investment is a good proxy for the "broader political-economic 
problems" or, alternatively speaking, political-economic embeddedness. Moreover, 
productive investment is in fact also a proxy for industrial policy or, more generally 
speaking, policies of promoting production upgrading. Lectard and Rougier (2018) 
points out that such policies often target at the sectoral or even firm level, which is 
difficult to measure, but they reflect on the country-level capital intensity of 
production. 
 
3.2.4. China and Developing Countries' Export Upgrading 
China's factor is another concern for developing countries' exports upgrading. Over 
the recent two decades, China has become an increasingly important trade partner 
for developing countries. The influence of China on developing countries has raised 
widespread concerns. Table 3.1 shows the fast growth of China's share in exports 
and imports of various groups of developing countries in 1995 and 2014. Only 
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developing countries specialising in manufactures (MANUs)39 still have quite low 
share of China in their export basket (5.7% in 2014). The first channel through which 
trade with China influences developing countries lies in the composition of China's 
exports and imports. Despite great productive capabilities in medium and high 
technology-intensive manufactures, China still has advantages in labour-intensive 
manufactures (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011). Therefore, China's manufactured exports 
may crowd out or displace developing countries' manufacturers in both their home 
markets and third markets. This "crowding-out" impact has been widely found for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (e.g., Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris, 
2007; Moreira, 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008; Power, 2008; Freund and Ozden, 
2009; Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2009; Fu, Zhang, and Kaplinsky, 2012). For another 
thing, China's commodity boom and the subsequent upward trend in primary 
commodity prices may act as a "push" factor to lead some developing countries to 
increasingly specialise in primary commodities and then experience export 
downgrading. The export-side and the import-side factors of trade with China thus 
produce a consequence of the so-called "re-primarisation". 
 
Table 3.1. China's share in developing countries' trade: 1995 versus 2014 (%) 
Developing Countries China's Share in Exports China's Share in Imports 
By Export Specialisation 1995 2014 1995 2014 
AGRIs 2.6 11.8 3.9 15.8 
MINEs 5.2 23.1 5.6 19.2 
FUELs 2.9 20.5 2.1 17.6 
MANUs 0.8 5.7 2.8 14 
   Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Another channel takes place through developing countries' absolute gains from 
trade with China as a source of productive investment. Capital accumulation, which 
is partly dependent on terms of trade, is crucial to economic development (Somel, 
2005). China's rapidly-growing demand for primary commodities and supply of 
                                            
39 AGRIs, MINEs, FUELs, and MANUs refer to major exporting countries of agricultural products, 
non-fuel minerals, mineral fuels, and manufactures, respectively. All groups refer to the case of 
developing countries. Classification details are shown in Section 3.2. 
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cheap manufactures lead to rising export prices and volumes but decreasing import 
prices for many developing countries specialising in primary commodities. As a 
result, these countries' income terms of trade (ITOT) vis-à-vis China will improve40. 
For developing countries specialising in manufactures, the trends of their income 
terms of trade vis-à-vis China remain an empirical question. Time series analysis in 
Table 3.2 shows that developing countries specialising in manufactures (MANUs) 
have experienced positive trends in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis China, but 
to a lesser extent than the positive trends for other groups of developing countries, 
especially those specialising in mineral fuels (FUELs). This clearly shows that even 
developing countries specialising in manufacture, which may directly compete with 
China, have absolute gains from their trade with China. 
 
Table 3.2. Trends of ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis China: 1995-2014 
Country Group r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
AGRIs 0.18***  (0.17***, 0.21***) 
0.83  
(0.92, 0.62) 
0.69  
(1.94, 2.15) 
MINEs 0.17***  (0.17***, 0.18***) 
0.94  
(0.96, 0.83) 
1.1  
(1.81, 1.72) 
FUELs 0.21***  (0.21***, 0.19***) 
0.92  
(0.86, 0.82) 
1.27  
(1.76, 1.9) 
MANUs 0.13***  (0.13***, 0.11***) 
0.84  
(0.97, 0.33) 
0.6  
(1.71, 1.66) 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(ITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the time (year) variable and r is the 
trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ITOT is defined as net barter terms of trade (NBTOT) multiplying export volume. In 
the case of 1st-order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten estimation 
and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical 
value (1.411). 
 
However, as suggested by Paus (2009), whether revenues from primary commodity 
exports are appropriately used is more important than simply gaining them. She 
argues that the use of revenues depends on how the government conceptualises its 
role in development, which echoes the "broader political-economic problems" (Lo, 
2016) and the importance of political agents (Kiely, 1998). Gallagher and Porzecanski 
(2009) question Latin America's ability to direct rents from commodity boom, 
especially China's boom, to stimulate development, showing negative evidence in 
spite of "good institutions". Gottschalk and Prates (2006) suggest developing 
                                            
40 Income terms of trade is defined as net barter terms of trade multiplied by export volume index. 
Net barter terms of trade reflects a country's relative gains from trade. Income terms of trade reflects 
a country's absolute gains from trade. 
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countries to capture the current exceptional commodity boom and direct commodity 
revenues to investment in tradable sectors and infrastructure construction. The 
failure in translating resource rents into production activities may lead developing 
countries to miss the opportunity of production diversification and then risk their 
"re-primarisation" (Cypher, 2007). Another concern is foreign ownership. FDI 
inflows going to many developing countries, especially SSA countries and South 
American countries, tend to concentrate in natural resource sectors (CEPAL, 2012; 
World Bank, 2014; Chen, Geiger, and Fu, 2015). Gottschalk and Prates (2006) suggest 
that foreign ownership in these sectors and inappropriate regulations on profit 
remittance and distribution may impede the transfer of natural resource revenues to 
domestic investment.  
 
3.3. Measurement, Data, and Country Sample 
3.3.1. Measuring Export Sophistication 
Hausmann et al. (2007) develop an indicator of "EXPY" to reflect a country's export 
sophistication, which is measured by the associated income level of all products in 
this country's export basket. According to Andreoni (2011), EXPY is a trade-based 
indirect measure of country-level productive capabilities. In particular, a country's 
export sophistication is a proxy for its frontier of productivity, because firm 
heterogeneity model argues that only the most productive firms are able to export 
(Melitz, 2003). The EXPY index and other similar indices following the same 
rationale are different from conventional product taxonomies that are based on prior 
assumptions of the technological intensity of a sector (e.g., manufacturing is more 
sophisticated than agriculture), because they are outcome-based indicators that 
classify technological level based on empirical calculation (Lall, Weiss, and Zhang, 
2006; Klinger, 2009). The underlying rationale is that a particular product embodies 
a certain level of technology, human capital, management, and other production-
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related factors, and these embodied factors can be reflected by the income level of 
countries that export this product. In other words, the sophistication of a given 
product is a function of productive capabilities that are required by the production 
of this product (Andreoni, 2011). Provided that there is no trade intervention, 
products mainly exported by rich countries tend to embody high level of technology, 
human capital, and management41, because it is these characteristics that enable 
high-wage producers from rich countries to have competitiveness in these products 
(Lall et al., 2006). Generally speaking, the higher is the mean income level of 
exporting countries of a given product, the higher is the sophistication of this 
product. In this sense, a country's productive capabilities can be revealed by the 
sophistication of its export basket. A country is said to have higher export 
sophistication, if its export basket contains a higher share of products with higher 
sophistication, namely rich-country goods. That is to say, its export basket is more 
similar to that of a typical rich country. Prior to Hausmann et al. (2007), Michaely 
(1984) proposes an index of "income level of exports" and Lall et al. (2006) develop 
an index of "sophistication of exports". However, these two indices are much less 
used in the literature, in comparison to the EXPY by Hausmann et al. (2007). They 
follow a similar approach as that of Hausmann et al. (2007) to quantify the 
sophistication of a country's export basket by the associated income level of its 
exported products42.  
 
Importantly, the index of export sophistication should not be read simply as a 
                                            
41 A striking exception is mineral fuel, especially petroleum and natural gas. These products 
have relatively high associated income level (PRODY), because some rich but not developed 
countries (e.g., the Gulf countries) take a major share in the world exports in mineral fuels. 
However, as a capital-intensive extractive sector, mineral fuel sector does not have high spillover 
effect or linkages with the rest of the economy. If a country specialises in mineral fuels, it may 
have numerically high export sophistication. However, such spuriously high export 
sophistication does not indicate high technological and manufacturing capabilities for the 
economy as a whole.  
42 Lall et al. (2006) use each country's share in the world export of a particular product, rather 
than their RCA in this product, as the weight in the formula of product sophistication. This will 
overestimate the role of a large country that does not actually have RCA in this product and 
underestimate the role of a small country that has RCA. 
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reflection of a country's technological level. A developing country's abilities to 
produce and export (relatively) sophisticated products implies that it has mastered 
both the "hardware" (e.g., technology and facilities) and the "software" (e.g., 
management) that are required by these products (Page, 2012). As aforementioned, 
what is revealed by the sophistication of a country's export basket is this country's 
overall productive capabilities (Andreoni, 2011). In other words, EXPY, as an 
outcome-based indicator, captures the overall capabilities required for the 
production of a given export basket. Development can be therefore seen as a process 
of transformation to produce goods that are associated with higher income level, 
which is a process of accumulating new productive capabilities.  
 
An advantage of this approach is that it measures product characteristics based on 
the characteristics of exporters (exporting countries) reflected by export data rather 
than the characteristics of "parent" industries reflected by industry data on factor 
content or technology intensity, such as R&D and number of patents (Lall et al., 2006). 
Trade data feature a high level of disaggregation (e.g., 6-digit level or even more) 
and great availability for a wide range of countries, while industry data (e.g., R&D) 
are much less available, especially for developing countries, and are collected at a 
high level of aggregation (e.g., 2-digit level or even country level). Classification 
based on aggregate industry data tends to conceal heterogeneity in actual 
technological level across products within a given product category and cannot give 
unique measurement of sophistication for each particular product. In contrast, 
disaggregated trade data can largely avoid such misclassification by differentiating 
between different products under the same product category at a more 
disaggregated level (Lall et al., 2006; Hausmann and Klinger, 2007).  
 
Moreover, industry data only partially reflect a country's productive capabilities, 
mostly the technological aspect. According to the capability theory of production 
(Andreoni, 2010 and 2011), productive capabilities have four interrelated and 
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complementary dimensions, namely, static capabilities (e.g., skills, knowledge, and 
experience), dynamic/technological capabilities (e.g., R&D), production capacity 
(e.g., means of production), and capability enablers (e.g., infrastructure) 43 . 
Technological capabilities, as reflected by industry data, are just one of the four 
components. Without a certain level of production capacity and capability enablers, 
neither static nor dynamic capabilities, say, the knowledge ingredients, can be fully 
realised. In particular, the relevance of the technological aspect of productive 
capabilities may be relatively weak for developing countries. Andreoni (2011) 
distinguishes between two types of functional activities: productive activities and 
technical change activities. The former refers to undertaking productive tasks based 
on existing technological, technical, and organisational conditions, requiring static 
productive capabilities (e.g., skills, knowledge, and experience). In comparison, the 
latter refers to undertaking changes and innovations with respect to existing 
conditions, requiring dynamic/technological capabilities (e.g., R&D). It is easy to see 
that static capabilities, production capacity, and capability enablers are more 
important and relevant to developing countries than dynamic capabilities, because 
developing countries largely involve themselves in standardised production with 
limited product and process innovations. Unlike technological capabilities, static 
capabilities, production capacity, and capability enablers tend not to reflect on 
industry data. 
 
In fact, even if the interest is confined to the technological side of production or 
product, classifications with regard to factor content/technological intensity based 
on industry data are still poor indicators of embodied technology and knowledge of 
products. This is because that such classifications do not reflect the contribution of 
knowledge-intensive intangibles (e.g., coordination and marketing) and technology 
and skill embodied in production process rather than in R&D process, which have 
                                            
43 Static and dynamic capabilities (knowledge ingredients) and production capacity constitute 
capability determinants (Andreoni, 2011). 
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been increasingly important (Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino, 2005) 44 . Another 
problem of conventional indicators based on industry data is that the variables 
which are used to construct these indicators (e.g., R&D) are actually proxies for the 
determinants of products' intensity of technology and know-how or, more generally 
speaking, producers' productive capabilities rather than proxies for productive 
capabilities per se, because those variables reflect the technological and knowledge 
basis for producing given products but whether and how the role of the 
technological and knowledge basis can be realised in real production depend on 
intangibles (e.g., policy and decision-making), production capacity, and 
infrastructures (Andreoni, 2011). This accords with Lall et al. (2006) that technology 
as a determinant of export sophistication should include not only tangible 
technology and innovation (e.g., R&D) but also the "production capabilities" to 
effectively use the tangible technology and innovation. In this sense, the outcome-
based index of export sophistication is a better proxy for products' intensity of 
technology and know-how or, more generally speaking, producers' productive 
capabilities, in comparison with the input-based indicators constructed based on 
industry data45. In brief, the arbitrarity of conventional product taxonomies based 
on industry data makes it more like an art rather than a science (Lall et al., 2006). In 
contrast, export data provide a relatively rigorous proxy for products' embodied 
technology and knowledge, in addition to other production-related factors (e.g., 
production capacity).  
 
As pointed out by Lall et al. (2006), the index of export sophistication, as an outcome-
based or "catch-all" indicator, is like an "amalgam" of a wide range of factors rather 
                                            
44 This accords with the argument by Andreoni (2011) that the technological/dynamic aspect 
(i.e., technological capabilities) of an entity's productive capabilities, such as R&D, is just one of 
the capabilities required for technological and organisational changes. In addition to 
technological capabilities, a wide range of capabilities on the static side (e.g., skill, experience, 
and knowledge) and production capacity are also necessary. 
45  Andreoni (2011) highlights the importance of analytical and theoretical grounding in 
designing indicators of productive capabilities, with the consideration of both input and 
outcome variables. However, for developing countries, such composite approach tends not to be 
feasible due to the unavailability of data. 
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than a pure "technological measure", which makes it unclear to what extent the level 
of sophistication can be ascribed to technological factors rather than other factors 
that are irrelevant to technology. The authors summarise the economic 
characteristics that reflect on the sophistication of a given product: technology, 
marketing, logistics and proximity to market, fragmentability of production process, 
information and familiarity with respect to the outsourced countries, natural 
resources, infrastructure, and value chain organisation. In addition to economic 
factors, some policy factors also affect the location of production, such as trade 
restriction and trade agreement. Clarifying the influence of these non-technological 
factors on export sophistication has to rely on case-by-case studies with specific 
background information. However, as implicitly suggested by the authors, amongst 
others, technology in a broad sense (e.g., not only R&D but also technology used in 
production process) is the major factor. More importantly, ascending the ladder of 
product sophistication implies that a country has obtained higher overall 
capabilities required by more sophisticated products. This is a process of 
accumulating and developing productive capabilities. 
 
Another proxy for the technological level of a product is unit price. For instance, 
Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino (2005) distinguish between innovative and non-
innovative products by the trends of unit prices, which is based on a kind of 
Schumpeterian assumption that increasing unit prices reflect high barriers to entry 
and growing innovations and that decreasing unit prices reflect low barriers to entry. 
However, as recognised by the authors and by Lall et al. (2006), for one thing, 
decreasing unit prices may be a result of cost-reducing innovation or different paces 
of innovation across products. If costs fall by a larger margin than prices, then 
declining unit prices do not necessarily reduce profits. For another thing, many 
factors other than innovation may affect unit prices, such as non-technological 
barriers to entry, policy distortions, and demand-side changes. Thus, it is unclear the 
extent to which the trends of unit prices can be attributed to innovations. Moreover, 
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for products that are exported by both developed and developing countries, it is 
unclear to what extent developed countries' unit prices are driven by their market 
power, mark-up, and labour costs and to what extent differences in unit prices are 
contributed by differences in technology rather than in technique. For developing 
countries, mastering the technology required to produce a relatively sophisticated 
product should be more important than whether they can produce it with more 
refined technique or produce a high-quality variety. This renders unit price an 
inappropriate indicator to measure the technological level of developing countries' 
exports. 
 
Following the rationale that higher similarity with rich countries' export basket 
means higher export sophistication, the construction of the index of EXPY is done in 
two steps, leading product-level sophistication to country-level sophistication. First, 
each traded product is given a certain level of income, which reflects the 
sophistication of this product. This is termed as PRODY. The PRODY of product k in 
year t is defined as: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7 = 𝑥8,7W 𝑋8,7𝑥8,7W 𝑋8,78 𝑌8,78  
where 𝑌8,7 equals GDP per capita of country i in year t, 𝑥8,7W  equals the export value 
of product k by country i in year t, and 𝑋8,7 is the total export value of country i in 
year t. The numerator is the share of product k in total exports of country i, and the 
denominator is the sum of this share across all countries exporting product k. The 
weight of GDP per capita is simply each country's revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) in this product, which captures the network structure of countries' 
specialisation. Therefore, PRODY is the mean GDP per capita of all exporting 
countries, weighted by each country's RCA. It should be noted that the RCA that is 
used as the weight in the PRODY formula is different from the classical RCA by 
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Balassa (1965), because the RCA in the PRODY formula has been normalised to make 
the sum of the weights equal to one.  
 
Then, product-level sophistication is transformed to country-level sophistication, 
say EXPY, based on the importance of each product in the country's total exports. 
The EXPY of country i in year t is calculated as:  
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7 = 𝑥8,7W𝑋8,7W 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W 
A country's EXPY is the average of PRODY values of all its exported products, 
weighted by the share of each product in this country's export basket. Importantly, 
each product's annual PRODY values (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7) during a given period are averaged 
to generate a single static PRODY of this product (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W, instead of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7). A 
country's annual EXPY is calculated based on the static PRODY values, which give 
each product a constant associated income level. The fixed value of PRODY ensures 
that any change in EXPY is due to change in this country's export structure, instead 
of change in GDP per capita of other exporting countries.  
 
There are three major criticisms of the measure of product sophistication "PRODY". 
The first criticism concerns the use of income information in calculating the 
sophistication level of a product, which generates a circularity that "rich countries 
export rich-country products" (Hidalgo, 2009; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). Their 
solution, the so-called "Method of Reflections", is to separate income information 
(each country's GDP per capita) from the network information (each country's 
revealed comparative advantage in a particular product) in the PRODY formula. 
Then, they propose a pure network-based measure of the sophistication level of a 
product by its ubiquity, termed as "Product Complexity Index" (PCI). The circularity 
problem mainly matters for studies on the impact of EXPY on economic growth. 
However, this chapter examines the determinants of EXPY of developing countries, 
which are relatively homogenous in terms of income level. Moreover, both PRODY 
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and EXPY are highly correlated with their network equivalents, namely, PCI and 
Economic Complexity Index (ECI), which indicates that the network structure of 
countries' revealed comparative advantages dominantly explains the variance in 
PRODY and EXPY (Hidalgo, 2009). Thus, the circularity problem tends not to matter 
in this chapter, and PRODY and EXPY are sufficient and qualified for the purpose of 
this chapter.  
 
The second criticism is raised by the consideration of within-product quality 
differentiation. Schott (2004) distinguishes between cross-product sophistication 
and within-product sophistication. The former refers to differences in sophistication 
(e.g., embodied technology) between different product categories and is exactly 
what PRODY measures, while the latter reflects differences in quality within a given 
product category and is not considered by PRODY. For instance, both Italy and 
Bangladesh export skirt, but the price of Italy's skirt is substantially higher than that 
of Bangladesh's skirt. Such differences in quality (unit value) are great even at 10-
digit disaggregation level (Xu, 2007). Ignoring this within-product differentiation 
may overestimate the value of export sophistication of poor countries whose 
product quality/unit value tends to be low and underestimate that of rich countries, 
because product quality or unit value is associated with income level (Schott, 2004). 
The solution is to adjust the formula of PRODY by multiplying it with a unit value 
multiplier, which is calculated based on all exporting countries' unit values of a 
particular product (Xu, 2007; Minondo, 2010; Xu, 2010). However, since unit value 
often contains extreme values or outliers, it is difficult to select an appropriate extent 
to which unit value truly reflects product quality. Minondo (2010) proposes to define 
quality grade based on the percentile of unit value, which is quite arbitrary. Xu (2007 
and 2010) proposes a regression-based method to select the quality multiplier, but 
his method is still subject to arbitrary judgement and requires sectoral R&D data, 
which are unavailable for many developing countries46.  
                                            
46 Xu (2007) suggests that there is no theoretically "correct" choice of the quality multiplier. He 
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In addition to the difficulty in selecting an optimal magnitude of adjustment with 
respect to unit value, there are some more important and fundamental arguments 
that point to the meaninglessness of adjusting quality differentiation for a study 
focusing on developing countries. First, as aforementioned, it is difficult to judge the 
extent to which the difference in unit price is due to market power and mark-up 
possessed by producers from rich countries and higher labour costs in these 
countries, and to what extent the difference is due to difference in production 
technology. As argued by Henn et al. (2017), unit price is driven by many factors. 
Changes on the supply and the demand side, non-technological barriers to entry, 
policy distortions, and cost-reducing innovations may also affect unit prices, which 
are irrelevant to the real sophistication of a product (Lall et al., 2006). Second, it is 
difficult to judge to what extent the difference in unit price is due to difference in 
production technology rather than production technique. The premise here is that 
production technology matters more for the developmental effect of a particular 
production process than production technique. For developing countries, the fact 
that they can produce a relatively sophisticated product is more important than 
whether they can produce it with more refined technique or produce a variety with 
higher quality. Although the level of a developing country's production technique 
in producing a particular (relatively) sophisticated product is not as high as that in 
developed countries, its ability to produce and export this product implies that it has 
at least reached the minimum level of technology and management required by this 
product. Moreover, disaggregated export data (e.g., HS 6-digit level in this chapter) 
can reduce the differential in the embodied level of technology and management 
between different products within a product category. Third, because all countries 
concerned by this chapter are developing countries with relatively similar 
                                            
proposes to regress various adjusted EXPY values on sectoral R&D expenditure and then select 
the optimal adjusted EXPY value that best reflects R&D. This method is not suitable to 
developing countries, due to, amongst other reasons, unavailability of data on sectoral R&D 
expenditure. 
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development level, the within-product heterogeneity should not be large. The major 
difference in unit price occurs between developed and developing countries, but this 
chapter does not compare export sophistication between developed and developing 
countries. Finally, this chapter uses EXPY as a vector for dynamic comparison of a 
given country's export sophistication across years, instead of as a scalar for 
horizontal comparison between countries at a given time point. 
 
The third criticism may be seen as an extension of the second one. Participation in 
global value chain (GVC) allows some developing countries to assemble 
technologically sophisticated intermediate inputs from developed countries and 
then export final products. This trade in task/production fragmentation masks the 
true sophistication level of these countries' export basket. Instead, it reflects the 
sophistication level of the producing countries of those intermediate inputs (Ma and 
van Assche, 2011). Such bias cannot be solved by export data. Van Assche and 
Gangnes (2010) use production data, rather than export data, to calculate the index 
of product and country sophistication, following the methodology of Hausmann et 
al. (2007). They use this method to measure the sophistication of China's electronics 
production, which is well-known for its deep involvement in trade in task. However, 
this kind of approach does not fit this chapter, because it requires data on production 
process rather than product per se, which are hardly available at a cross-country level, 
needless to say for developing countries (Lall et al., 2006). Actually, using export data 
rather than industry data (i.e., on technological intensity, instead of production 
process) can, to some extent, mitigate the impact of production fragmentability on 
the estimation of the technological level of products. Using industry data on 
technological intensity (e.g., R&D) leads to a discrepancy between the location of 
R&D (e.g., in outsourcing developed countries) and the location of production (e.g., 
in outsourced developing countries), which generates spuriously high export 
sophistication of the outsourced developing countries. Instead, using export data 
(e.g., the EXPY index) takes into account the income level of other outsourced 
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developing countries and can, to some extent, identify the fragmentation of 
production process along the value chain, which differentiates between where the 
R&D is carried out and where the real production is carried out. For instance, as 
demonstrated by Lall et al. (2006), a combination of high technological intensity and 
low sophistication indicates that such products are designed and developed in high-
income countries but produced in (relatively) low-income countries. Moreover, 
trade in task in medium and high technology-intensive products is more relevant to 
emerging countries rather than developing countries. The latter, rather than the 
former, is the focus of this chapter. In the country sample of this chapter, only a few 
countries (e.g., the Philippines and Vietnam) actively participate in technology-
intensive trade in task. Thus, the bias due to trade in task is not a major problem in 
this chapter. 
 
3.3.2. Data  
The calculation of PRODY and EXPY requires data on countries' annual export 
values in each product category and GDP per capita. Export data are from the BACI 
database at the 1992-version Harmonised System (HS 92) 6-digit disaggregation 
level from 1995 to 2014. BACI database adopts an original and unique statistical 
method to reconcile export and import data reported by around 150 countries in the 
UN COMTRADE database and expands data coverage to more than 200 countries 
(Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). The number of reporting countries varies from the 
minimum of 212 in 1995 and 1996 to the maximum of 221 in 2013 and 2014. Export 
values are reported in current US Dollars. Data on GDP per capita (PPP, in 2011 
constant International Dollars) are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database.  
 
Hausmann et al. (2007) emphasise that PRODY should be calculated based on a 
consistent sample of countries, because non-reporting situation may be correlated 
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with the income level of a country. Moreover, the country coverage for calculating 
PRODY should be as large as possible, in order to include more countries that export 
a particular product. For the period of 1995 to 2014, although more than 200 
countries have export data in the BACI database, only 165 countries have full data 
on GDP per capita (PPP) in the WDI database. Thus, each product's PRODY in each 
year from 1995 to 2014 is calculated based on these 165 countries. Then, each 
product's annual PRODY values during the 20 years are averaged into a single static 
PRODY, which is used for constructing each country's annual EXPY. Previous 
studies tend to calculate the static PRODY based on a short period, for example 1999-
2001 (Hausmann et al., 2007), 2003-2005 (Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon, 2010), and 2005-
2009 (Spatafora et al., 2012). Because the BACI database provides a sufficiently large 
country coverage for the whole period under study, PRODY here is calculated based 
on a 20-year period. 
 
3.3.3. Country Sample and Classification 
Developing Countries are defined as Other Developing Economies (ODEs) and 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the UNIDO country grouping (UNIDO, 2013). 
The 2013 UNIDO country grouping divides the world into four tiers: Industrialised 
Economies (IEs), Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs) and China, Other 
Developing Economies (ODEs), and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The 
classification criterion is manufacturing value added per capita (MVA per capita)47. 
IEs correspond to developed countries, and EIEs and China correspond to emerging 
countries. Moreover, developing countries are further classified into major exporting 
countries of agricultural products (AGRIs), major exporting countries of 
manufactures (MANUs), major exporting countries of non-fuel minerals (MINEs), 
and major exporting countries of mineral fuels (FUELs). A country is defined as 
                                            
47 	𝑀𝑉𝐴$% = 012	(222)23$4567839 × ;<=012  
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major exporter of a particular product category if this product category accounts for 
on average no less than 40% in this country's total exports in 1995, 2005, and 2014. 
Agricultural products are defined as products of SITC 0+1+2+4-27-2848; non-fuel 
minerals are defined as products of SITC 27+28+667+68+971; mineral fuels are 
defined as products of SITC 349; and manufactures are defined as products of SITC 
5+6+7+8-667-68. A country may be a major exporter of two product categories. For 
instance, Moldova is major exporting country of both agricultural products and 
manufactures. Among the total of 101 developing countries in the sample, only five 
countries do not have any product categories that account for no less than 40% of 
total exports (i.e., Bolivia50, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, and Togo). 
These five countries are kept in the database, but they are not covered by the dummy 
variable on export specialisation. Appendix B lists countries in each group of export 
specialisation. 
 
The original groups of Other Developing Economies (ODEs) and Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) have totally 128 countries, but 27 countries are dropped in the 
following analyses, for the reasons of centrally planned economies (Cuba and D.P.R. 
Korea), long-term (civil) war and/or the lack of an effective central government 
(Afghanistan, Somalia, and Palestine), territorial alteration and/or newly-
established countries between 1995 and 2014 (Sudan, South Sudan, and Timor Leste), 
                                            
48  Agricultural products are defined in a broad-sense way. In addition to conventional 
agricultural products, this category also includes hide and skin (SITC 21), crude rubber (SITC 
23), wood product (SITC 24), pulp (SITC 25), and textile fibre (SITC 26). 
49 The sub-group of SITC 35 under SITC 3 refers to electric current, which is not mineral fuel, 
but in the database there is no developing country that exports electric current. Thus, the 
inclusion of SITC 35 in SITC 3 does not distort the result. 
50  Bolivia is an important exporting country of non-fuel minerals, especially trace element 
minerals (e.g., silver, zinc, bismuth, antimony, and tungsten), and an important exporting 
country of natural gas. However, the share of mineral fuels in Bolivia's total exports did not 
outnumber 40% until 2005. In 1995, the share was only 12.3%, and the share was 51.1% in 2014. 
This is because the major reserve of natural gas in Bolivia had not been discovered until 1997. 
For another thing, the share of non-fuel minerals in total exports declined from 46.9% in 1995 to 
19.5% in 2005. By 2014, the share had rebounded to 30.2%. As a result, the 1995-2014 average of 
neither the share of mineral fuels nor the share of non-fuel minerals outnumbers the threshold 
of 40%. Thus, Bolivia is not classified under either major exporting countries of mineral fuels or 
those of non-fuel minerals. 
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non-sovereign entity (e.g., Marshall Islands), associate states of another country (e.g., 
Palau), countries with population less than 50,000 (e.g., Saint Kitts and Nevis), and 
countries without export data in the BACI database (Namibia, Swaziland, and 
Lesotho). This results in a sample of 101 developing countries. Furthermore, since 
major exporting countries of mineral fuels (FUELs) have special pattern of export 
sophistication, they are dropped in the econometric analysis in Section 3.5 and in 
part of the descriptive analysis in Section 3.4. Mineral fuels have relatively high 
associated income level (PRODY), because some rich but not developed countries 
(e.g., the Gulf countries) take a major share in the world exports in mineral fuels. 
However, as a capital-intensive extractive sector, mineral fuel sector does not have 
high spillover effect or linkages with the rest of the economy. If a country specialises 
in mineral fuels, it may have numerically high export sophistication. However, such 
spuriously high export sophistication does not indicate high technological and 
manufacturing capabilities for the economy as a whole. These fuel-abundant 
countries enter the calculation of other countries' EXPY, because they enter the 
calculation of the PRODY index. However, this does not matter, because fuels do not 
take major share in other countries' export basket. Following Page (2012), countries 
with population less than one million are dropped in the econometric analysis, but 
are included in the descriptive analysis. Most of these countries are small island 
economies with special economic and export structure. This treatment results in a 
panel database of 62 developing countries for econometric analysis.  
 
3.4. Developing Countries' Export Sophistication: Descriptive Evidence 
3.4.1. Developing Countries' Export Sophistication in a Global Comparison 
What is the position of developing countries in the global map of export 
sophistication? Figure 3.1 shows that Other Developing Economies (ODEs) are 
positioned at the lower half of both of the global GDP per capita distribution and the 
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EXPY distribution, and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are mostly positioned at 
the bottom. By contrast, developed and emerging countries are positioned at the 
upper half. Importantly, there is a high correlation between GDP per capita and 
EXPY. If a country is richer, it tends to have more sophisticated exports. The slope of 
the quadratic fitted curve is steeper at low income level and becomes flat at higher 
income level. This reflects that low-income countries' export sophistication increases 
in income growth at a faster speed than high-income countries. At the far right part 
of the graph, there are three special countries (region): Kuwait, the United Arabic 
Emirates, and Macau. They have quite high income level without comparably high 
export sophistication. Brunei is another special case. It is a country specialising in 
mineral fuels, but it has much higher export sophistication than other fuel exporters. 
This is because that methanol, which has higher PRODY than many other fuel 
products and precious metals, dominates Brunei's export basket. Some countries are 
outliers in the group of developing countries (e.g., Algeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, Congo, and Gabon), because they have relatively high EXPY and 
GDP per capita. These countries are basically major exporters of petroleum.  
 
Figure 3.1. Developing countries in the world: EXPY against GDP per capita 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
USA
ARE
MAC
FIN
GBR
ITA KWT
CHE
NORCAN
PRTLTU
SVN
ISL
SVK
EST
AUT
AUS
JPN
ISR BHR
RU
DE
BEL
HKG
IRL
DNK
KORMYS
SWE
NZL FRA
CHN
HUNCZE ESP
NLD SGP
BRN
ROMBGR
MUS
VEN
MKD
CYPBLR
CHL
UKR
THA
IND
SUR
SAU
MEX
IDN
TUN
OMN
ZAF GRC
POL
COLRACRIURYTUR
LVAHRVKAZ
VCT
SLV
BIH
DOM
JOR
NGA
GEO LCA
GRD
KGZ
KENHND
ZWE
MNG
ECU
GTM
MHL
GAB
BOL
PAK
FSM
BLZ
PRY
ALB
BRB
TJK PLWNICFJI
CMR
COG
SYC
ATG
DZA
IRN
IRQ
ARM
TKM
CIV
MARJAM
VNM
PHL
LBN
UZB
MDA
PER
TTO
TON
KNA
PA
DMA
BHS
LKAPNG
GUY
AZEEGY
GHA
UGA
DJICPV
RWA
SEN
GNQ
BFACOMETHBDI
ZAR
GNB
TUV
NPL
BEN
BGD
AGO
MLI
HMZMB
MWI
VUTGMB
MRT
T D
LAO
SL
GIN
CAF
T O
TZ
KIR
MOZ
LBR
MDG
BTN
NE
SLE
WSM
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
19
95
-2
01
4 
M
ea
n 
EX
PY
 (2
01
1 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 In
t'l 
Do
lla
r)
0 20000 40000 60000 8000010000 30000 50000 70000
1995-2014 Mean GDP per capita, PPP (2011 Constant International Dollar)
IEs EIEs and China
ODEs LDCs
Fitted Line
The World EXPY Distribution
 115 
 
3.4.2. Heterogeneity of Export Sophistication within Developing Countries 
Figure 3.2 presents developing countries' export sophistication by country group 
with respect to export specialisation. The ranking of GDP per capita and that of 
export sophistication are highly correlated. Major exporting countries of mineral 
fuels are positioned at the top in both GDP per capita and export sophistication, 
followed by countries specialising in manufactures and in non-fuel minerals. 
Countries specialising in agricultural products are at the bottom. The perfect fitted 
line of the logarithms of EXPY and GDP per capita shows the correlation between 
export sophistication and income level. According to Yang and Yao (2008), this fitted 
line represents countries' predicted comparative advantages conditional on income 
level. Countries located above this line show a catch-up in income growth and may 
eventually converge to a higher income level, because they positively deviate from 
their comparative advantages and ascend the ladder of export sophistication. By 
contrast, countries located below this line lag behind in income growth. These 
countries' export sophistication is below the level predicted by their comparative 
advantages and they may experience export degeneration. In Figure 3.2, almost all 
major exporting countries of mineral fuels are located above the comparative 
advantage line. However, this should be treated cautiously, because mineral fuels 
are special products, as discussed previously. Around half of major exporting 
countries of manufactures lie above the line, whereas the majority of major exporting 
countries of agricultural products and non-fuel minerals lie below the line. This 
pattern implies negative catch-up potential for countries specialising in non-fuel 
primary commodities. Meanwhile, since these countries' predicted comparative 
advantage lies above their real export sophistication, there is available space for 
export upgrading and industrial policy may be needed.  
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Figure 3.2. Developing countries by country group: EXPY against GDP per capita 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between EXPY and GDP per capita by country 
group with respect to world region: Ex-Socialist (ex-European socialist countries and 
ex-Soviet Republics that fall in the group of ODEs, plus Mongolia), MENA (ODEs 
and LDCs countries in Middle East and North Africa plus Iran and Pakistan), SSA 
(ODEs and LDCs countries in Sub-Saharan Africa), LAC (ODEs and LDCs countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean), Asia (ODEs and LDCs countries in Southeast 
Asia and South Asia), and Oceania. SSA countries are basically positioned at the 
lower half in terms of GDP per capita and EXPY. Ex-Socialist, MENA, and LAC 
countries are at the upper half. Petroleum exporters in MENA and SSA show 
extraordinarily high EXPY and, to a lesser extent, GDP per capita. In terms of catch-
up, the majority of LAC and Oceanian countries lie below the comparative 
advantage line, while the majority of Ex-Socialist, MENA, and Asian countries lie 
above the line. Approximately half of SSA countries lie below the line and half above 
the line. Given SSA's regional variation, more disaggregated investigation at the sub-
continental level may be necessary, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Figure 3.3. Developing countries by world region: EXPY against GDP per capita  
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
3.5. Methodology and Results 
3.5.1. The Empirical Model of Export Upgrading 
Based on the review of various strands of (trade) theories, the determinants of 
developing countries' export upgrading can be generally modelled as: 
 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7 = 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh + 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑦8m𝛿	 + 𝜏𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛8 + 𝜃𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛8,7 +𝜑𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛	𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙8,7 + 𝜌𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠8,7 + 𝜔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡8,7 + 𝜆𝐹𝐷𝐼8,7 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒8,7m 𝜂 + 𝜇8 +𝛾7 + 𝜀8,7  
 𝜇8 refers to unobservable country-specific fixed effects, 𝛾7	stands for year-specific 
fixed effects, and 𝜀8,7 refers to idiosyncratic errors. 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh refers to the lagged 
export sophistication by one year. EXPY has also been treated with a lag structure 
by Kemeny (2010), Iwamoto and Nabeshima (2012), Weldemicael (2012), and 
Lectard and Rougier (2018). A country's past export sophistication is likely to impact 
on its current export sophistication. Moreover, as demonstrated by Hausmann and 
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Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et al. (2007), export upgrading is a path-dependent 
process, because externalities restrict entrepreneurship for new production activities, 
especially in developing countries. Using lagged dependent variable as regressor 
renders the model to be a dynamic one and involves some important econometric 
issues, which are discussed in Section 5.2. Appendix B gives descriptive statistics 
and data source of the variables for the 62-country panel. 
 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑦8m  is a vector of geographical variables: access to sea (Landlock) and 
remoteness (Remoteness). Remoteness is defined, following Wei (1999), as a country's 
mean distance to all other countries weighted by each country's share in the total 
world trade51. 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛8  refers to a country's export specialisation dummy, 
say major exporting country of agricultural products (AGRIs), non-fuel minerals 
(MINEs), or manufactures (MANUs). This variable is also a proxy for a country's 
natural resource endowment52. Since there are several countries that do not belong 
to any of the three specialisation groups, including three country dummies does not 
generate the "dummy trap". 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛8,7  controls for country size and labour 
endowment. In the cost discovery model by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and 
Hausmann et al. (2007), labour endowment is negatively correlated with wage costs 
and stimulates new production activities.  
 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛	𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙8,7 measures a country's human capital level, which is proxied by its 
mean years of schooling. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠8,7  represents institutional quality in the 
mainstream terms, which is proxied by the average of three variables from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database (i.e., rule of law, control of corruption, 
and regulatory quality). These three variables reflect the degree of a country's market 
                                            
51  𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠8,7 = 𝑤U,7×𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)U8 , 	𝑤U,7 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒U,7 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒W,7WU . Distance refers to the 
one between the most populous cities of two countries. 
52 Previous studies tend to use land per capita to measure natural resource endowment. However, 
land abundance may not be necessarily correlated with the abundance of natural resources and does 
not reflect the real dependence of an economy on natural resources. 
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friendliness and the government's role in guaranteeing the functioning of the market. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡8,7 measures productive investment proxied by gross capital 
formation per worker. Gross capital formation has been widely used as a proxy for 
capital accumulation (e.g., Lee and Huang, 2002; Lee, 2005; Soytas and Sari, 2006; 
Narayan and Smyth, 2008). The quantity of capital, in addition to the quality, is a 
major determinant of labour productivity and economic development (Somel, 2005; 
Lavopa and Szirmai, 2012).  
 𝐹𝐷𝐼8,7 measures FDI inflow as a share in GDP, which is a proxy for the inflow of 
external knowledge and technology. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒8,7m  is a vector of trade variables, 
including a country's trade openness (Residual Openness), the share of imports in 
medium-technology manufactures in total imports (Manu. Imports) as a proxy for 
imported technology and means of production, the share of China in total exports 
and imports (Exports to CHN and Imports from CHN), and income terms of trade vis-
à-vis China (Income TOT) as a proxy for absolute gains from trade with China. 
Different combinations of these variables, rather than all of them, are used in 
different model specifications. Residual Openness is derived, following Wei (1999), as 
the residual between a country's observed trade share in GDP and the fitted share 
based on geography, population, language, and income53. The fitted share is the so-
called "natural openness" (Frankel and Romer, 1999). According to Wei (1999), the 
"residual openness" includes the effect of trade policy on trade share, and thus can 
be used as a proxy for trade policy. Here, due to the "catch-all" feature of the "residual 
openness", trade policy is defined in a broad-sense way, including a wide range of 
                                            
53 To derive the "residual openness" of country i in year t, the following equation is estimated: 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒8,7 𝐺𝐷𝑃8,7 = 𝛽h𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠8,7 + 𝛽b𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛8,7) + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝. 𝑐.8,7 ) + 𝛽𝐸𝑛𝑔8 + 𝛽𝐹𝑅𝑁8 +𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑁8 + 𝛽𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑8 + 𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘8 + 𝜀8 + 𝜇8,7, where 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠8,7 is the same as in footnote 49.  𝐸𝑁𝐺8, 𝐹𝑅𝑁8, and 𝑆𝑃𝑁8 specifies whether country i's official language is English, French or Spanish. 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑8  and 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘8  are dummies for island countries and landlocked countries, respectively. 
This model extends the original model of Wei (1999) by adding GDP per capita to the equation and 
using panel data. As pointed by Clemens and Williamson (2011), income is the major contributor of 
trade growth. The regression results are available upon request. 
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policies that may influence trade. However, the "catch-all" feature makes the 
"residual openness" to be like a black box, because it is not clear to what extent it is 
contributed by the broad-sense trade policy rather than some unknown/unspecified 
time-variant factors. This drawback should be borne in mind.  
 
Following Kemeny (2010), Weldemicael (2012), and Zhu and Fu (2013), FDI Inflow is 
treated as an endogenous variable. However, the mechanism underlying this 
endogeneity is unlikely to be reverse causality as argued by Zhu and Fu (2013). 
Rather, the mechanism explained by Weldemicael (2012) is more realistic: factors that 
promote export upgrading may attract more FDI inflow as well, such as sound 
investment climate. However, it is difficult to find exogenous variables that are 
sufficiently correlated with FDI inflow but do not impact on export sophistication 
unless through FDI. Zhu and Fu (2013) use latitude and longitude to instrument FDI 
inflow and Weldemicael (2012) instruments FDI inflow by international capital 
control. However, these two variables are actually direct determinants of export 
sophistication. This difficulty in finding external instruments is bypassed by using 
System GMM with internal instruments. 
 
Following Cabral and Veiga (2010), Spatafora et al. (2012), and Weldemicael (2012), 
human capital is not treated as endogenous variable. First, it is unlikely that in short 
term export sophistication can influence human capital. Changes in export 
composition indeed affect the incentive and possibility to invest in education 
through Stolper-Samuelson effect or income effect. However, this influence takes 
effect with a lag. Galor and Mountford (2008) and Blanchard and Olney (2017) find 
positive impacts of exports on mean years of schooling with a lag of five or ten years, 
which excludes the possibility of an instantaneous or contemporaneous effect of 
trade on human capital. Second, unlike FDI inflow, human capital is largely 
influenced by some fundamental socio-economic factors, and thus tends not to share 
common determinants with export sophistication. 
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Finally, following Zhu and Fu (2013), GDP per capita, which measures income and 
development level, is not considered as an explanatory variable. This is because GDP 
per capita is an outcome variable as a result of a set of socio-economic factors (e.g., 
human capital, FDI inflow, trade, institutions, and investment) rather than an input 
variable. In other words, GDP per capita per se does not have explanatory power. 
Thus, if GDP per capita is included in the model, then its effect on export 
sophistication is a spurious one, serving as a proxy for the effects of other variables.  
 
3.5.2. Empirical Strategy of Dynamic Linear Model 
Introducing lagged export sophistication as explanatory variable invalidates 
standard static panel regression, due to the "dynamic panel bias" (Nickell, 1981). 
After eliminating the country-specific fixed effects by first differencing, the first-
differenced lagged dependent variable (△ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh ≡ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gb) is still 
correlated with the first-differenced idiosyncratic error term (△ 𝜀8,7 ≡ 𝜀8,7 − 𝜀8,7gh), 
because 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh  is correlated with 𝜀8,7gh . This raises the endogeneity problem, 
and static estimation will generate biased and inconsistent results. The bias is subject 
to an order of 1 𝑇 and tends to disappear if the time dimension approaches infinity 
(Baltagi, 2008). Asteriou and Hall (2011) suggest that adding exogenous regressors 
can reduce the bias, provided that the time dimension T is large. However, as shown 
by Judson and Owen (1999), the bias only decreases from 50% of the true value to 
20%, which is still a significant level, if the time dimension substantially increases 
from 5 to 30. Given that the database of this chapter has only 20 time points/years, 
this bias is believed to be a problem. 
 
This "dynamic panel bias" can be solved by System GMM estimation, which has 
been used in export sophistication studies by Kemeny (2010), Weldemicael (2012), 
Zhu and Fu (2013), and Lectard and Rougier (2018). System GMM (Arellano and 
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Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is an augmented version of the earlier 
Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In order to address the "dynamic panel 
bias", Arellano and Bond (1991) eliminate individual-specific fixed effects by first 
differencing and then suggest to use the lagged dependent variable from the time 
point t-2 onward (in our case, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gb , 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7g ,......) as instruments for the 
lagged first differenced dependent variable (∆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh ) in the first differenced 
equation. The second and the subsequent higher-order lagged dependent variables 
(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gb , 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7g ,......) meet the requirement of a valid instrument variable 
because they are correlated with △ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh ≡ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gb  and 
uncorrelated with △ 𝜀8,7 ≡ 𝜀8,7 − 𝜀8,7gh. The lagged dependent variable is seen as a 
predetermined variable, which is correlated only with past idiosyncratic errors. 
Other predetermined and endogenous independent variables follow this approach 
to be instrumented as well. 
 
However, Difference GMM is subject to the weak instrument problem because the 
lagged level variables tend to be only weakly correlated with the instrumented 
lagged first-differenced variable, especially if the variable is subject to strong 
persistence across time (Blundell and Bond, 1998). System GMM (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) solves this problem by introducing the level 
equation and building an equation system by combining moment conditions for the 
differenced equation and those for the level equation. In the level equation, lagged 
first-differenced dependent variables (in our case, △ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh, △ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gb,......) are 
used as instruments of the lagged level dependent variable (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7gh ), and the 
treatment for the first-differenced equation is the same as in Difference GMM. The 
correlation between lagged differenced variables and the level variable is believed 
to be stronger than that between lagged level variables and the differenced variable. 
System GMM has been proved by simulation exercises to be more efficient, more 
precise, more consistent, and less subject to finite-sample and downward bias, in 
comparison with Difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 2000; Blundell, Bond, and 
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Windmeijer, 2001; Bond, Hoefller, and Temple, 2001; Bond, 2002; Windmeijer, 2005).  
 
Roodman (2006) argues that both Difference GMM and System GMM are 
particularly suitable for small-T and large-N panel database with dynamic 
dependent variable, predetermined and/or endogenous independent variables, 
individual fixed effects, heterogeneity, and serial correlation within individuals 
across time. As all instruments are generated from the model itself, rather than from 
outside of the model, lagged level and differenced variables in System GMM are 
"internal instruments". This has significant empirical importance. One of the major 
concerns in econometric analysis is the difficulty in finding a valid exogenous 
variable to instrument the endogenous variable, the so-called "external instrument". 
A valid instrumental variable should be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous 
variable, be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term, and impacts on the 
dependent variable only through its impact on the endogenous variable. However, 
it is quite difficult to find variables that meet these conditions, especially the last one. 
The use of lagged variable as "internal instrument" bypasses this difficulty. Actually, 
the superiority of System GMM is not confined within the alleviation of the difficulty 
in finding instruments. With Monte Carlo simulations, Kočenda and Poghosyan 
(2018) demonstrate that GMM-type estimators have better bias properties than 
traditional instrumental variable regressions and fixed-effects regressions in 
examining the determinants of export sophistication. 
 
Valid System GMM estimation is established on several conditions. First, in order to 
obtain consistent estimation on the lagged dependent variable, which is used as 
regressor, the idiosyncratic error term should have first order serial correlation but 
not have second order serial correlation. That is to say, the Arellano-Bond test for the 
first order serial correlation, AR(1), should reject the null hypothesis, while the test 
for the second order serial correlation, AR(2), should not reject the null. Moreover, 
Roodman (2006) argues that the absence of cross-individual correlation in the 
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idiosyncratic error term is a critical condition for the Arellano-Bond serial correlation 
test and robust estimations on coefficients' standard errors. He suggests that time 
dummy helps to make this condition hold. Thus, year dummy is always used in the 
following regressions. 
 
The second condition is the exogeneity and validity of instruments. The Hansen 
overidentification test examines the null hypothesis of the joint validity of 
instruments, and the Difference-in-Hansen test examines the null hypothesis of the 
validity of each subset of instruments. Despite being robust to heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation (unlike the Sargan test), the Hansen test is not robust to the 
weak instrument problem that is generated by including too many instruments. This 
problem, coined as "instrument proliferation", leads to false acceptance of the null 
hypothesis with the unrealistic p-value of 1.000 (Roodman, 2009). This phenomenon 
is called as under-rejection (Anderson and Sørensen, 1996) or zero rejection 
frequencies (Bowsher, 2002). Thus, in order to obtain valid result for the Hansen test, 
as suggested by Roodman (2009), the number of instruments must be lower than the 
number of groups/cross sections (in our case, the number of countries). Without 
cautious control, it is easy to break this rule of thumb in System GMM estimation 
because in System GMM (and actually Difference GMM as well) all lags starting 
from the first or the second order may in theory be used as instruments54. This 
problem is especially severe under large time dimensions, because the number of 
instrument is quadratic in time dimension (Roodman, 2006). Given that the number 
of predetermined and/or endogenous variables is usually determined by theory or 
experience without discretionary space and the time dimension is fixed, the 
instrument proliferation problem may be avoided only by restricting the length of 
lags as instruments or collapsing the instrument set into a single column for all time 
                                            
54  In the first-differenced equation, instrument starts from the second lag of (level-form) 
regressors. In the level equation, instrument starts from the first lag of (difference-form) 
regressors. 
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points. The following regressions use the "collapsing" method55. 
 
Finally, in carrying out System GMM, Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard 
errors (Windmeijer, 2005) with two-step estimation are used. Cameron and Trivedi 
(2010) suggest that two-step System GMM estimation outperforms one-step 
estimation in asymptotical efficiency. In theory, standard errors generated by two-
step estimation are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlations in 
idiosyncratic error term. However, as pointed by Bond et al. (2001), finite sample 
leads to downward-biased estimates on standard errors even under two-step 
estimation. In order to deal with this discrepancy between theory and practice, 
Windmeijer (2005) suggests to make finite-sample corrections on the standard errors 
in two-step estimation. 
 
3.5.3. Results 
Two sets of regressions on export sophistication are carried out. The first set concerns 
the aforementioned direct impact of China through the quantity side of developing 
countries' exports to and imports from China. This corresponds to the approach in 
existing studies on China's impact of crowding-out and re-primarisation. China's 
differential impacts on different groups of developing countries are examined by 
including interaction terms. Interaction regression is preferred to split-sample 
regression, because the number of observations in each country group is not large 
enough to avoid the problem of instrument proliferation. The second set of 
regressions concerns the indirect impact of China through developing countries' 
income terms of trade vis-à-vis China, examining whether absolute gains from trade 
with China promote developing countries' export upgrading. Importantly, we use 
mediation analysis to explore whether the effect of income terms of trade on export 
                                            
55 This is realised by using the "collapse" option under the Stata command xtabond2. 
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upgrading takes effect through their effect on productive investment.  
 
Baseline regressions are based on data from 1995 to 2014. Because consecutive data 
on institutional quality from the WGI database are only available from 2002, the two 
sets of regressions are repeated with the institutional quality variable for a shorter 
period from 2002 to 2014. As China's trade with developing countries has rapidly 
grown since the early 2000s, the period of 2002 to 2014 is of great relevance. Actually, 
the short-period regressions can also serve as a robustness check. Another 
robustness check is concerned with the potential lagged effects of productive 
investment, income terms of trade, FDI inflow, and trade policy, by using the lagged 
forms of these variables. This treatment also further excludes the possibility of 
reverse causality. The last robustness check concerns the impact of global value chain 
(GVC). All regressions include year dummies, which control for linear time trend 
and country-invariant but time-variant common shocks (e.g., the global trade 
slowdown and the 2007-2008 crisis). Finally, panel unit-root test has shown the 
stationarity of the data. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the first set of regressions. The System GMM regressions are valid 
as shown by the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, Hansen test, and Difference-in-Hansen tests 
(not shown in table for the sake of space). Lagged EXPY is statistically significant at 
the 1% or 5% level in all specifications, indicating the path dependence of 
developing countries' export upgrading. Neglecting this lagged dependent variable 
will compound the effect of other variables with the path-dependent effect. The 
Landlock dummy has significantly negative coefficients in all but Column 5. 
Population has positive impact in half of the specifications. Remoteness has significant 
coefficient in half of the specifications, with small but negative impact. Human 
Capital has significant positive effect at the 1% level in all specifications. A one-
standard-deviation increase in Human Capital (5.4 and 5.7 years of schooling for 
1995-2014 and 2002-2014) raises EXPY by on average 6.7% for 1995-2014 or 7.5% for 
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2002-2014. Productive Investment is significant at the 1% level in all columns. A one-
standard-deviation increase in Productive Investment increases EXPY by on average 
7.4% for 1995-2014 and 9.8% for 2002-2014. An increase in Residual Openness by one 
standard deviation increases EXPY by approximately 1.7% for 1995-2014 and 2.7% 
for 2002-2014. However, considering that the within-country variation of variables 
significantly varies across countries, the interpretation based on changes in one 
standard deviation should be treated cautiously. FDI Inflow and Institutions are not 
statistically significant in any specifications.  
 
How trade with China has directly impacted on EXPY? Columns 1-2 concern 
developing countries as a whole. Imports from CHN is not significant, and Exports to 
CHN has quite small significantly negative effect in Column 1. Columns 3-6 examine 
whether China's impact varies across country groups by adding interaction terms 
between Exports to (Imports from) CHN and the export specialisation dummy. Imports 
from CHN increases EXPY of major exporting countries of agricultural products 
(AGRIs countries), as shown by the relatively large positive coefficients of the 
interaction term (AGRIs×ImpCHN). The coefficients of Imports from CHN in Columns 
3-4, which represent the impact of Imports from CHN on MANUs and MINEs 
countries, are insignificant, because, as shown in the following, Imports from CHN 
has opposite impacts on these two country groups. Imports from CHN reduces EXPY 
of major exporting countries of manufactures (MANUs countries) but increases it 
for other countries, because negative coefficients of the interaction term 
(MANUs× ImpCHN, -0.00547 and -0.00530) significantly outnumber the positive 
coefficients of Imports from CHN (0.00296 and 0.00339). Exports to CHN only shows 
possible interaction effect for MANUs countries, with significant large positive 
coefficients of the interaction term (MANUs×ExpCHN) but insignificant small 
negative coefficients of the main effect. The actual impact of imports from China and 
exports to China is quite limited. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the share of imports from China reduces MANUs countries' export sophistication by 
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2.2% for 1995-2014 and 1.7% for 2002-2014. A concern about reverse causality may 
be raised due to the fact that as a country has increased its export sophistication it 
may be engaged more in trade in task with China. However, this should not be a 
problem, because, except Vietnam and the Philippines, other countries in the sample 
have quite small share of China in their foreign value added in exports. 
 
Table 3.3. System GMM: direct channel of China's influence 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXPY 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 
Lagged EXPY 0.363*** 0.262** 0.352*** 0.252** 0.337*** 0.270** 0.360*** 0.258** 
 (0.0823) (0.115) (0.0852) (0.115) (0.0804) (0.115) (0.0949) (0.113) 
Landlock -0.0473* -0.0932** -0.0557** -0.0879** -0.0467 -0.0749* -0.0549* -0.0907** 
 (0.0272) (0.0383) (0.0277) (0.0342) (0.0329) (0.0407) (0.0311) (0.0370) 
Population 0.0262* 0.0238 0.0283* 0.0273 0.0329** 0.0298 0.0429*** 0.0383* 
 (0.0150) (0.0195) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0163) (0.0235) (0.0160) (0.0198) 
Remoteness -0.000340 -0.000461 -0.00048* -0.00053* -0.00062** -0.000325 -0.000414 -0.00060** 
 (0.00027) (0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00027) (0.00030) (0.00030) 
Human Capital 0.0218*** 0.0253*** 0.0213*** 0.0247*** 0.0257*** 0.0253*** 0.0259*** 0.0287*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00695) (0.00528) (0.00654) (0.00492) (0.00646) (0.00560) (0.00718) 
Institutions  -0.0221  -0.0368  -0.0213  -0.0297 
  (0.0322)  (0.0356)  (0.0344)  (0.0358) 
Productive Investment 0.0482*** 0.0692*** 0.0526*** 0.0730*** 0.0553*** 0.0771*** 0.0632*** 0.0797*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0201) (0.0147) (0.0207) (0.0129) (0.0197) (0.0152) (0.0219) 
Residual Openness 0.122** 0.210*** 0.133** 0.214*** 0.137** 0.222*** 0.140*** 0.194** 
 (0.0491) (0.0751) (0.0531) (0.0763) (0.0570) (0.0825) (0.0525) (0.0778) 
Manu. Imports 0.000233 -0.000317 -0.000980 -0.00151 -0.00151 -0.000380 -0.00381* -0.00285 
 (0.00189) (0.00243) (0.00186) (0.00246) (0.00189) (0.00306) (0.00214) (0.00278) 
Imports from CHN 0.00152 0.00162 -0.00102 -0.000221 0.00296*** 0.00339** 0.00170 0.00135 
 (0.00142) (0.00175) (0.00145) (0.00153) (0.00109) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00171) 
AGRIs×ImpCHN   0.00491*** 0.00425*     
   (0.00190) (0.00245)     
MANUs×ImpCHN     -0.00547** -0.00530*   
     (0.00268) (0.00308)   
MINEs×ImpCHN       -0.000871 0.00186 
       (0.00205) (0.00264) 
Exports to CHN -0.00144* -0.00115 -0.000447 -0.000563 -0.00100 -0.00173 -0.00342* -0.00388 
 (0.00086) (0.00106) (0.00077) (0.00097) (0.00077) (0.00114) (0.00207) (0.00269) 
AGRIs×ExpCHN   -0.00284 -0.00339     
   (0.00221) (0.00274)     
MANUs×ExpCHN     0.00620* 0.00925*   
     (0.00376) (0.00553)   
MINEs×ExpCHN       0.00298 0.00324 
       (0.00217) (0.00287) 
FDI Inflow 0.000946 -0.000461 0.00118 -0.000194 0.00147 -0.000542 0.00107 0.000147 
 (0.00238) (0.00291) (0.00216) (0.00249) (0.00229) (0.00347) (0.00220) (0.00244) 
AGRIs -0.0631* -0.0749** -0.131*** -0.101**     
 (0.0326) (0.0372) (0.0392) (0.0426)     
MANUs 0.0715** 0.0185   0.114*** 0.0961**   
 (0.0343) (0.0416)   (0.0386) (0.0477)   
MINEs 0.0511 -0.0259     0.0303 -0.0548 
 (0.0402) (0.0453)     (0.0444) (0.0486) 
Constant 5.497*** 6.620*** 5.960*** 6.932*** 5.532*** 6.248*** 5.704*** 6.601*** 
 (0.939) (1.121) (1.004) (1.180) (0.840) (1.075) (1.079) (1.118) 
Observations 1018 687 1018 687 1018 687 1018 687 
Groups 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Instruments 37 31 37 31 37 31 37 31 
AR(1) 0.00147 0.00271 0.00152 0.00285 0.00131 0.00167 0.00160 0.00277 
AR(2) 0.820 0.403 0.882 0.430 0.831 0.426 0.813 0.397 
Hansen Test (p) 0.950 0.471 0.945 0.526 0.983 0.424 0.926 0.545 
Diff.-in-Hansen Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
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Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In summary, major exporting countries of manufactures tend to be affected by China 
in an opposite way in contrast to major exporting countries of agricultural products. 
The positive influence of imports from China on major exporting countries of 
agricultural products may indicate the positive effect of imported technology and 
capital goods or a welfare-enhancing effect of cheap imported manufactures, 
whereas the negative impact of imports from China (mainly manufactures) on major 
exporting countries of manufactures indicates a kind of crowding-out. The positive 
effect of exports to China on major exporting countries of manufactures lends 
support to the positive role of manufactured exports in export upgrading. Moreover, 
the insignificant effect of exports to China on developing countries specialising in 
agricultural products and non-fuel minerals indicates the absence of re-
primarisation. 
 
Next, we shift the interest to China's indirect influence through developing 
countries' monetary gains from trade with China. This entails a two-step causality 
chain from income terms of trade vis-à-vis China (gains from trade) to productive 
investment (step one) and then from productive investment to export upgrading 
(step two), in addition to any direct and independent contribution of income terms 
of trade to export upgrading. In other words, productive investment may act as a 
mediator that channels (part of) the effect of gains from trade with China to export 
upgrading.  
 
The concept of mediation effect is borrowed from the psychology literature. 
Assuming Income TOT (income terms of trade vis-à-vis China) as the independent 
variable, Productive Investment as the mediator variable, and EXPY as the outcome 
variable, following Baron and Kenny (1986), Productive Investment acts as the 
mediator between Income TOT and EXPY, if: 
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   (1) its variations are significantly explained by Income TOT; 
   (2) Income TOT significantly explains variations of EXPY; 
   (3) after controlling for Productive Investment, the effect of Income TOT on EXPY 
turns to be insignificant or weaker.  
 
This method has been used by Busse, Erdogan, and Mühlen (2016) in examining the 
mediation effect of investment in the causality from FDI and trade to economic 
growth. Three regressions should be implemented for testing this mediation effect: 
regression (1) of Productive Investment on Income TOT, regression (2) of EXPY on 
Income TOT without controlling for Productive Investment, and regression (3) of EXPY 
on Income TOT and Productive Investment together. For a mediation effect to hold, 
coefficients of Income TOT and Productive Investment in regressions (1) and (2) should 
be significant with expected signs, the coefficient of Income TOT in regression (3) 
should be smaller or insignificant in comparison with that in regression (2), and the 
coefficient of Productive Investment should be significant in regression (3). Table 3.4 
shows results for regression (1) of Productive Investment on Income TOT. Explanatory 
variables are drawn from the literature on gross capital formation. Income TOT has 
highly significant positive effect on Productive Investment, supporting condition (1). 
 
Table 3.4. Mediator test: income terms of trade and productive investment 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive Investment 1995-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 2002-2014 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate 0.00833** 0.00596 0.00872* 0.00697 
 (0.00353) (0.00480) (0.00463) (0.00580) 
FDI Inflow 0.0175*** 0.0141** 0.0154** 0.0140** 
 (0.00570) (0.00597) (0.00610) (0.00631) 
External Debt 0.000148 -9.46e-06 2.86e-05 3.53e-05 
 (0.000257) (0.000193) (0.000180) (0.000186) 
Exchange rate -2.94e-05 -3.79e-05 -3.49e-05 -2.47e-05 
 (2.88e-05) (2.39e-05) (2.90e-05) (3.64e-05) 
Interest Rate  -0.00171  -0.00268 
  (0.00227)  (0.00274) 
Income TOT 0.0467*** 0.0468*** 0.0563*** 0.0520** 
 (0.0127) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0209) 
Financial Development* 0.0133*** 0.0126*** 0.0121*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.00155) (0.00175) (0.00186) (0.00225) 
Gross Saving % of GDP 0.0177*** 0.0138** 0.0122** 0.0109* 
 (0.00575) (0.00569) (0.00600) (0.00606) 
Constant 4.908*** 5.096*** 4.953*** 5.093*** 
 (0.121) (0.163) (0.188) (0.221) 
Observations 868 664 610 508 
Number of Countries 53 48 53 47 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.517 0.447 0.410 0.349 
    Fixed-effects regression: robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
      *Financial Development is measured by domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP. 
 
Table 3.5 shows regressions (2) and (3). In Columns 1 and 3, Income TOT significantly 
increases EXPY at the 1% level. A one-standard-deviation increase in Income TOT 
raises EXPY by 3.8% and 5.1% for 1995-2014 and 2002-2014, respectively. Having 
controlled for Productive Investment, Income TOT becomes marginally insignificant 
(p-value=0.102) in Column 2 and its significance decreases from the 1% level in 
Column 3 to the 5% level in Column 4. Accordingly, the coefficients decrease from 
0.0113 to 0.00659 and from 0.0179 to 0.0129 for the two periods, respectively. Thus, 
condition (2) and (3) hold, supporting the mediation effect of Productive Investment 
between Income TOT and EXPY. Interestingly, the impact of Income TOT on export 
sophistication is stronger during the period of 2002-2014, which coincides with 
China's commodity boom and its strong performance in manufactured exports. 
Table 3.6 concerns the potential differential impacts of Income TOT across country 
groups by introducing interaction terms between Income TOT and export 
specialisation dummy. However, no interaction effects are found.  
 
Table 3.5. System GMM (mediation analysis): indirect channel of China's influence 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EXPY 1995-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 2002-2014 
Lagged EXPY 0.335*** 0.344*** 0.263** 0.260** 
 (0.0788) (0.0787) (0.103) (0.108) 
Landlock -0.0766** -0.0384 -0.106** -0.0818* 
 (0.0306) (0.0301) (0.0451) (0.0426) 
Population -0.000924 0.0227 -0.0105 0.00907 
 (0.0139) (0.0159) (0.0184) (0.0197) 
Remoteness -0.000172 -0.000253 -0.000161 -0.000346 
 (0.000312) (0.000302) (0.000357) (0.000319) 
Human Capital 0.0291*** 0.0234*** 0.0310*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.00533) (0.00487) (0.00791) (0.00714) 
Institutions   0.0275 -0.0258 
   (0.0368) (0.0340) 
Productive Investment  0.0510***  0.0617*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0183) 
Income TOT 0.0113*** 0.00659 0.0179*** 0.0129** 
 (0.00393) (0.00404) (0.00652) (0.00585) 
Residual Openness 0.0662 0.125** 0.0979 0.184** 
 (0.0629) (0.0497) (0.0769) (0.0773) 
Manu. Imports 0.000875 -0.00106 -0.0000663 -0.00190 
 (0.00177) (0.00181) (0.00235) (0.00229) 
FDI Inflow 0.00120 0.00161 0.00108 -0.000634 
 (0.00205) (0.00229) (0.00302) (0.00282) 
AGRIs -0.0565* -0.0521 -0.0691* -0.0719** 
 (0.0304) (0.0321) (0.0362) (0.0346) 
MANUs 0.123*** 0.0720** 0.0904** 0.0266 
 (0.0326) (0.0318) (0.0423) (0.0348) 
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MINEs 0.00423 0.00236 -0.0417 -0.0659 
 (0.0353) (0.0327) (0.0433) (0.0412) 
Constant 6.031*** 5.528*** 6.843*** 6.633*** 
 (0.935) (0.948) (1.189) (1.106) 
Observations 1003 976 665 654 
Groups 57 56 57 56 
Instruments 35 36 29 30 
AR(1) 0.000715 0.00166 0.00203 0.00255 
AR(2) 0.904 0.906 0.481 0.470 
Hansen Test (p) 0.956 0.967 0.676 0.633 
Diff.-in-Hansen Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.6. System GMM with interactions: indirect channel of China's influence 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EXPY 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 
Lagged EXPY 0.340*** 0.258** 0.342*** 0.256** 0.340*** 0.273*** 
 (0.0818) (0.106) (0.0824) (0.110) (0.0896) (0.105) 
Landlock -0.0533* -0.0881** -0.0315 -0.0756* -0.0481 -0.0841* 
 (0.0307) (0.0426) (0.0318) (0.0453) (0.0347) (0.0451) 
Population 0.0333** 0.0222 0.0239 0.00775 0.0363** 0.0210 
 (0.0154) (0.0207) (0.0160) (0.0219) (0.0156) (0.0193) 
Remoteness -0.000428 -0.000456 -0.000233 -0.000239 -0.000411 -0.000399 
 (0.000338) (0.000350) (0.000301) (0.000322) (0.000341) (0.000334) 
Human Capital 0.0235*** 0.0254*** 0.0258*** 0.0283*** 0.0268*** 0.0286*** 
 (0.00517) (0.00663) (0.00519) (0.00719) (0.00516) (0.00733) 
Institutions  -0.0189  -0.0332  -0.0304 
  (0.0361)  (0.0371)  (0.0379) 
Productive Investment 0.0612*** 0.0679*** 0.0523*** 0.0611*** 0.0696*** 0.0749*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0189) (0.0108) (0.0173) (0.0128) (0.0203) 
Income TOT 0.00117 0.00759 0.00865 0.00738 0.00761 0.0139** 
 (0.00471) (0.00791) (0.00580) (0.00922) (0.00477) (0.00626) 
AGRIs×ITOT 0.00518 0.00120     
 (0.00717) (0.0124)     
MANUs×ITOT   0.000199 0.0132   
   (0.00727) (0.0140)   
MINEs×ITOT     -0.0122 -0.0138 
     (0.00761) (0.00899) 
Residual Openness 0.149*** 0.198*** 0.127** 0.176** 0.170*** 0.195** 
 (0.0539) (0.0758) (0.0495) (0.0771) (0.0541) (0.0801) 
Manu. Imports -0.00219 -0.00289 -0.00211 -0.00178 -0.00421** -0.00409 
 (0.00193) (0.00262) (0.00185) (0.00271) (0.00213) (0.00273) 
FDI Inflow 0.00126 -0.000659 0.00178 -0.000336 0.00128 -0.000645 
 (0.00233) (0.00268) (0.00225) (0.00268) (0.00222) (0.00257) 
AGRIs -0.126 -0.0768     
 (0.0780) (0.130)     
MANUs   0.0910 -0.0546   
   (0.0734) (0.142)   
MINEs     0.132 0.121 
     (0.0820) (0.101) 
Constant 5.761*** 6.674*** 5.441*** 6.475*** 5.563*** 6.329*** 
 (1.061) (1.134) (0.942) (1.121) (1.087) (1.070) 
Observations 976 654 976 654 976 654 
Groups 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Instruments 35 29 35 29 35 29 
AR(1) 0.00206 0.00280 0.00160 0.00262 0.00186 0.00210 
AR(2) 0.886 0.455 0.903 0.455 0.868 0.458 
Hansen Test (p) 0.938 0.639 0.972 0.713 0.928 0.665 
Diff.-in-Hansen Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7 gives results for the robustness check with lag structure. FDI Inflow, Manu. 
Imports, Residual Openness, Productive Investment, and Income TOT are lagged by one 
year. Results for Human Capital, Productive Investment and its mediation effect, and 
Income TOT do not show any qualitative differences in comparison with previous 
regressions. FDI Inflow and Institutions still do not show statistical significance.  
 
Table 3.7. System GMM with lag structure: indirect channel of China's influence 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EXPY 1995-2014 1995-2014 2002-2014 2002-2014 
Lagged EXPY 0.426*** 0.447*** 0.346*** 0.304*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0795) (0.110) (0.0714) 
Landlock -0.0274 -0.0445 -0.0221 -0.0791** 
 (0.0508) (0.0308) (0.0851) (0.0358) 
Population -0.0571* 0.0140 -0.0844* 0.0126 
 (0.0292) (0.0158) (0.0432) (0.0165) 
Remoteness 0.000377 -0.000181 0.000166 -0.000327 
 (0.000456) (0.000262) (0.000590) (0.000300) 
Human Capital 0.0127* 0.0183*** 0.0179* 0.0226*** 
 (0.00749) (0.00437) (0.0102) (0.00535) 
Institutions   -0.0281 -0.0227 
   (0.0646) (0.0310) 
Lagged  
Productive Investment  0.0409
***  0.0583*** 
  (0.0111)  (0.0173) 
Lagged  
Income TOT 0.0567
** 0.00559 0.0820** 0.00980* 
 (0.0243) (0.00380) (0.0345) (0.00545) 
Lagged  
Residual Openness 0.000556 0.100
** -0.0156 0.145** 
 (0.0899) (0.0457) (0.135) (0.0699) 
Lagged  
Manu. Imports -0.00157 -0.0000140 -0.00355 -0.000912 
 (0.00328) (0.00161) (0.00539) (0.00214) 
Lagged  
FDI Inflow 0.00163 -0.000202 0.00117 0.000129 
 (0.00245) (0.00177) (0.00273) (0.00141) 
AGRIs 0.00823 -0.0480 0.0114 -0.0681** 
 (0.0634) (0.0294) (0.0864) (0.0327) 
MANUs 0.185*** 0.0530* 0.208* 0.0181 
 (0.0651) (0.0287) (0.107) (0.0342) 
MINEs -0.0403 -0.00702 -0.0924 -0.0546 
 (0.0750) (0.0324) (0.0986) (0.0363) 
Constant 4.860*** 4.698*** 6.132*** 6.192*** 
 (1.049) (0.916) (1.541) (0.842) 
Observations 973 973 653 653 
Number of Groups 56 56 56 56 
Number of Instruments 35 36 29 30 
AR(1) 0.000513 0.000649 0.00173 0.000505 
AR(2) 0.921 0.994 0.652 0.469 
Hansen Test (p) 0.307 0.286 0.316 0.614 
Diff.-in-Hansen Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Finally, how has global value chain (GVC) influenced export upgrading? Deeper 
engagement in GVC induces more trade in task, especially in relatively technology-
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intensive intermediate goods, which increases export sophistication. However, with 
a few exceptions such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Lebanon, the countries in our 
sample tend not to be active in trade in task. As a further robustness check, all 
regressions are replicated with adding the GVC variable of the share of foreign value 
added in exports from the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database, but the results do not 
show qualitative differences. Moreover, because seven countries that are missing in 
the UNCTAD-Eora database have to be dropped, we have chosen not to include the 
GVC variable in the models. Results with the GVC variable are available upon 
request.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Historical experience of economic catch-ups, especially the case of late 
industrialisers, has demonstrated the role of export upgrading as a precondition of 
development. Thus, it is of importance and relevance to understand the mechanism 
underlying the upgrading of developing countries' export basket. However, 
empirical explorations into this issue have been insufficient. Moreover, the rise of 
China as an increasingly important trade partner for developing countries has made 
it a new factor influencing developing countries' export upgrading. Given the 
research gap, this paper examines the determinants of developing countries' export 
upgrading from 1995 to 2014 with a particular interest in the role of trade with China 
and productive investment.  
 
This chapter examines the determinants of developing countries' export upgrading, 
measured by export sophistication, from 1995 to 2014 with a particular interest in 
the role of trade with China and productive investment. This chapter finds that, 
amongst general factors, access to sea, human capital, productive investment, and 
trade openness are the major determinants of developing countries' export 
upgrading. Landlocked location substantially impedes export upgrading, which 
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implies that some developing countries are doomed to be at a disadvantageous 
position of industrialisation and structural transformation, a "curse of geography". 
However, improving human capital, accumulating productive investment, and 
promoting trade openness definitely stimulate export upgrading. The robust and 
strong positive effect of productive investment lends support to the hypothesis by 
Lo (2016) that insufficient productive investment leads to the poor performance of 
developing countries' manufactured exports. The policy implication is clear. In order 
to promote export upgrading, developing countries should have strong and 
accountable political and social agents, especially the state, that can appropriately 
conceptualise their roles in the development agenda and are able to direct the 
economy to a path of industrialisation and structural transformation. Their roles 
may operate via investing in education, accumulating productive investment, 
translating productive investment into technological and productive upgrading, 
and promoting trade openness. A special note should be given to the last point. 
Promoting trade openness is not necessarily related to trade regime neutrality and 
laissez-faire trade policy. Rather, the experience of the Asian Tigers provides an 
alternative example of export-led model in which the developmental state plays a 
decisive role. 
 
Absolute gains from trade with China, reflecting on improvement in income terms 
of trade vis-à-vis China, are found to promote developing countries' export 
upgrading, which takes effect largely through the role of trade with China as a 
source of productive investment. This effect is particularly strong and robust in the 
period of 2002-2014, during which China showed rapidly growing role in the global 
economy, especially through the commodity boom and the strong performance in 
manufactured exports. This finding echoes the suggestion of Gottschalk and Prates 
(2006) that developing countries should grasp the "windfalls" of the current 
commodity boom and channel revenues from resource exports to productive 
investment. Moreover, this finding provides a new perspective to understand 
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China's role in developing countries' industrialisation and development. The 
conventional arguments of the "crowding-out" effect and the "re-primarisation" 
effect are concerned with the direct channel through which China's cheap 
manufactured exports compete with developing countries' counterparts and China's 
import demand induces developing countries to specialise or re-specialise in 
primary commodities. However, the literature neglects an indirect channel through 
which monetary benefits from trade with China accruing to developing countries 
can serve as a source of productive investment for their export upgrading. This 
chapter points to the need to distinguish between the direct and the indirect channel 
of the impact of trade with China on developing countries. Based on the findings, 
we suggest that, for developing countries, China serves more as a stimulator of 
capital accumulation than a competitor in manufacturing market or a predator of 
natural resources. 
 
Finally, the effects of labour endowment, FDI inflow, and institutional quality shown 
by previous studies are basically rejected. A very likely reason is the use of only 
developing countries as sample in this chapter. Developing countries tend to feature 
excessive but low-skilled labour force, and thus larger population or richer labour 
endowment is not necessarily a cost advantage for the cost discovery process of new 
production activities as suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann 
et al. (2007). FDI going to many developing countries concentrates on extractive 
sectors or, more generally speaking, natural resource sectors, and thus tends not to 
stimulate export upgrading. The absence of institutional quality in the mainstream 
terms as a contributor to export upgrading may imply that market-friendly 
institutional arrangement may not necessarily promote industrial development in 
developing countries, because state intervention and some market-unfriendly 
measures are necessary for industrialisation. This echoes the experience of the East 
Asian model and justifies the developmental state. For another thing, the absence of 
the effect of institutions indicates that institutional quality in the mainstream sense 
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is like a black box with a vague role. It is unclear how institutions influence 
productive activities and technological progress, because the influence may take 
effect through either a better planning of production or a better functioning of the 
market. These two aspects are even not fully mutually compatible. Moreover, from 
a sociological perspective, industrialisation is socially-determined process, which 
reflects the motivations and interests of various political and social agents, such as 
the state and entrepreneurs. Historical experience has demonstrated that all 
industrialisations are intrinsically up-to-down and profit- or interest-driven 
revolutions initiated by elite agents, such as entrepreneurs and politicians (Moore, 
1966; Kiely, 1998). In this sense, these agents' motivations and interests may have a 
more important role to play in the industrialisation process than the so-called 
"institutional quality". This conforms to the centrality of strong and 
developmentally-oriented elites in the developmentalist model of industrialisation 
and development (Leftwich, 1995). Thus, the absence of institutions as a contributor 
to developing countries' export upgrading may not be read as a surprise. 
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Appendix A. Recent Studies on China's Impact on Developing Countries 
Table A1. Summary of recent studies on China's impact on developing countries 
Paper Theme Methodology Relevant Findings 
Busse, Erdogan 
and Mühlen 
(2016) 
The impact of China's 
trade, FDI, and aid on 
African countries' 
growth (1991-2010) 
Direct Impact56 
 
Fixed-effects 
regression and 
System GMM 
regression 
1. Imports from China modestly reduce 
African countries' GDP p.c. growth, 
implying displacement effect. 
2. Improvement in terms of trade 
increases African countries' GDP p.c. 
growth, implying benefits from resource 
exports to China. 
3. Revenues from exports to China 
increase investment. 
4. Exports to China and FDI from China 
do not matter. 
Drummond and 
Liu (2013) 
The impact of China's 
domestic investment 
on Africa's export 
growth 
(1995-2012) 
Fixed-effects 
regression 
1. Growing trade links between China 
and Africa make Africa susceptible to 
China's domestic volatility. 
2. China's domestic fixed assets 
investment growth stimulates Africa's 
export growth. 
3. The effect is stronger for resource-rich 
African countries. 
Kummer-
Noormamode 
(2014) 
The impact of trade 
with China on SSA's 
growth (1985-2012) 
Direct Impact 
 
Fixed-effects 
regression 
1. Trade with China does not have impact 
on SSA countries' GDP p.c. growth 
between 1985 and 1999. 
2. Trade with China increases SSA 
countries' GDP p.c. growth between 2000 
and 2012. 
                                            
56  The "Direct Impact" and "Indirect Impact" are defined as China's impact on developing 
countries in their home market and in third market, respectively, according to Kaplinsky (2009). 
These concepts are irrelevant to the "direct channel" and "indirect channel" of China's impact on 
developing countries defined in this chapter. 
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3. The effect of trade with China is greater 
than that of trade with EU between 2000 
and 2012. 
He (2013) The impact of 
manufactured imports 
from China on SSA's 
manufactured exports 
(1988-2005) 
Direct Impact 
Random-effects 
regression and IV 
regression 
(sectoral level) 
1. Manufactured imports in each sector 
from China increase SSA countries' 
manufactured exports in corresponding 
sector. 
2. Manufactured imports from the US and 
France hardly have significant impact. 
3. Capital goods from China are more 
suitable for SSA countries than those from 
developed countries for their export 
upgrading.  
Fu, Zhang, and 
Kaplinsky (2012) 
The impact of China 
on developing 
countries' export unit 
value in developed 
market (1989-2006) 
Indirect Impact 
 
System GMM 
regression 
(HS 8-digit) 
1. China's impact on medium-income 
countries takes effect through price 
competition. 
2. China's impact on low-income 
countries takes effect through market 
expansion. 
3. After 1997, medium-income countries 
lost most due to China's exports, while 
before 1997 low-income countries lost 
most. 
4. Price competition due to China has 
been decreasing. 
Baliamoune-
Lutz (2011) 
The growth effect of 
Africa's trade with 
China (1995-2008) 
Direct Impact 
 
Difference GMM 
regression 
1. High concentration of Africa's exports 
to China and high diversification of 
China's exports to Africa. 
2. Exports to China do not 
unconditionally enhance African 
countries' growth. 
3. Countries exporting one major 
commodity to China enjoy higher growth 
than those with diverse exports. 
4. Imports from China have robust 
growth-enhancing effect. 
Sandrey and 
Edinger (2011) 
China's manufactured 
exports and SSA's 
industrialisation 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
1. Poor export performance impedes 
SSA's manufacturing. 
2. SSA's industrial policy is impeded by: 
low investment, poor infrastructure, poor 
institution and governance, problematic 
industrial policy, and rigid 
macroeconomic framework. 
3. Competitiveness of China's 
manufactured exports is not due to low 
wage. 
4. Governments of resource-rich SSA 
countries tend not to have incentive to 
diversify exports or invest revenues from 
commodity boom in other sectors, and do 
not have appropriate management of 
those revenues. 
Jenkins (2010) The impact of trade 
with China on Latin 
America 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
1. Trade is the dominant channel that 
links China and Latin America. 
2. China's competitiveness in 
manufactures and demand for primary 
commodities impede Latin American 
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countries' industrialisation and push 
them back to specialising in primary 
commodities. 
Freund and 
Ozden (2009) 
The impact of China's 
export growth on 
Latin American 
countries' exports in 
third markets (1985-
2004) 
Indirect Impact 
Weighted OLS 
(SITC 4-digit) 
1. China's negative impacts on Latin 
America concentrate in Mexico's 
manufactured exports to the US. 
2. Export price of Latin America as a 
whole faces downward pressure, due to 
China's competition. 
3. China's competition concentrates in 
high-wage sectors, which restricts Latin 
America's export upgrading. 
Giovannetti and 
Sanfilippo (2009) 
The impact of China 
on Africa's 
manufactured exports 
in third markets (1995-
2005) 
Indirect Impact 
 
IV regression and 
GMM regression 
(sectoral and product 
level) 
(HS 6-digit) 
 
1. China's exports reduce Africa's exports, 
especially in manufactures, in third 
markets. 
2. China's displacement effect is 
particularly significant in clothing and 
textile sector and machine and equipment 
sector. 
3. China's displacement effect is 
particularly significant for intra-SSA 
trade. 
Paus (2009) Changing pattern of 
trade between Latin 
American countries 
and China and their 
development 
prospects 
Direct Impact 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
1. Latin America's exports to China 
concentrate in primary commodities. 
2. The pattern of trade between China 
and Latin America does not fit their 
comparative advantage: China is labour-
intensive, but its medium and high 
technology-intensive exports to Latin 
America are disproportionately high. 
3. Latin America's exports are 
technologically moving down, partly due 
to China's move-up. 
4. Latin American countries register trade 
deficit with China, except the few who 
have surplus in primary commodity 
exports. 
5. TOT has improved in only few 
resource-rich Latin American countries. 
Power (2008) The impact of China's 
manufactured exports 
on SSA's 
industrialisation 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
1. SSA's MVA has been unchanged 
between 1996 and 2004. 
2. Intra-SSA exports are more technology-
intensive than outward exports 
3. China's impacts are predominantly 
harmful for SSA's industrial growth. 
4. It is difficult to see a bright future of 
SSA's manufacturing. 
Meyersson, i 
Miquel and Qian 
(2008) 
The impact of resource 
exports to China on 
SSA's growth and 
institution (1990-2006) 
Direct Impact 
IV regression 1. Natural resource exports to China 
increase SSA countries' GDP growth, 
human capital formation, and 
manufacturing. 
2. Natural resource exports to China 
negatively impact on human rights. 
Kaplinsky 
McCormick, and 
Morris (2007) 
The impact of China's 
trade and FDI on SSA 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
1. SSA benefits from primary commodity 
exports to China and cheap 
consumer/capital goods from China. 
2. Few trade outside primary 
 147 
commodities and clothing and textile. 
3. China's trade impact on SSA takes 
effect more through indirect channel (in 
third and global markets) than direct 
channel (domestic markets). 
4. SSA runs increasing trade deficit with 
China. 
5. The benefits of commodity boom do 
not come automatically, since effective 
management of resource revenues is 
necessary.  
Moreira (2007) The trade impact of 
China on Latin 
America in third 
markets 
(1990-2004) 
Indirect Impact 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis (market 
share analysis) 
(Up to HS 6-digit) 
1. China's advantages lie in labour 
endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin type), 
productivity (Ricardian type), economic 
scale (Krugmanian type), and state 
intervention. 
2. Latin American countries bear small 
but growing loss in market share, due to 
China's exports. 
Lall, Weiss, and 
Oikawa (2005) 
The trade impact of 
China on Latin 
America (1990-2002) 
Direct and Indirect 
Impact 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
(SITC 3-digit) 
1. China's export structure is 
complementary to that of Latin America, 
but bilateral trade is limited. 
2. Competition in third markets is small. 
3. China has become a net exporter of 
manufactures, while Latin America has 
become a net exporter of primary 
commodities. 
4. Latin America has experienced export 
downgrading. 
5. China's continuous technological 
upgrading will further strengthen Latin 
America's downgrading. 
Source: Author's elaboration. 
 
Appendix B. List of Countries by Export Specialisation Pattern 
Table B1. List of countries in each group of export specialisation 
AGRIs MINEs FUELs MANUs 
Belize Armenia Algeria Albania 
Benin D. R. Congo Angola Antigua and Barbuda 
Burkina Faso Guinea Azerbaijan Bahamas 
Burundi Guyana Cameroon Bangladesh 
Cameroon Jamaica Chad Barbados 
Central African Rep. Mauritania Congo Bhutan 
Comoros Mongolia Ecuador Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Cote d'Ivoire Peru Equatorial Guinea Cambodia 
Ecuador Tajikistan Gabon Cape Verde 
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Ethiopia Zambia Iran  Djibouti 
Fiji   Iraq Dominica 
Gambia   Libya Dominican Republic 
Ghana   Nigeria Egypt 
Grenada   Syrian Arab Republic El Salvador 
Guatemala   Trinidad and Tobago Eritrea 
Guinea-Bissau   Turkmenistan Georgia 
Guyana   Yemen Guatemala 
Kenya     Haiti 
Kiribati     Honduras 
Laos     Jordan 
Madagascar     Lebanon 
Malawi     Liberia 
Maldives     Moldova 
Mali     Morocco 
Mauritania     Nepal 
Moldova     Nicaragua 
Mozambique     Niger 
Myanmar     Pakistan 
Nicaragua     Panama 
Paraguay     Philippines 
Rwanda     
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Sao Tome and Principe     Samoa 
Senegal     Sri Lanka 
Seychelles     Vietnam 
Solomon Islands       
Tanzania       
Tonga       
Uganda       
Uzbekistan       
Vanuatu       
Source: Author's elaboration. 
 
 149 
Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics  
Table C1. Descriptive statistics (62-country panel) 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
EXPY (ln) 1,240 9.04 0.34 7.55 9.78 
Landlock 1,240 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Remoteness 1,240 1727.79 49.81 1574.55 1827.2 
Population (ln) 1,237 16.2 1.11 13.88 19.04 
Human Capital (years) 1,169 5.44 2.84 0.9 12.2 
Institutions 992 -0.66 0.43 -2.01 0.6 
Productive Investment (ln) 1,177 5.86 1.34 -2.78 8.95 
Income TOT (ln) 1,139 9.97 3.36 -0.61 17.75 
Manu. Imports (% of total imports) 1,240 26.86 10.92 7.27 92.88 
FDI Inflow (% of GDP) 1,204 4.09 7.14 -82.89 89.48 
Imports from CHN (% of total imports) 1,240 9.21 8.66 0.004 56.26 
Exports to CHN (% of total exports) 1,204 5.44 11.08 0.0003 88.13 
Residual Openness 1,200 0.01 0.13 -0.36 0.83 
AGRIs 1,240 0.44 0.5 0 1 
MANUs 1,240 0.4 0.49 0 1 
MINEs 1,240 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Source: Author's elaboration. 
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Chapter 4. The Directionality of Developing Countries' Export 
Sophistication and Its Determinants 
4.1. Introduction  
A country's exports to different directions may embody different levels of 
technology and capital (Amsden, 1986). In the 1970s and the 1980s, economists 
observed that many developing countries' exports to other developing countries 
contained more physical and human capital than their exports to developed 
countries (e.g., Amsden, 1976; Havrylyshyn, 1985; Amsden, 1987; Cizeljc and Fuks, 
1987). This raises the issue of the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication. Provided that more sophisticated exports are more development-
enhancing, export direction with higher sophistication level is expected to be more 
beneficial to development. Therefore, it has been widely believed that South-South 
exports have greater developmental effect than South-North exports (Amsden, 1980; 
Amsden, 1987; Lall, 1987; Klinger, 2009)57.  
 
Understanding the pattern and mechanism of export directionality has great 
relevance for trade policy, because export direction with greater sophistication 
should, in theory, be particularly promoted. A telling example is regional integration 
and trade agreement. If Southbound exports are more sophisticated, then trade 
integration with other developing countries may be of greater interest for policy 
makers. The reverse is true, if Northbound exports are more sophisticated. However, 
the determinants of developing countries' export directionality have not been 
sufficiently explored, neither theoretically nor empirically. Conventional 
international trade theories, either those traditional ones based on comparative 
                                            
57 However, there is opposite viewpoint that export direction is not important and the higher 
skill and capital intensity in South-South trade is largely a result of the distrotion generated by 
import substitution industrialisation (e.g., Havrylyshyn, 1985; Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1987). 
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advantages or those new ones based on economies of scale and consumers' love of 
variety, do not deal with export directionality, because they only explain single 
export direction, either North-South trade or South-South/North-North trade. In the 
1980s, there were some discussions on why South-South exports had higher level of 
skill and capital than South-North exports (e.g., the World Bank symposium on 
exports of developing countries in 1987), and some alternative arguments were 
proposed, such as industrial policy distortion, cultural and geographical proximity, 
and uncertainty in developing countries' markets. However, empirical explorations 
have been still lacking.  
 
Furthermore, empirical observation on developing countries' export directionality 
need to be revisited, because the aforementioned export directionality observed in 
the 1970s and the 1980s were largely influenced by those outward-looking Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs), most of which should not be defined as developing 
countries since the 1990s. Recent evidence on developing countries' export 
directionality is quite limited, and recent studies are subject to inappropriate 
treatment of country grouping. For instance, Klinger (2009) defines some developed 
countries (e.g., the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and emerging countries (e.g., 
China) under developing countries, and Bernhardt (2014) use de facto developed and 
emerging countries (e.g., South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and China) as 
representatives of developing countries. 
 
Considering the research gap and the problems in the recent studies, this paper aims 
to provide the latest evidence on the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication from 1995 to 2014 and examines the determinants of this directionality, 
say, what factors lead some developing countries to have more sophisticated 
Southbound exports than Northbound exports or the opposite. In this sense, this 
chapter revisits and extends the discussion in the 1980s on the directionality of the 
level of skill and capital in developing countries' exports. In order to avoid the 
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distortion led by inappropriate country grouping and to reflect the latest changes in 
the global economic hierarchy, this chapter applies the industrialisation-based 
UNIDO country grouping system (UNIDO, 2013) to distinguish between emerging 
countries and developing countries and redefines South-South trade exclusively as 
trade between real developing countries. Because, to my best knowledge, there have 
not been studies that specifically examine the determinants of the directionality of 
developing countries' export sophistication, this chapter is an exploratory study.  
 
This chapter uses the EXPY index (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007) to measure 
the sophistication of a country's export basket. The underlying assumption is that 
products mainly exported by rich countries tend to be more sophisticated 58 . 
Specialising in such "rich-country products" reflects higher export sophistication 
and generates more promising development prospect. The BACI export data at the 
HS 6-digit level show that, between 1995 and 2014, more than half of developing 
countries have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports in 
more than half of the 20-year period, whereas others tend to have more sophisticated 
Northbound exports. Econometric analyses based on both continuous and binary 
measures of export directionality show that productive capabilities are a major 
contributor to the directionality of developing countries' export sophistication. 
Developing countries with greater productive capabilities are less likely to have 
more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports, while those with 
lower productive capabilities are more likely to have more sophisticated 
Southbound exports. This finding suggests that productively more advanced 
developing countries may be able to enter the highly competitive developed markets 
and/or the downstream value chains with relatively sophisticated products, but 
those productively less advanced developing countries do not have such capability 
                                            
58 A striking exception is mineral fuel, especially oil and natural gas, which has relatively high 
associated income level (PRODY) but limited technological level, because some rich but not 
developed countries (e.g., the Gulf countries) account for a major share in the global exports in 
mineral fuels. 
 153 
and thus are only able to export their relatively sophisticated products to the less 
competitive developing markets. Given this finding, the conventional argument that 
South-South trade benefits developing countries more than North-South trade 
should be understood conditionally. For those productively less advanced 
developing countries, South-South trade seems to be, in the words of Klinger (2009), 
a "testing ground" for structural transformation, because this export direction tends 
to be more sophisticated. However, for those productively more advanced 
developing countries, exports to the North should be expected to have greater 
developmental effect. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews theories on the determinants 
of developing countries' export directionality. Section 4.3 presents data, country 
grouping, and the directionality of export sophistication. Section 4.4 gives 
descriptive evidence on the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication. Section 4.5 discusses empirical strategy and shows regression results 
for the determinants of export directionality. Section 4.6 concludes the findings. 
 
4.2. Determinants of the Directionality of Export Sophistication 
4.2.1. Conventional Trade Theories and Export Directionality 
The explorations into why countries trade with each other fall in the very core of 
international trade studies. This question is answered by two major strands of 
international trade theories, which are defined as conventional trade theories here. 
Classical trade theories base their arguments on countries' comparative advantages. 
The Ricardian model focuses on a country's comparative advantages in productivity. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model and its subsequent variants, such as the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model, base 
their arguments on a country's comparative advantages in resource endowments or 
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production factors. That is to say, the Ricardian model assumes that countries differ 
in their productivity, whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin-like models assume 
homogeneous productivity but heterogeneous endowments across countries 
(Morrow, 2010). This traditional strand of trade theories explains traditional trade 
relationship between differently endowed countries (e.g., North-South trade during 
the colonial era). A country should export the product that has comparatively lower 
production costs or intensively uses the country's well-endowed production factors. 
In brief, countries trade with each other because they are different (Debaere, 2003; 
Gourdon, 2009). Since the end of the Second World War, however, intra-industry 
trade has begun to account for a major share in international trade. Traditional trade 
theories cannot explain this trade flow in similar products between similarly 
endowed countries (e.g., North-North trade). Thus, new trade theories, represented 
by the Krugman model, arise. The Krugman model bases its argument on 
specialisation in a particular product niche59. Each country produces a similar but 
differentiated product in comparison with those produced by other similar countries. 
By doing this, each country can gain from increasing returns to scale through 
producing only particular differentiated products and can fulfil foreign consumers' 
love of variety.  
 
However, theoretical analyses on export directionality are lacking (Havrylyshyn, 
1985). Traditional comparative advantage-based theories do not leave space for 
export directionality in their analytical framework (Havrylyshyn, 1985; 
Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1987). This problem applies to new trade theories as well. 
Both of them deal with single export direction, either between different countries or 
between similar countries. However, the presence of export directionality implies 
that a country exports to both similar and dissimilar countries. In a typical 
traditional two-country and two-factor comparative advantage model, the 
                                            
59 The new trade theory by Krugman (1979) uses more formal model to further ascribe the 
motivation of trade between similar countries to firms' economies of scale, consumers' love of 
variety, and reduced post-trade price. 
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developing country only unidirectionally exports primary commodity or resource- 
or labour-intensive manufacture to the developed country. However, in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, Newly Industrialised Countries stood out in the developing world. 
These countries became manufacture-oriented exporters and their manufactured 
exports to developed countries were observed to be more labour-intensive and less 
capital-intensive than their manufactured exports to other (less advanced) 
developing countries. As a response to this phenomenon, Deardorff (1987) extends 
the traditional two-country and two-factor comparative advantage model to a three-
country model with a continuous distribution of goods rather than assuming two or 
three tradable goods. In Deardorff's extended comparative advantage model, the 
world consists of a developing country, an emerging country (rich developing 
country), and a developed country. The emerging country, which is relatively 
capital-abundant, exports relatively capital-intensive goods to the developing 
country, which is least capital-abundant. In turn, the developing country exports 
labour-intensive goods to the emerging country, and the emerging country exports 
relatively labour-intensive goods to the developed country. Krueger (1977) and 
Baldwin (1979) have also demonstrated similar analytical frameworks. This strand 
of model adjusts the traditional comparative advantage theories to the rise of Newly 
Industrialised Countries. Hanson (2012) discusses the paradigm shift of the "return 
of comparative advantage" in post-1990s international trade research. The 1980s and 
the 1990s were dominated by new trade theories based on firms' economies of scale 
and consumers' love of variety, and traditional comparative advantage theories were 
believed to largely lose the relevance. However, the rise of emerging countries since 
the 1990s has retrieved the interests in comparative advantage. Those (relatively) 
resource-poor and capital/skill-rich emerging countries source primary 
commodities and perhaps also resource/labour-intensive manufactures from those 
resource/labour-rich but capital/skill-poor developing countries, and the latter 
sources capital/skill-intensive manufactures from the former (IMF, 2011). 
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The three-country comparative advantage model, however, only partially explains 
export directionality. They have explicitly dealt with different sophistication levels 
of exports to different directions from the "middle countries", but they do not deal 
with export directionality of countries at the bottom, say, those real developing 
countries. The aforementioned comparative advantage models and the Krugman 
model (except the assumption of consumers' love of variety) stand on the supply 
side of motivations to trade. However, as suggested by Cizeljc and Fuks (1987), 
demand similarity is a contributor to South-South trade. Therefore, export 
directionality of developing countries may be analysed from the demand side rather 
than the supply side. The model of Linder (1961) provides a demand-side 
explanation for trade and can better explain the observed phenomenon that South-
South trade tends to be more skill- and capital-intensive than North-South trade. 
The Linder model argues that countries with similar income level have similar 
preference that generates "overlapping demand". It is this "overlapping demand" 
that makes similar countries to trade more with each other, especially in 
manufactures. It is easy to see that this "overlapping demand" is different from the 
"love of variety" in the Krugman model. The latter is more relevant to consumers in 
developed countries, while the former applies more to developing countries 60 . 
Because of different demands and preferences, skill- and capital-intensive 
manufactures from developing countries tend not to find market in developed 
countries61 . Instead, other developing countries provide market outlet for these 
manufactures. Therefore, the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication may be explained by combining the supply-side comparative 
                                            
60 As well-documented in the literature, more developed countries tend to have more demand 
for more sophisticated imports. This pattern actually does not contradict with the observation 
that developing countries' exports to developed countries tend to be less sophisticated than their 
exports to other developing countries. As demonstrated by "overlapping demand" and "love of 
variety", trade in more sophisticated products is more likely to take place between similar 
countries, either developed or developing. Therefore, although developed countries have more 
demand for more sophisticated products, this demand tends to be supplied by other developed 
countries. In turn, developed countries still demand less sophisticated imports from developing 
countries. 
61 One exception is manufactured export from some emerging countries (e.g., China), provided 
that these countries are classified under developing countries.  
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advantage models and the demand-side Linder model. Developing countries' less 
skill- and capital-intensive but more labour- and resource-intensive exports to 
developed countries reflect their comparative advantages in labour and resource 
and disadvantages in skill and capital. On the other hand, similarity in preference 
and demand due to comparable income level generates greater space for exporting 
more skill- and capital-intensive products to other developing countries.  
 
Developing countries' comparative advantages in labour- and resource-intensive 
products can be understood as their capabilities to compete with developed 
countries' producers of similar products, if any, in the latter's home market. Regolo 
(2013) develops a North-South trade model, predicting that exports tend to be more 
diverse between similarly endowed countries. That is to say, developing countries' 
Southbound export diversification should be higher than their Northbound export 
diversification. The underlying rationale is that in the Northern markets the 
competition in skill- and capital-intensive products is too tough for producers from 
developing countries to enter, because they do not have price advantages in skill-
and capital-intensive products. Instead, developing countries' labour- and resource-
intensive products and primary commodities are competitive in the Northern 
markets. On the other hand, similar comparative advantages in labour- and 
resource-intensive products and primary commodities reduce the opportunities of 
developing countries to export these products to other developing countries. Instead, 
they are more likely to export relatively skill- and capital-intensive products to each 
other. This model can be seen as a comparative advantage-based explanation for 
intra-industry and intra-group trade. It may also be seen as a capability-based 
explanation for export directionality. A developing country's capabilities of 
producing relatively sophisticated products determine whether it is capable of 
entering advanced countries' market with these products rather than those less 
sophisticated products or even primary commodities. Another contributor to the 
directionality of export diversification, according to Regolo (2013), is distance, which 
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refers to not only geographical remoteness but also trade costs. Smaller distance 
increases the probability to export more diversified products (Amurgo-Pacheco and 
Piérola, 2008; Regolo, 2013). This goes beyond conventional trade theories and falls 
within the gravity-like explanation for trade. Since export diversification is often 
regarded as one of the indicators of the broad-sense export upgrading, the analytical 
framework of the directionality of export diversification can shed light on the 
directionality of export sophistication. Regarding the influence of distance, Melitz 
(2007) provides another interpretation. Larger distance in terms of differences in 
latitude implies differences in natural resources and conditions, and thus increases 
trade complementarity. Accordingly, developing countries are expected to export 
primary commodities (e.g., tropical agricultural products) to developed countries, 
and therefore their Northbound exports should be less sophisticated than their 
Southbound exports. This is in line with the comparative advantage theories. 
 
4.2.2. Alternative Perspectives 
Section 4.2.1 discusses the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication from the perspective of conventional trade theories. This section 
reviews some alternative contributions to the discussion on export directionality, 
going beyond the conventional trade theories. Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1987) 
summarise some factors that may determine the directionality of export 
sophistication: comparative advantages, distortions in trade and industrial policy, 
restrictive commercial policy, similarity in demand, cultural and geographical 
proximity, and market size. Comparative advantages have already been discussed 
as the theoretical basis of traditional trade theories. Distortions in trade and 
industrial policy are argued by Havrylyshyn (1985) and Havrylyshyn and Wolf 
(1987) as a major contributor to developing countries' more skill- and capital-
intensive Southbound exports. According to them, the distortion is represented by 
inward-looking development strategy, in particular import substitution 
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industrialisation. Such policy can widen a country's production range beyond where 
its comparative advantages fall in, especially towards skill- and capital-intensive 
sectors. This widened production range then reflects on increasing skill- and capital-
intensive exports to other developing countries, because these products tend not to 
have market in developed countries and because some developing countries have 
established regional trade agreement for promoting trade in manufactures between 
each other. As a result, the difference between Northbound export sophistication 
and Southbound export sophistication has been enlarged. An interesting fact in the 
1970s and the 1980s is that developing countries that followed "distortive" policy 
(e.g., Latin American countries and South Asian countries) tended to have more 
exports to other developing countries and their exports were more capital- and skill-
intensive, whereas those pursuing "open" policy (e.g., Southeast Asian countries) 
relied much more on developed countries as a target market and their exports were 
more labour-intensive (Havrylyshyn, 1985). According to Havrylyshyn (1985), this 
kind of trade and industrial policy is a distortion with respect to comparative 
advantages62. Furthermore, the effect of distortive policy can be strengthened by 
restrictive commercial policy (e.g., import barrier), which confines a developing 
country's exports to products that the importing country cannot produce 
domestically. However, because inward-looking strategy has been basically 
abandoned by developing countries since the 1980s, industrial policy distortion and 
restrictive commercial policy tend to be irrelevant to developing countries' export 
directionality under today's context. 
 
Besides similarity in demand, which has been discussed in Section 4.2.1, the other 
                                            
62 It must be noted that whether import substitution industrialisation is justifiable is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Havrylyshyn (1985) treats it as a distortion with respect to comparative 
advantages and argues that it is inefficient and growth-impeding. However, many studies have 
shown that defying comparative advantages promotes developing countries' growth (e.g., 
Hausmann et al., 2007; Lectard and Rougier, 2018). Actually, the failure of many developing 
countries in the 1960s and the 1970s should not be attributed to import substitution 
industrialisation per se, but to policy makers' problematic interpretation and implementation of 
import substitution industrialisation. 
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two factors relevant to export directionality are geographical and cultural proximity 
and market size. These are intrinsically in line with the rationales of gravity model. 
It is straightforward and natural to understand that a developing country may trade 
more with other developing countries that are geographically and culturally close. 
According to the Linder model, trade between similar countries tends to contain 
more manufactures. Therefore, developing countries' Southbound exports can be 
expected to be relatively sophisticated. For another thing, colonial history of many 
developing countries may facilitate their trade with previous colonisers in primary 
commodities, which lies in the scope of North-South trade and reduces their 
Northbound export sophistication. Market size has always entered gravity equation 
as a robust driver of bilateral trade. Economic growth and industrialisation of some 
emerging and developing countries expand their market size and increase their 
demand for both primary commodities and capital goods. Moreover, greater 
economic size of trade partners implies not only higher trade volume, but also more 
traded varieties, because larger countries tend to have more diverse and 
differentiated demand (Bergstrand, 1990; Amurgo-Pacheco and Piérola, 2008). 
Therefore, developed and emerging countries' greater economic size and growth 
may increase Northbound export sophistication of some developing countries that 
are able to export relatively sophisticated products. However, for those less 
advanced developing countries, greater economic size and growth of developed and 
emerging countries may imply more demand for primary commodities, which may 
reduce their Northbound export sophistication. 
 
Amsden (1987) gives another explanation for the higher skill and capital intensity of 
developing countries' Southbound exports. Less advanced developing countries' 
markets are riskier and more uncertain due to poor functioning and unstable 
economic situation. Therefore, these markets are less attractive to producers from 
developed countries. However, producers from those more advanced developing 
countries (newly industrialising countries) tend to enter such markets due to less 
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entry costs, especially in comparison with the costs in developed markets, and less 
competition from their counterparts from developed countries. For another thing, 
consumers in less advanced developing countries have lower requirement for 
quality but more stringent requirement for price. Due to similar development and 
income level, products from those more advanced developing countries are more 
suitable for the demand of consumers in those less advanced developing countries. 
To some extent, Amsden's reasoning accords with the Linder model and the model 
of Regolo (2013). For developing countries, it is more difficult to sell their relatively 
sophisticated products to developed countries than to other developing countries 
(Cizeljc and Fuks, 1987). It should be noted that Amsden (1987) treats developing 
countries' Southbound exports as exports from more advanced developing countries 
(newly industrialising countries) to less advanced developing countries. However, 
this analytical framework may apply to trade between less advanced developing 
countries themselves as well.  
 
4.3. Measurement, Data, and Country Classification  
4.3.1. The Measure of Export Sophistication 
A country's export sophistication is measured by the index of EXPY (Hausmann et 
al., 2007). The details of this index, including its properties, criticisms, and responses 
to criticisms, have been discussed in Section 3.3.1, and thus this section just briefly 
introduces this index. The responses to the three major criticisms of the PRODY 
index, which are documented in Section 3.3.1, also apply to this chapter. The first 
step to calculate EXPY is to construct the weighted mean income level associated 
with each product, that is PRODY (of product k in year t): 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7 = 𝑥8,7W 𝑋8,7𝑥8,7W 𝑋8,78 𝑌8,78  
 162 
where 𝑌8,7 equals GDP per capita of country i in year t, 𝑥8,7W  equals the export value 
of product k by country i in year t, and 𝑋8,7 refers to total export values of country i. 
The numerator is the share of product k in the country's total exports, and the 
denominator is the sum of this share across all countries exporting product k. 
Therefore, the PRODY of product k is the mean GDP per capita of all exporting 
countries, weighted by each country's normalised revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) in this product.  
 
Then, the EXPY of country i in year t is calculated as:  
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌8,7 = 𝑥8,7W𝑋8,7W 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W 
A country's EXPY is the average of PRODY values of all of its exported products, 
weighted by the share of each product in the country's export basket. Importantly, 
each product's annual PRODY values (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7) during a given period are averaged 
to generate a single static PRODY of this product (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W, instead of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑌W,7). A 
country's annual EXPY is calculated based on the static PRODY values, which give 
each product a constant associated income level. The fixed value of PRODY ensures 
that any change in EXPY is due to change in this country's export structure, instead 
of change in GDP per capita of other exporting countries. 
 
4.3.2. Country Classification and the Measure of Export Directionality 
As in previous chapters, this chapter uses the 2013 UNIDO country grouping, which 
divides the world into four tiers: Industrialised Economies (IEs), Emerging 
Industrial Economies (EIEs) and China63, Other Developing Economies (ODEs), and 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The classification criterion is a country's 
                                            
63 According to statistical criterion, China is in the group of EIEs, but China is separately treated 
in the UNIDO statistics due to its size. 
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industrialisation level measured by manufacture value added (MVA) per capita64. 
This chapter makes minor modifications with respect to the original UNIDO country 
grouping. The modification is mostly concerned with moving some countries from 
Emerging Industrial Economies to Industrialised Economies (i.e., some advanced former 
European socialist countries, advanced former Soviet Republics, advanced 
constituent republic of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
Southern Cone, and Brunei). Montenegro is moved away from the group of Other 
Developing Economies to Emerging Industrial Economies. Moreover, Angola, Cape 
Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Maldives are moved away from the group of Other 
Developing Economies to Least Developed Countries, following the original UN 
definition. This modification serves more as a conceptual work and is unlikely to 
generate major differences to empirical analyses, because countries under 
modification are not big players in the global trade. The details and reasons for each 
individual country case in this modification is documented in Appendix A. 
However, it has to be admitted that, even if after the modification, India and 
Indonesia are still two exceptions with obviously lower socio-economic 
development in the group of Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs). As 
aforementioned in footnote 18, these two countries are classified under EIEs by 
UNIDO due to an exceptional criterion of the share in the world MVA higher than 
0.5 % rather than the normal criterion of MAV per capita or GDP per capita for other 
EIEs countries. Because India and Indonesia have relatively large shares in the world 
trade, it seems to be better to conform to the original UNIDO grouping, instead of 
reclassifying them. 
 
In this chapter, Other Developing Economies (ODEs), which are the richer half of the 
developing world, and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which are the poorer half 
of the developing world, constitute the group of Developing Countries. Southbound 
                                            
64 𝑀𝑉𝐴$% = 012	(222)23$4567839 × ;<=012  
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exports of a developing country are then defined as its exports to all other 
developing countries, say, South-South exports. This is different from the common 
definition of "South-South exports", because those so-called "emerging countries" are 
excluded. Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs) and China are defined as Emerging 
Countries. It is important to note that the concept of emerging countries here is not 
comparable with the well-known concept of emerging markets outside of the 
academia (e.g., the FTSE list and the MSCI list). The concept of emerging markets 
outside of the academia primarily concerns a country's business and investment 
environment rather than economic development level, which generates a country 
list quite different from the list based on a development perspective. Industrialised 
Economies (IEs) correspond to developed countries. A developing country's 
Northbound exports are defined in two distinct ways based on different 
considerations. The broadly-defined Northbound exports (N-bound 1) are defined 
as a developing country's exports to both developed countries (IEs) and emerging 
countries (EIEs and China), both of which are economically positioned north to 
developing countries. The narrowly-defined Northbound exports (N-bound 2) are 
defined as a developing country's exports exclusively to developed countries. This 
is similar to the conventional way to define North-South trade. The broadly-defined 
and the narrowly-defined Northbound export sophistication will be examined 
separately in the following descriptive and econometric analyses. In the following 
tables and figures, any titles with "1" refer to the case of the broadly-defined 
Northbound exports, and those with "2" refer to the case of the narrowly-defined 
Northbound exports. 
 
As in Chapter 3, 27 out of the total of 128 countries in the UNIDO group of ODEs 
and LDCs are completely dropped in the empirical analyses, for the reasons of 
centrally planned economies (Cuba and D.P.R. Korea), long-term (civil) war and/or 
the lack of an effective central government (Afghanistan, Somalia, and Palestine), 
territorial alteration and/or newly-established countries between 1995 and 2014 
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(Sudan, South Sudan, and Timor Leste), non-sovereign entity (e.g., Marshall Islands), 
associate states of another country (e.g., Palau), countries with population less than 
50,000 (e.g., Saint Kitts and Nevis), and countries without export data in the BACI 
database (Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho). Furthermore, since major exporting 
countries of mineral fuels have special pattern of export sophistication and 
directionality (the majority of exports in mineral fuels from developing countries go 
to developed and emerging countries, namely, the Northbound direction), these 
countries are dropped in the econometric analysis in Section 4.5 and in part of the 
descriptive analysis in Section 4.4. Major exporting countries of mineral fuels are 
defined as countries with the mean share of mineral fuels (SITC 3) in total export 
values in 1995, 2005, and 2014 being larger than 40%. Countries with population less 
than one million are dropped too in part of the econometric analysis. Most of these 
countries are small island economies with special economic and export structure. 
This treatment results in a panel database of 62 developing countries.  
 
4.3.3. Data  
Export data are from the BACI database at the 1992-version Harmonised System (HS 
92) 6-digit disaggregation level from 1995 to 2014. Export values are reported in 
current US Dollars. Data on GDP per capita (PPP, in 2011 constant International 
Dollars) are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Each product's 
PRODY in each year between 1995 and 2014 is calculated based on data of 165 
countries. Then, each product's annual PRODY values during the 20 years are 
averaged into a single fixed PRODY, which is used for constructing each country's 
annual EXPY. Other details of data and the calculation of PRODY and EXPY have 
been shown in Section 3.3.2, and are not repeated here. 
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4.4. The Directionality of Developing Countries' Export Sophistication: 
Descriptive Evidence 
Developing countries' exports to developed and emerging countries, concentrating 
on primary commodities and labour- and resource-intensive manufactures, reflect 
their comparative advantages, which is explained by traditional trade theories. In 
contrast, their exports to other developing countries correspond to the pattern 
predicted by alternative trade theories (e.g., the Linder model), according to which 
trade between similar countries contains more manufactures and is relatively 
sophisticated and diverse. Thus, developing countries' Southbound exports should 
be anticipated to be more sophisticated than their Northbound exports. However, 
disaggregated data on developing countries' exports show a story that somewhat 
deviates from theoretical prediction. Here, the directionality of export sophistication 
is proxied by a country's Southbound export sophistication (EXPY of this country's 
Southbound exports without being weighted by the share of Southbound exports in 
total exports) minus its Northbound export sophistication (EXPY of this country's 
Northbound exports). According to theoretical prediction and the previous 
literature, this value of Southbound EXPY minus Northbound EXPY should be 
positive. Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of 1240 observations (62 countries×20 
years) of the Southbound EXPY-Northbound EXPY difference for the broadly-
defined Northbound exports (N-bound 1) and the narrowly-defined Northbound 
exports (N-bound 2). The two graphs in Figure 4.1 are quite similar. There is a 
bimodal distribution with one mode positioned far right to the zero value (around 
4000 Dollars) and another mode more or less around the zero value. The majority of 
observations support the theoretical prediction that developing countries' 
Southbound exports are more sophisticated than their Northbound exports, but 
many other observations show negative values, which implies more sophisticated 
Northbound exports. Figure 4.2 shows the case for the panel of 101 developing 
countries, including major exporting countries of mineral fuels and small countries 
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with population less than one million. A similar pattern of the directionality of 
export sophistication is observed.  
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of the directionality of export sophistication (62 countries) 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Figure 4.2. Distribution of the directionality of export sophistication (101 countries) 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Furthermore, developing countries are classified into two groups, in order to see the 
pattern of directionality in each world region. The first group is termed as DCS, 
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which refers to countries whose Southbound exports are more sophisticated than 
Northbound exports in a particular year. The second group is DCN, which refers to 
those whose Northbound exports are more sophisticated than Southbound exports 
in a given year. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of countries that have different year 
ranges to be DCS countries during the 20-year period from 1995 to 2014 in the 101-
country panel, based on the broadly-defined Northbound exports (N-bound 1). 
Taken as an example, 9% of Ex-Socialist countries in the group of ODEs (there are no 
Ex-Socialist countries in the group of LDCs) have 1-5 years to be DCS countries 
during the 20-year period. The corresponding proportions of Ex-Socialist countries 
in the group of ODEs with 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-19 years, and 20 years to be 
DCS countries are 18%, 27%, 36%, and 9%, respectively. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, Ex-Socialist countries (those in the group of ODEs), and Latin American 
and the Caribbean (LAC) countries tend to have more than ten years to be DCS 
countries. In comparison, Asian countries (mostly Southeast Asian countries) and 
MENA countries in the group of ODEs tend to have less years to be DCS countries. 
An explanation is that these countries have closer trade ties with Northern countries, 
especially through global production chain. Moreover, the theoretical prediction that 
developing countries' Southbound exports should be more sophisticated than their 
Northbound exports is further deviated by the fact that many developing countries' 
directionality of export sophistication varies over years. Results based on the 
narrowly-defined Northbound exports show similar pattern, and are thus not 
shown. 
 
Table 4.1. Percentage of countries with various year ranges to be DCS65 
ODEs 0 of 20 years  
1-5 of 20 
years 
6-10 of 20 
years 
Total (0-10 
of 20 years) 
11-15 of 
20 years 
16-19 of 
20 years 
20 of 20 
years 
Total (11-20 
of 20 years)66 
Ex-Socl. 0 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.09 0.72 
MENA 0 0.5 0.1 0.6 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 
SSA 0 0.11 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.11 0.33 0.55 
LAC 0.05 0.1 0 0.15 0.1 0.43 0.33 0.86 
                                            
65 The definition of each world region is shown in Section 3.4.2. 
66 The sum of the Total (0-10 of 20 years) and Total (11-20 of 20 years) is not equal to one for 
several country groups due to rounding. 
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Asia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Oceania 0 0.33 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 0.67 
Total  0.02 0.23 0.11 0.36 0.11 0.26 0.28 0.65 
LDCs 0 of 20 years  
1-5 of 20 
years 
6-10 of 20 
years 
Total (0-10 
of 20 years) 
11-15 of 
20 years 
16-19 of 
20 years 
20 of 20 
years 
Total (11-20 
of 20 years) 
Ex-Socl - - - - - - - - 
MENA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
SSA 0 0.1 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.77 
LAC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Asia 0 0.43 0.29 0.72 0.29 0 0 0.29 
Oceania 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 
Total  0.02 0.14 0.18 0.34 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.66 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Table B1, B2, and B3 in Appendix B show each country's number of years of being 
DCS country during the 20 years for the group of the 62 developing countries, the 
group of major exporting countries of mineral fuels, and the group of small countries, 
respectively. Under the broadly-defined Northbound exports, countries with no 
more than five years to be DCS countries are (ascending in the number of years to 
be DCS) Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Mauritania, Sri 
Lanka, Egypt, Bolivia, Myanmar, and Cambodia. The corresponding list under the 
narrowly-defined Northbound exports is similar. All of these countries are Southeast 
Asian/Oceanian countries, except Mauritania, Egypt, and Bolivia. Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines have only one year to be DCS countries. This is quite 
understandable, because these three countries are deeply involved in the global 
production chain led by developed and emerging countries: the Philippines in 
electronics and Bangladesh and Vietnam in textile and garment. On the other hand, 
most of countries with all the 20 years of being DCS are SSA and LAC countries. 
Among the 17 major exporting countries of mineral fuels, only Cameroon and 
Ecuador have more than ten years to be DCS. This is consistent with the stylised fact 
that mineral fuels with disproportionately high PRODY value dominate these 
countries' Northbound exports. However, such high export sophistication due to 
exports in mineral fuels cannot be associated with higher possibility of technological 
progress, which is why major exporting countries of mineral fuels will be excluded 
in the following econometric analysis. Table B4 gives each country's 20-year mean 
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Southbound EXPY-Northbound EXPY difference for the 62-country panel. This list 
is basically consistent with Table B1. Countries with less years to be DCS countries 
tend to have more sophisticated Northbound exports or less sophisticated 
Southbound exports. 
 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 visualise the aforementioned descriptions with respect to 
the 62-country panel. The directionality of export sophistication is plotted against 
mean GDP per capita between 1995 and 2014. Four kinds of directionality, based on 
different measures and definitions of Northbound exports, are presented. In 
addition to observations already discussed, it is clear to see that there is no clear 
correlation between the directionality of export sophistication and GDP per capita. 
 
Figure 4.3. GDP p.c. and the directionality of export sophistication (binary measure) 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
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Figure 4.4. GDP p.c. and the directionality of export sophistication (continuous 
measure) 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Figure 4.5 plots the sophistication level of the 62 developing countries' Southbound 
exports and Northbound exports against their GDP per capita, respectively. Richer 
developing countries have both more sophisticated Southbound and Northbound 
exports than poorer countries. SSA countries are positioned at the bottom in terms 
of both GDP per capita and Southbound and Northbound export sophistication. The 
logarithm of Northbound export sophistication concentrates below 9.25, while the 
logarithm of Southbound export sophistication concentrates above 9.25. This 
indicates that, generally speaking, developing countries' Southbound exports tend 
to be more sophisticated than their Northbound exports. 
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Figure 4.5. Southbound and Northbound export sophistication by world region 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
4.5. Determinants of the Directionality of Developing Countries' Export 
Sophistication 
4.5.1. Empirical Strategy of Dynamic and Static Nonlinear Models 
This section discusses the empirical model of the determinants of the directionality 
of developing countries' export sophistication, say, what kind of countries tend to 
have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports or the 
reverse. Following Section 4.4, two measures of the comparison between a country's 
Southbound and Northbound export sophistication are used as the dependent 
variable. Dependent Variable Type 1 (DepVar 1) is a binary measure. Since using 
binary variable as dependent variable in dynamic model induces quite complex 
econometric issues, this sub-section deals with econometric techniques and the 
details of the empirical model (e.g., definitions of variables) are presented in Section 
4.5.2. The binary dependent variable is defined as: 
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𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 0, 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌 < 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌1, 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌 > 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌 
 
Since there are no observations for which Southbound EXPY is exactly equal to 
Northbound EXPY, only inequality between the two EXPY values is defined. The 
binary measure clearly provides a distinction between countries having more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports and countries having 
the opposite pattern in a particular year. The broadly-defined Northbound exports 
(N-bound 1) and the narrowly-defined Northbound exports (N-bound 2) are 
examined separately, and thus the Dependent Variable Type 1 has two sub-types: 
S/N Dummy 1 and S/N Dummy 2. 
 
Considering that the binary variable cannot measure the magnitude of the difference 
between a country's Southbound and Northbound export sophistication, it is 
complemented by the continuous Dependent Variable Type 2 (DepVar 2). It is 
defined as: 
 𝑆 − 𝑁	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌) − 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑌) 
 
If a country's Southbound export sophistication is higher than its Northbound 
export sophistication in a particular year, then S-N Diff in that year is positive. The 
greater the sophistication advantage of Southbound exports over Northbound 
exports is, the greater is the S-N Diff. If a country's Northbound exports are more 
sophisticated than its Southbound exports, then S-N Diff is negative. 
Correspondingly, there are two sub-types of S-N Diff based on the broadly-defined 
Northbound exports (S-N Diff 1) and the narrowly-defined Northbound exports (S-
N Diff 2). 
 
Binary dependent variable requires logistic regression. Furthermore, as shown in 
Table 4.2, in the 62-country panel, around one-thirds of countries (22 for S-N Dummy 
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1 and 20 for S-N Dummy 2) have zero standard deviation in the binary outcome of 
the directionality of export sophistication between 1995 and 2014. That is to say, 
these countries' Southbound exports have always been more sophisticated than their 
Northbound exports, or the reverse, over the 20 years. As a result, within variation 
of the dependent variable is zero for these countries, which renders fixed-effects 
model inappropriate. This is because that fixed-effects model, which is based on 
within estimation, only utilises information from variation within individuals and 
ignores information from variation across individuals. All countries without any 
change in the directionality of their export sophistication will be automatically 
dropped in fixed-effects model. This results in not only a great loss of observations, 
but, more importantly, also a sample selection bias leading to biased estimates of 
coefficients (Heckman, 1976 and 2013), because one kind of countries is "selectively" 
and "systematically" singled out and another kind of countries is "selectively" and 
"systematically" dropped. Those zero-variation countries are valuable for estimating 
the influence of potential heterogeneity in some country characteristics on the binary 
outcome of the directionality of export sophistication. In this regard, the loss of these 
countries will result in the loss of some important information. Given this, random-
effects model is a better choice, because it utilises information from both within and 
between variation, which increases estimation efficiency. Moreover, for some 
variables of interest in the database, their within variations are dominated by 
between variations. Allison (2009) points out that within estimators of fixed-effects 
model generate intolerably large standard errors if within variation is too small 
relative to between variation. This may damage the efficiency of the estimators 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). An extreme case is demonstrated by time-invariant 
and individual-variant variables (e.g., distance), which are completely omitted from 
estimation by fixed-effects model. This further justifies the use of random-effects 
logistic model. A concern on logistic model is the small-sample bias for rare events, 
say, extreme probability. If the probability of an outcome is extremely low, such as 
lower than 5% and the sample size is relatively small, then logistic model may be 
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biased. However, this should not matter for the database here, because neither 
having more sophisticated Northbound exports nor having more sophisticated 
Southbound exports is rare event. 
 
Table 4.2. Standard deviation of S/N Dummy 
SD Countries Percentage 
S/N Dummy 1   
0 22 35.48% 
0.2-0.3 8 12.90% 
0.3-0.4 8 12.91% 
0.4-0.5 15 24.19% 
0.5-0.6 9 14.52% 
S/N Dummy 2   
0 20 32.26% 
0.2-0.3 9 14.52% 
0.3-0.4 9 14.52% 
0.4-0.5 17 27.42% 
0.5-0.6 7 11.29% 
          Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
The above discussion refers to the static situation. However, the change in the 
directionality of export sophistication is likely to be subject to a dynamic pattern or 
a kind of inertia. If a country's Southbound export sophistication is higher than its 
Northbound export sophistication in year 1, then it may be anticipated that in year 
2 such a state is more likely to hold, instead of being reversed. A reason is that a 
country's established relationship with its trade partners at both firm and country 
level is likely to follow state dependence. Moreover, if the directionality of export 
sophistication is determined by a country's economic or production structure, then 
it tends to be relatively sticky. This is partly supported by the evidence in Table 4.2 
that many developing countries do not have any changes in the directionality of 
their export sophistication, or have only a few changes. Econometrically speaking, 
the past realisation of the binary outcome of export directionality tends to impact on 
the current realisation. This state dependence requires introducing the lagged binary 
dependent variable to the right-hand side of the regression equation as a regressor, 
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which transforms the static model to a dynamic one. Dynamic nonlinear model 
features two major difficulties for econometric estimation: unobservable 
heterogeneity and initial condition. Heckman (1978, 1981a, and 1981b) suggests two 
kinds of state dependence: one purely induced by past experience, known as 
structural state dependence, and the other one induced by unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, known as spurious state dependence. Unobservable country-specific 
characteristics, either permanent or highly correlated across time, may generate 
persistence in a country's directionality of export sophistication. Without controlling 
for such unobservable country heterogeneity, it is likely to overestimate the impact 
of the past directionality (the lagged dependent variable) on the current 
directionality, because the impact of unobservable country-specific effects is 
incorporated into the impact of the lagged dependent variable. In other words, 
without controlling for the unobservable country heterogeneity, the impact of 
structural state dependence in which economists are interested is compounded by 
the impact of spurious state dependence, which is normally beyond economists' 
interests. 
 
For another thing, the initial state of the binary outcome 𝑦8h (supposing that time 1, 
rather than time 0, is the first time point of the database) on the right-hand side of 
the equation is not exogenous, because it may be correlated with the unobservable 
individual-specific effects or determined by the pre-sample history of the entire 
stochastic process. This is the so-called "initial conditions problem" in estimating 
discrete variable. A formal description of this issue is provided by Heckman (1981c). 
To be specific, it is reasonable to suppose that the process in operation to generate 
the state of the binary outcome had already existed prior to the time point at which 
the initial observations in the database were recorded. In other words, assuming an 
entire process from time 1 to time T, in the real world it is very likely that what a 
database records is only the recent part of the entire process, say, observations from 
time J (the initial time point in the database) to time T (the last or the current time 
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point) rather than from time 1 (the first time point of the entire process) to time T. 
Thus, the initial condition, which is the probability of the initial binary outcome 𝑝(𝑖, 𝐽) , is endogenously determined by the logic of the entire process or the 
summation of probabilities of all the realisations of the binary outcome during the 
pre-J history of the process. In this regard, the initial condition is dependent on 
unobservable heterogeneity. If time J in the entire history of the binary outcome is 
the starting point of a new process (in other words, the pre-J time points belong to 
an old and different process) or if there is no unobservable heterogeneity across 
individuals, then the initial conditions problem does not exist. However, these two 
assumptions are too strong to practically hold true. Therefore, simply assuming the 
initial condition as exogenous leads to inconsistent and upward-biased estimation 
of the state dependence variable (Heckman, 1981c; Chay and Hyslop, 1998). Similar 
to the situation in dynamic linear model, the bias due to the endogeneity decreases 
in the number of time dimension of a panel. However, since the database of this 
chapter has only 20 years (time dimension=20), this endogeneity is anticipated to 
matter. 
 
In order to deal with this initial conditions problem and country heterogeneity, the 
random-effects dynamic nonlinear model (Wooldridge, 2005) is adopted. Random-
effects model is a common and exclusive choice in dynamic nonlinear estimation. 
For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) use random-
effects probit model to estimate firms' exporting decision. In addition to the 
aforementioned small-sample selection bias, Heckman (1981c) uses Monte Carlo 
simulation to show that fixed-effects dynamic model generates downward-biased 
estimator of the lagged dependent variable, and he suggests that fixed-effects model 
is not a qualified solution to the initial conditions problem. Instead, random-effects 
model produces less biased and more reliable estimation. Wooldridge's dynamic 
nonlinear approach is originally designed for probit model, but Wooldridge (2005) 
suggests that it can fit the binary dependent variable in either the probit form or the 
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logit form. Panel logit model is used in this chapter, as it directly allows for easier 
interpretation of the results by odds ratios. The general equation for dynamic 
nonlinear model allowing for unobservable heterogeneity but assuming initial 
condition as exogenous can be expressed as: 
 𝑦8,7 = 𝛽h𝑦8,7gh + 𝑋8,7m 𝛽b + 𝑍8m𝛽 + 𝛾8 + 𝜀8,7              (1) 
 
where 𝑦8,7gh is the lagged dependent variable used as a regressor for controlling for 
state dependence, 𝑋′8,7  is a vector of time-variant regressors, and 𝑍′8  refers to a 
vector of time-invariant regressors. 𝛾8 refers to unobservable individual effects, and 𝜀8,7 is the idiosyncratic error term. 𝛾8 and 𝜀8,7 jointly constitute the composite error 
term. The coefficient 𝛽h measures the state dependence effect of the lagged state on 
the current state. The model here is slightly different from the standard random-
effects dynamic nonlinear model. In order to allow for a kind of correlation between 
the individual effects and regressors, following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain 
(1984), the overall unobservable individual effects 𝛾8,7  are decomposed into a 
longitudinally averaged observable individual-specific characteristics part (𝜌𝑋′), 
which is correlated with the individual-specific regressors 𝑋′8,7 , and a purely 
unobservable part ( 𝑢8 ), namely, 𝛾8 = 𝑋′𝜌 + 𝑢8  where 𝑢8~𝑖𝑖𝑑	𝑁(0, 𝜎4b ) , 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢8, 𝑋′8,7) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢8, 𝜀8,7) = 0	∀	𝑖, 𝑡 . Since 𝑋′  captures some underlying 
individual-specific characteristics, 𝑢8  as the rest part of the overall individual 
effects is assumed to be uncorrelated with the observable individual-specific 
characteristics 𝑋′8,7.  
 
The Wooldridge's Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation separately 
models the distribution of the binary outcome starting from the second time point 
and the binary outcome of the first time point, rather than the joint distribution of 
the entire sequence of the binary outcome conditional only on exogenous regressors. 
Moreover, it models the distribution of the individual heterogeneity conditional on 
 179 
the initial condition 𝑦8,h and time-specific observable individual characteristics. The 
latter can be in the form of either 𝑋8m = (𝑋8,hm , . . ., 𝑋8,7m ), which is the row vector of all 
time- and individual-variant regressors at all time points, or 𝑋′  as defined 
previously. Since the database has 20 time points and four time- and country-variant 
regressors, 𝑋′, rather than 𝑋8′, is used in order to avoid computationally disrupting 
the statistical software67. Finally, the overall individual effects abstracting from 𝜌𝑋′ 
are defined as 𝛾8 = 𝜃 + 𝜃h𝑦8,h + 𝑢8 + 𝜀8,7 . Plugging 𝜌𝑋′  and the Wooldridge 
specification of the overall individual effects 𝛾8 into equation (1), the Wooldridge 
random-effects dynamic nonlinear model is expressed as: 
 𝑦8,7 = 𝜃 + 𝛽h𝑦8,7gh + 𝜃h𝑦8,h + 𝑋8,7m 𝛽b + 𝑋′𝜌 + 𝑍8m𝛽 + 𝑢8 + 𝜀8,7                (2) 
 
where 𝑋′ is the vector of the longitudinally averaged regressors, and 𝑦8,h refers to 
the value of the binary dependent variable at the initial time point, say, the initial 
condition. Introducing 𝑦8,h	and	𝑋′  allows for the endogeneity of the initial 
condition. Otherwise, 𝛽h  will be overestimated. The Wooldridge's approach is a 
simpler solution to the initial conditions problem in comparison with the random-
effects probit estimation by Heckman (1981c), according to which two separate 
equations are used for the initial condition and the binary outcomes of the following 
time points, respectively. The initial condition equation (𝑦8,h = 𝛼𝑋8,hm + 𝜆8, where 𝜆8 =𝜙𝛾8 + 𝜀8,h ) and the dynamic equation for the following time points are jointly 
estimated. Furthermore, in comparison to Heckman (1981c), the Wooldridge's 
approach can easily fit the function of logistic model in standard statistical software. 
 
Following Stewart (2007), dynamic linear model by System GMM (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used as an alternative to the dynamic 
                                            
67 If the original method suggested by Wooldridge (2005) is used to control for the time-specific 
observable individual characteristics by introducing loop regressors, then all the loop regressors 
are omitted and the functioning of Stata is broken. A possible reason is the relatively large time 
dimension (20 years). 
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nonlinear model (Wooldridge, 2005). System GMM is an augmented version of the 
earlier Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991), solving the weak instrument 
problem of lagged level variables in Difference GMM. This method is particularly 
suitable for small-T and large-N dynamic database (Roodman, 2009). Difference 
GMM uses first differencing to eliminate individual effects and then uses lagged 
level variables as instruments to estimate the differenced equation. System GMM, 
instead, uses both differenced equation and level equation to establish an equation 
system. In this two-equation system, lagged differenced endogenous or 
predetermined variables are used as instruments in the level equation, and lagged 
level endogenous or predetermined variables are used as instruments in the 
differenced equation. Thus, System GMM allows to include time-invariant variables 
in the model. More technical details of System GMM have been discussed in Section 
3.4.2. The use of System GMM in estimating binary outcome variable transforms the 
dynamic logistic model to dynamic linear probability model (dynamic LPM). The 
LPM assumes the probability of the binary outcome as a linear function of regressors. 
A concern regarding the LPM is that linear model may generate fitted probability 
above one or below zero, which is practically impossible because probability only 
ranges between zero and one. However, this happens only in the situation of extreme 
probabilities. Long (1997) demonstrates the nearly linear relationship between odds 
ratio and probability for probabilities between 20% and 80%. Hellevik (2007) further 
argues that the results of linear probability model and those of logistic model are 
often practically indifferent.  
 
System GMM is also used to estimate the continuous Dependent Variable Type 2. 
For the same reason as in the case of the binary Dependent Variable Type 1, path 
dependence68 of the directionality of export sophistication requires dynamic model. 
When estimating dynamic panels, static model is subject to the "dynamic panel bias" 
                                            
68 State dependence is used to describe the dynamic pattern of binary variable, because the 
outcome of being 1 or 0 is a kind of state. In comparison, path dependence is more appropriate 
to describe the dynamic pattern of continuous variable. 
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(Nickell, 1981), due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term. The bias is subject to an order of 1 𝑇 and tends to disappear if the 
time dimension approaches infinity (Baltagi, 2008). Asteriou and Hall (2011) suggest 
that adding exogenous regressors can reduce this bias, provided that the time 
dimension T is large. However, as shown by Judson and Owen (1999), the bias only 
decreases from 50% of the true value to 20%, which is still a significant level, if the 
time dimension substantially increases from 5 to 30. Given that the database has only 
20 time points, System GMM is necessary. 
 
4.5.2. The Model of the Directionality of Export Sophistication 
Given the lack of a systematic approach towards the directionality of export 
sophistication, its determinants have to be derived from several different strands of 
literature as discussed in Section 4.2. The static random-effects logistic model 
without time effects to estimate the binary Dependent Variable Type 1 (S/N Dummy) 
is expressed as: 
 𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8,7= 𝛽h𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐺𝐷𝑃)8,7 + 𝛽b𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)8,7+ 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼	𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	𝑝. 𝑐. )8,7 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠8,7+ 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ)8 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ)8+ 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝. 𝑐. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ)7+ 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝. 𝑐. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	(𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ)7 + 𝜂7 + 𝜀8,7 
 
where i refers to country, t refers to year, 𝜂7 represents year-specific effects (used in 
specifications without GDP p.c. Growth Rate North/South), and 𝜀8,7  is the 
idiosyncratic error term. Robust standard errors are used in all specifications, 
regardless of static model or the following dynamic model. Total GDP controls for a 
country's economic size. Overall Export Sophistication is the overall sophistication 
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level of a country's total exports measured by the index of EXPY, regardless of 
Northbound or Southbound exports. Because characteristics associated with 
products at a given level of sophistication allow countries with corresponding 
income level to compete in the market (Lall, Weiss, and Zhang, 2006), overall export 
sophistication can also be read as a proxy for a country's competitiveness in target 
markets. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.3.1, from the 
perspective of the capability theory of production (Andreoni, 2010 and 2011), the 
overall sophistication of a country's export basket reveals this country's productive 
capabilities. In this sense, this variable tests the capability-based explanation for 
export directionality implicitly derived from the North-South trade model by Regolo 
(2013). Productive capabilities reflect a country's static capabilities (e.g., skills, 
knowledge, and experience in particular productive tasks), dynamic/technological 
capabilities (e.g., R&D), production capacity (e.g., means of production), and 
capability enablers (e.g., infrastructures). The "catch-all" characteristic of export 
sophistication makes it a reflection of a country's overall capabilities of performing 
particular productive tasks. It is this characteristic that makes export sophistication 
an overwhelmingly better proxy for a country's capabilities than other commonly-
used indicators that biasedly focus on the technological aspect of production (e.g., 
R&D expenditure and TFP69), especially for developing countries. Andreoni (2011) 
distinguishes between productive activities, which depend on a country's static 
capabilities, and technical change activities, which depend on 
dynamic/technological capabilities. The realisation of both of them has to be 
conditional on production capacity and capability enablers. As discussed in Section 
3.3.1, technological capabilities, which particularly reflects on R&D, may be less 
                                            
69 Both R&D and TFP have biases that they do not reflect the capital and labour aspect of 
productivity and do not take into account the efficiency of the utilisation of resource and 
employment issues. In particular, the relationship between TFP and real economic and 
productive performance is sometimes blurred and even misleading. High TFP may accompany 
idle capital and unemployment, while low TFP may accompany efficient utilisation of resource. 
For example, China's quite low level of TFP, as shown in Figure C1 of Chapter 5, is inconsistent 
with its technological progress and capital deepening. That is to say, the validity of TFP as a 
proxy for productivity is based on assumptions of full employment and exogenous technological 
progress. 
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relevant to developing countries than static capabilities, production capacity, and 
capability enablers.  
 
Meanwhile, R&D is actually poor indicator of technological intensity of products, 
because it does not reflect the contribution of knowledge-intensive intangibles (e.g., 
coordination and marketing) and technology and skill embodied in production 
process rather than in R&D process, which have been increasingly important 
(Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino, 2005). Also, the world distribution of R&D 
expenditure is highly biased in favour of developed countries, which makes R&D 
less relevant to developing countries, and only part of R&D expenditure can actually 
translate into real production (Kemeny, 2010). For developing countries, the 
upgrading of their export composition can be expected to take place mainly in 
production process (e.g., as a result of the transfer of production from more 
advanced countries) rather than in R&D process, which further renders R&D less 
relevant to the technological and managerial intensity of developing countries' 
exports. In contrast, the index of export sophistication reflects technology and 
management embodied in both R&D process, if any, and real production process. 
Moreover, the availability of some commonly-used indicators, such as TFP and R&D 
expenditure, is not sufficient. Thus, using TFP or R&D expenditure will result in a 
significant loss of observations. Instead, the own calculated Overall Export 
Sophistication is available for all countries in all the years. 
 
FDI Inflow p.c. measures inflow of foreign investment per capita, which is associated 
with the inflow of foreign technology and know-how. Data are from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Resource Rents measures a country's 
revenues from fuels, minerals, and forests, which reflects this country's natural 
resource endowment in general and the dependence of the economy on natural 
resources in particular. Because developing countries' resource exports largely go to 
developed and emerging countries, higher share of resource rents in GDP may affect 
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the directionality of developing countries' export sophistication. Data are from the 
WDI database. 
 
The other two sets of variables are distance to trade partner and growth rate of trade 
partner, which are inspired by gravity model. Distance to North measures the mean 
distance between a particular developing country and all countries in the northern 
direction (IEs, EIEs, and China for N-bound 1 and IEs for N-bound 2). Distance has 
always been used in gravity model to explain the magnitude of trade between two 
countries. Moreover, distance reflects trade costs in general and transportation costs 
in particular. Regolo (2013) demonstrates that export diversification decreases in the 
distance between the exporting and the importing countries. The distance variable 
is calculated as the simple average of all bilateral distances between a particular 
developing country and all countries in the northern direction. In comparison with 
distance weighted by countries' trade share or GDP, simple mean distance is 
expected to measure a country's absolute remoteness. While the former may be more 
suitable for examining the level of export sophistication or trade volume, the latter 
is more suitable for examining export directionality. Each bilateral distance is 
measured by the distance between the most populous city of each country. Similarly, 
Distance to South measures the mean distance between a particular developing 
country and all other developing countries (ODEs and LDCs). Data are from the 
CEPII database. 
 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North) is the growth rate of GDP per capita for countries in the 
North as a whole (IEs, EIEs, and China for N-bound 1 and IEs for N-bound 2), 
namely, the growth rate of the ratio of total GDP to total population of the North. 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South) is the growth rate of GDP per capita for all developing 
countries as a whole. This variable measures macroeconomic situation and 
dynamics of the country group of interest, considering that higher growth of the 
South (North) stimulates South-South (North-South) trade (Havrylyshyn, 1985; 
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Demir and Dahi, 2011). In specifications without GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North) and 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South), dummies of year effects are included, which can 
control for all forms of time effects, including linear time trend and country-
invariant but time-variant common shocks (e.g., the global trade slowdown and the 
2007-2008 crisis). Including both time-variant but individual-invariant variables (e.g., 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North)) and year dummies leads to multicolinearity. This 
applies to all the following specifications. Data are from the UNCTAD database. 
 
The dynamic version of the binary Dependent Variable Type 1 is estimated by both 
the linear System GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and the 
nonlinear dynamic logistic model (Wooldridge, 2005). The equation of System GMM 
is the same as that of the static logistic model, except the addition of the lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side and country-specific fixed effects. Several 
conditions must hold for a valid system GMM estimation. There should be first order 
serial correlation but no second order serial correlation in the residual of the 
specification (Arellano-Bond (AR) Test) and instruments should be jointly valid 
(Hansen Overidentification Test). Moreover, two-step estimation is adopted in all 
System GMM regressions. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) suggest that two-step 
estimator generates more efficient estimation under overidentification. Windmeijer 
finite-sample corrected standard errors are used. 
 
The dynamic random-effects logistic model has quite a different form: 𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8,7 = 𝛽h𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8,7gh + 𝛽b𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐺𝐷𝑃)8,7+ 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)8,7 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼	𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	𝑝. 𝑐. )8,7+ 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠8,7 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ)8 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ)8+ 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝. 𝑐. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ)7 + 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝. 𝑐. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	(𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ)7+ 𝛽h𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8,h + 𝛽bm 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐺𝐷𝑃)+ 𝛽m 𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝚤𝑠𝑡𝚤𝑐𝑎𝑡𝚤𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽m𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼	𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤	𝑝. 𝑐. )+ 𝛽m𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒	𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝜂7 + 𝜀8,7 
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where variables with the bar symbol represent the longitudinal averages along the 
whole period for the corresponding time- and country-variant regressors, and 𝑆/𝑁	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦8,h  refers to the initial condition. In the following regression tables, 
however, the longitudinal averages and the initial condition variable are not shown, 
because they just serve as controls for unobservable heterogeneity and initial 
conditions problem. 
 
Another concern lies in the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables other 
than the lagged dependent variable. A major doubt arises from using Overall Export 
Sophistication to explain the directionality of export sophistication. This concern 
seemingly makes sense, but by definition the use of Overall Export Sophistication is 
not problematic. A country's overall export sophistication (overall EXPY) may be 
approximately regarded as the weighted average of this country's export 
sophistication to each direction where the weight is the share of the export value to 
each direction in total exports. However, here a country's Southbound EXPY and 
Northbound EXPY are calculated in absolute terms, without considering the value 
share of exports to each direction in this country's total exports. To some extent, this 
eliminates the correlation between a country's overall EXPY value and its 
Northbound and Southbound EXPY values. More importantly, binary outcome of 
the directionality and the difference between Southbound and Northbound EXPY, 
rather than the absolute Southbound and Northbound EXPY values, are used as the 
dependent variable. This further reduces the likelihood of reverse causality. There 
may be one scenario in which even unweighted Northbound and Southbound EXPY 
values may still lead to reverse causality. If a country's Northbound (Southbound) 
exports account for the dominant share in its total exports and have substantially 
greater sophistication level than that of Southbound (Northbound) exports, then 
overall EXPY may tend to be largely determined by the EXPY of the dominant export 
direction, regardless of the use of the share of export value as weight. However, 
endogeneity tests robustly support the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of Overall 
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Export Sophistication for all types of dependent variables.  
 
The baseline regressions are based on annual data of 62 developing countries from 
1995 to 2014. Appendix C gives descriptive statistics of all variables in the 62-country 
panel. Since different kinds of dependent variables and econometric methods are 
already applied in the baseline analyses, robustness checks focus on the different 
choices of country sample and time interval. Three robustness checks are carried out. 
First, in order to further control for the inertia and stickiness of export directionality, 
annual data are rearranged by taking average of every two non-overlapping years. 
Thus, the 20-year panel becomes a 10-year non-overlapping panel. Second, a three-
year overlapping interval panel is examined. For example, the first three-year 
interval is 1995-1997, the second one is 1996-1998, and the last one is 2012-2014, 
which results in 18 overlapping three-year periods. Third, countries with population 
less than one million but more than 50,000 are added to the panel, which increases 
the number of countries from 62 to 84. Most of these countries are small island 
economies. Major exporting countries of mineral fuels are still excluded, because 
their pattern of export sophistication and directionality is too special. For space limit, 
only the results of the first robustness check are shown. 
 
4.5.3. Results 
Table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show baseline regressions for the 62-country panel. N-
bound 1 refers to the broadly-defined Northbound exports, say, a developing 
country's exports to all countries in the group of IEs, EIEs, and China, which 
corresponds to S/N Dummy 1. N-bound 2 refers to the narrowly-defined Northbound 
exports, say, a developing country's exports to all countries in the group of IEs, 
which corresponds to S/N Dummy 2. The dependent variable is equal to one if in a 
particular year a country's Southbound EXPY is higher than its Northbound EXPY, 
otherwise it is equal to zero. Odds ratios, rather than default coefficients, are 
 188 
reported for all panel logit regressions. The default output for logit model is log odds 
(the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of having a particular outcome to the 
probability of having the opposite outcome), which is not straightforward to 
interpret. Rather, odds ratio, which is the exponentiation of log odds, is easier for 
interpretation. Odds ratio ranges from zero onwards without upper bound, and the 
threshold is one. If odds ratio is larger than one, then the probability to have the 
dependent variable equal to one is larger than the probability to have it equal to zero. 
If odds ratio lies between zero and one, then the probability to have the dependent 
variable equal to zero is larger than the probability to have it equal to one. Here, if 
the odds ratio of a variable lies between zero and one, then this variable increases 
(reduces) the probability of a developing country to have more sophisticated 
Northbound (Southbound) exports than Southbound (Northbound) exports. Odds 
ratio closer to zero indicates stronger effect. In turn, if odds ratio is larger than one, 
then this variable increases the probability to have more sophisticated Southbound 
exports than Northbound exports. Each dependent variable is estimated with two 
specifications, one controlling for year effects without GDP per capita growth rates 
of the North and the South and the other one controlling for GDP per capita growth 
rates of the North and the South but without year effects. Finally, the data have been 
tested to be stationary through panel unit-root tests, and thus the regressions are not 
spurious. 
 
Random-effects static panel logit regressions for the binary Dependent Variable Type 
1 (S/N Dummy) are presented in Table 4.3. Overall Export Sophistication, measured as 
the overall EXPY, increases (reduces) the probability of a developing country to have 
more sophisticated Northbound (Southbound) exports than Southbound 
(Northbound) exports in all the four specifications. The magnitude of impact is 
stronger for the broadly-defined Northbound exports (N-bound 1) with significance 
at 1% level and odds ratios lower than 0.025. For the narrowly-defined Northbound 
exports (N-bound 2), the impact is slightly weaker (odds ratios are around 0.15) at 
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the 5% significance level. An increase in Overall Export Sophistication by one 
percentage point generates an odds ratio of approximately 0.9670 for Northbound 1 
and 0.98 for Northbound 2, indicating an reduction in the odds of having more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports by 4 and 2 percentage 
points, respectively. Resource Rents increases the probability to have more 
sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound exports (odds ratios are around 
0.96), which is statistically significant in three out of the four specifications. A one-
percent increase in the share of resource revenues in GDP reduces the odds of having 
more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports by approximately 
4 percentage point. The insignificant case in Column 3 lies just beyond the 10% 
significance level (p-value=0.137). Larger Distance to South increases the probability 
to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound exports at the 10% 
significance level in all the four specifications. A one-percent increase in Distance to 
South produces an odds ratio of approximately 0.94 for Northbound 1 and 0.95 for 
Northbound 2, indicating a reduction in the odds of having more sophisticated 
Southbound exports than Northbound exports by 6 and 5 percentage points. Other 
variables are not statistically significant. The four specifications give very consistent 
results. Countries with higher overall export sophistication or higher revenues from 
natural resources and countries being more remote from other developing countries 
are more likely to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound 
exports. 
 
Table 4.3. Static panel logit regressions for S/N Dummy  
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Total GDP 1.285 1.247 1.510 1.171 
 (0.361) (0.348) (0.589) (0.335) 
Overall Export Sophistication 0.0227*** 0.0225*** 0.136** 0.152** 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.123) (0.137) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 1.167 1.168 1.028 1.029 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.115) (0.102) 
Resource Rents 0.961** 0.962** 0.964 0.961* 
 (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0236) (0.0200) 
Distance to North 1 15.71 14.99   
                                            
70 0.96≈exp(ln(0.0226)×ln(1.01)).  
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 (41.89) (39.99)   
Distance to South 0.00216* 0.00238* 0.00251* 0.00733* 
 (0.00704) (0.00778) (0.00784) (0.0206) 
Distance to North 2   27.14 16.93 
   (60.57) (35.24) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  5.64e-05   
  (0.000402)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  0.766  2.474 
  (6.393)  (21.09) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    0.000847 
    (0.00521) 
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Year Dummy Yes No Yes No 
Wald chi2 (p) 58.83*** 60.39*** 52.95*** 32.92*** 
Log Likelihood -411.92 -410.94 -446.13 -458.68 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Odds ratios are reported. 
 
Table 4.4 gives the random-effects dynamic logit regressions. The first lags of the 
dependent variable S/N Dummy have positive odds ratios at the 1% significance level 
in all specifications. The high statistical significance robustly justifies the 
consideration of the state dependence of the directionality of developing countries' 
export sophistication. Omitting the lagged dependent variable will overestimate the 
effects of other regressors. As in the static setting, Overall Export Sophistication has 
highly significant positive impact on the probability to have more sophisticated 
Northbound exports than Southbound exports in all specifications. The magnitude 
of impact is quite similar to that in the static setting. The odds ratios of Resource Rents 
are almost the same as those in the static setting, but this variable loses significance 
in all specifications. Similar to the static setting, larger Distance to South increases the 
probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound 
exports in all specifications. Moreover, Distance to North 2, namely, distance to 
developed countries, turns to be statistically significant with negative impact on the 
probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports. That is to say, being 
remote from developed countries reduces a developing country's probability to have 
more sophisticated exports to these countries.  
 
Table 4.4. Dynamic panel logit regressions for S/N Dummy  
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Lagged S/N Dummy 1 4.751*** 4.166***   
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 (1.263) (1.053)   
Lagged S/N Dummy 2   7.592*** 6.324*** 
   (1.738) (1.268) 
Total GDP 3.044 1.456 4.465 1.189 
 (3.390) (0.778) (4.284) (0.608) 
Overall Export Sophistication 0.0188*** 0.0260*** 0.136*** 0.170** 
 (0.0128) (0.0175) (0.104) (0.126) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 1.022 1.069 0.948 0.989 
 (0.0991) (0.0981) (0.0908) (0.0903) 
Resource Rents 0.976 0.972 0.975 0.968 
 (0.0203) (0.0179) (0.0244) (0.0214) 
Distance to North 1 33.62 25.93   
 (81.35) (59.43)   
Distance to South 0.00292** 0.00409** 0.00841** 0.0125** 
 (0.00753) (0.0100) (0.0169) (0.0235) 
Distance to North 2   24.02* 17.62* 
   (42.59) (29.20) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  0.000158   
  (0.00129)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  1.516  3.102 
  (13.99)  (26.11) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    6.40e-05 
    (0.000409) 
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Year Dummy Yes No Yes No 
Wald chi2 (p) 136.1*** 130.4*** 149.8*** 141.4*** 
Log-Likelihood -350.95 -362.93 -373.80 -390.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Odds ratios are reported. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the dynamic linear probability model by System GMM. Standard 
coefficients are reported, instead of odds ratios. Negative coefficients are 
qualitatively equivalent to odds ratios between zero and one in the logistic model, 
and positive coefficients correspond to odds ratios larger than one. The first lags of 
the dependent variable S/N Dummy have positive coefficients at the 1% significance 
level in all the four specifications, which confirms the consideration of state 
dependence. Overall Export Sophistication significantly reduces the probability to 
have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports. In other 
words, it increases the probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports 
than Southbound exports. The magnitude of impact is greater for the broadly-
defined Northbound exports, which is consistent with the logit model. FDI Inflow 
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p.c. turns to be significant with positive impact on the probability to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports or less sophisticated Northbound exports in all 
the four specifications. Resource Rents reduces the probability to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports at the 1% significance level in all specifications, 
which confirms the results in logit model. While Distance to North 1 and Distance to 
North 2 are not significant, Distance to South reduces the probability to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports in all specifications, which is consistent with the 
logit model. GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2) significantly reduces (increases) the 
probability to have more sophisticated Southbound (Northbound) exports. That said, 
higher economic growth of developed countries increases developing countries' 
Northbound export sophistication. The Arellano-Bond test confirms the existence of 
first order serial correlation and reject the existence of second order serial correlation. 
Hansen test for the joint validity of the instruments does not reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity and Difference-in-Hansen tests (for the sake of space, 
details are not shown) show the validity of each subset of instruments. 
 
Table 4.5. Dynamic linear probability model for S/N Dummy  
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Lagged S/N Dummy 1 0.181*** 0.197***   
 (0.0533) (0.0571)   
Lagged S/N Dummy 2   0.243*** 0.270*** 
   (0.0442) (0.0466) 
Total GDP -0.0133 -0.0148 -0.00955 -0.0124 
 (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0265) 
Overall Export Sophistication -0.312*** -0.337*** -0.166* -0.168* 
 (0.0970) (0.0937) (0.0927) (0.0912) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 0.0414*** 0.0445*** 0.0311** 0.0314** 
 (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0139) 
Resource Rents -0.00837*** -0.00841*** -0.00794*** -0.00760*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00308) (0.00261) (0.00246) 
Distance to North 1 0.345 0.314   
 (0.264) (0.265)   
Distance to South -0.552* -0.544* -0.437* -0.406* 
 (0.316) (0.299) (0.250) (0.241) 
Distance to North 2   0.265 0.240 
   (0.190) (0.189) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  -0.895   
  (0.664)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  0.687  0.591 
  (0.887)  (0.895) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    -1.043* 
    (0.578) 
Constant 5.468*** 5.975*** 3.687*** 3.800*** 
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 (1.568) (1.554) (1.419) (1.439) 
Observations 1140 1140 1140 1140 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Number of Instruments 28 12 28 12 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.735 0.700 0.426 0.525 
Hansen Test (p) 0.288 0.283 0.667 0.425 
Difference-in-Hansen Test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM regression: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.6 gives System GMM regressions for the continuous Dependent Variable 
Type 2, which is defined as the log difference between a country's Southbound and 
Northbound EXPY. Positive value indicates more sophisticated Southbound exports 
than Northbound exports. The larger the positive difference is, the greater is the 
sophistication advantage of Southbound exports over Northbound exports. Two 
definitions of Northbound exports are examined separately. Column 1 and 3 control 
for year effects, and Column 2 and 4 control for GDP per capita growth rates of the 
North and the South without year effects. The first lags of the dependent variable 
have positive coefficients of quite similar magnitude at the 1% significance level in 
all the four specifications. This result confirms the path dependence of the 
directionality of export sophistication. Overall Export Sophistication reduces 
Southbound export sophistication or increases Northbound export sophistication. 
This impact is more statistically significant and has larger magnitude for the 
broadly-defined Northbound exports, N-bound 1, (at the 1% significance level) than 
the narrowly-defined Northbound exports, N-bound 2, (at the 10% and 5% 
significance level), which is fully consistent with results from the binary Dependent 
Variable Type 1. FDI Inflow p.c. slightly increases the sophistication of Southbound 
exports or reduces the sophistication of Northbound exports in all the four 
specifications, whereas Resource Rents has the opposite impact. Distance to North 1 
and Distance to North 2 significantly increase Southbound export sophistication or 
reduce Northbound export sophistication, and Distance to South has the opposite 
impact in all specifications. These results are consistent with those from the binary 
dependent variable, except Distance to North 1, which is insignificant for the case of 
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the binary dependent variable. Generally speaking, continuous dependent variable 
gives quite similar results with those from the binary dependent variable.  
 
Table 4.6. System GMM regressions for S-N Difference  
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S-N EXPY Diff. 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Lagged S-N Diff. 1 0.292*** 0.291***   
 (0.0624) (0.0661)   
Lagged S-N Diff. 2   0.274*** 0.285*** 
   (0.0467) (0.0534) 
Total GDP -0.0142 -0.0143 -0.0109 -0.0180 
 (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0185) (0.0178) 
Overall Export Sophistication -0.331*** -0.325*** -0.165* -0.203** 
 (0.0831) (0.0807) (0.0870) (0.0959) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 0.0247** 0.0260** 0.0230** 0.0215* 
 (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0113) 
Resource Rents -0.00725*** -0.00706*** -0.00682*** -0.00699*** 
 (0.00207) (0.00192) (0.00188) (0.00188) 
Distance to North 1 0.319 0.327*   
 (0.197) (0.193)   
Distance to South -0.482* -0.497** -0.455** -0.403* 
 (0.247) (0.243) (0.215) (0.216) 
Distance to North 2   0.349** 0.309* 
   (0.164) (0.167) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  -1.155**   
  (0.458)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  0.200  0.0643 
  (0.741)  (0.789) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    -0.400 
    (0.533) 
Constant 4.887*** 4.959*** 2.840** 3.239*** 
 (1.051) (1.037) (1.173) (1.214) 
Observations 1140 1140 1140 1140 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Number of Instruments 28 12 28 12 
AR(1) 0.00200 0.00206 0.000583 0.000840 
AR(2) 0.162 0.162 0.185 0.215 
Hansen Test (p) 0.333 0.441 0.426 0.268 
Difference-in-Hansen Test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM regression: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show the robustness check by using the 62-country panel 
of two-year non-overlapping interval. In a two-year period, if a country has more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports in at least one year, 
then the S/N dummy is coded as one. Table 4.7 gives the random-effects static logit 
regressions for the binary Dependent Variable Type 1. Overall Export Sophistication 
increases the probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than 
Southbound exports. Similar to the situation in the baseline annual panel, this 
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impact is greater and more statistically significant for the broadly-defined 
Northbound exports. Resource Rents increases the probability to have more 
sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound exports in all specifications 
with the odds ratios quite similar to those in the baseline regressions. However, 
variables of distance do not show statistical significance. 
 
Table 4.7. Static panel logit regressions for S/N Dummy (two-year interval panel) 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Total GDP 1.070 1.022 1.113 1.033 
 (0.352) (0.294) (0.443) (0.345) 
Overall Productive Investment 0.00534*** 0.00643*** 0.0756** 0.0811** 
 (0.00532) (0.00642) (0.0896) (0.0953) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 1.292 1.305 1.056 1.057 
 (0.238) (0.219) (0.204) (0.188) 
Resource Rents 0.931** 0.927*** 0.948* 0.946** 
 (0.0278) (0.0262) (0.0286) (0.0265) 
Distance to North 1 1.302 1.493   
 (3.645) (3.916)   
Distance to South 0.0469 0.0419 0.0121 0.0166 
 (0.174) (0.140) (0.0436) (0.0561) 
Distance to North 2   10.55 9.261 
   (27.90) (23.39) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  0.000656   
  (0.00998)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  0.0900  44.91 
  (1.590)  (800.4) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    0.00662 
    (0.0847) 
Observations 594 594 594 594 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No 
Wald chi2 (p) 42.35*** 39.80*** 25.18** 20.98*** 
Log Likelihood -215.1 -217.21 -223.09 -225.85 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Odds ratios are reported. 
 
Table 4.8 shows random-effects dynamic logit regressions for the two-year interval 
panel. The lags are highly significant in all the specifications. Overall Export 
Sophistication increases the probability to have more sophisticated Northbound 
exports than Southbound exports in all specifications. As in previous regressions, 
the impact is stronger and more statistically significant for the broadly-defined 
Northbound exports. Distance to South increases the probability to have more 
sophisticated Northbound exports, which is in line with previous regressions on 
annual basis. 
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Table 4.8. Dynamic panel logit regressions for S/N Dummy (two-year interval 
panel) 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Lagged S/N Dummy 1 6.163*** 5.470***   
 (2.885) (2.280)   
Lagged S/N Dummy 2   4.144*** 3.527*** 
   (1.968) (1.404) 
Total GDP 5.839 1.695 6.880 1.448 
 (9.688) (1.445) (9.857) (1.177) 
Overall Productive Investment 0.00269*** 0.00255*** 0.0564** 0.0540** 
 (0.00345) (0.00333) (0.0741) (0.0731) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 0.989 1.000 0.845 0.847 
 (0.215) (0.210) (0.146) (0.129) 
Resource Rents 0.971 0.965 0.969 0.965 
 (0.0360) (0.0373) (0.0313) (0.0308) 
Distance to North 1 11.52 9.848   
 (23.91) (19.48)   
Distance to South 0.00499* 0.00632** 0.00405* 0.00509* 
 (0.0139) (0.0162) (0.0124) (0.0146) 
Distance to North 2   37.36 32.31 
   (90.82) (74.25) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  7.02e-05   
  (0.00119)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  1.478  193.9 
  (25.59)  (3,235) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    0.000899 
    (0.0124) 
Observations 537 537 537 537 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No 
Wald chi2 (p) 89.70*** 90.13*** 63.50*** 61.67*** 
Log Likelihood -168.73 -171.66 -176.75 -180.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Odds ratios are reported. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the dynamic linear probability regressions for the two-year interval 
panel. The second lag of the dependent variable is included. This is because that, in 
this two-year interval panel with S/N Dummy, using only the first lag leads to second 
order serial correlation of the residuals, which weakens the System GMM estimation. 
Both the first lags and the second lags of the binary dependent variables have highly 
significant and positive coefficients, and the second lags have smaller coefficients 
than the first lags in all the four specifications. Overall Export Sophistication increases 
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the probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound 
exports, but this effect is only significant for the broadly-defined Northbound 
exports (Column 1 and 2). FDI Inflow p.c. reduces the probability to have more 
sophisticated Northbound exports but only for the broadly-defined Northbound 
exports. Resource Rents increases the probability to have more sophisticated 
Northbound exports than Southbound exports in all the four specifications. Other 
variables are not significant. 
 
Table 4.9. Dynamic linear probability model for S/N Dummy (two-year interval 
panel) 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S/N Dummy 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
1st Lagged S/N Dummy 1 0.355*** 0.366***   
 (0.0912) (0.0911)   
2nd Lagged S/N Dummy 1 0.174*** 0.165**   
 (0.0587) (0.0675)   
1st Lagged S/N Dummy 2   0.387*** 0.383*** 
   (0.0843) (0.0813) 
2nd Lagged S/N Dummy 2   0.198*** 0.194*** 
   (0.0687) (0.0673) 
Total GDP -0.00482 -0.00557 -0.0131 -0.0144 
 (0.0205) (0.0214) (0.0232) (0.0196) 
Overall Export Sophistication -0.319*** -0.298*** -0.119 -0.126 
 (0.0889) (0.0929) (0.109) (0.0976) 
FDI Inflow p.c. 0.0301* 0.0290* 0.0122 0.0123 
 (0.0172) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0132) 
Resource Rents -0.00633** -0.00634** -0.00538** -0.00601** 
 (0.00260) (0.00265) (0.00273) (0.00234) 
Distance to North 1 0.000207 0.0355   
 (0.225) (0.225)   
Distance to South -0.154 -0.182 -0.230 -0.195 
 (0.283) (0.269) (0.256) (0.213) 
Distance to North 2   0.110 0.121 
   (0.214) (0.177) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  -0.843   
  (1.590)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  -0.480  0.939 
  (1.571)  (1.688) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    -0.878 
    (1.076) 
Constant 4.688*** 4.487*** 2.740** 2.443** 
 (1.323) (1.261) (1.338) (1.131) 
Observations 478 478 478 478 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Number of Instruments 18 13 20 13 
AR(1) 0.0000562 0.0000301 0.000756 0.000171 
AR(2) 0.539 0.314 0.786 0.954 
Hansen Test (p) 0.191 0.335 0.120 0.557 
Difference-in-Hansen Test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Constant 4.688*** 4.487*** 2.740** 2.443** 
Two-step System GMM regression: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Finally, Table 4.10 shows the System GMM regressions for the continuous 
Dependent Variable Type 2 with the two-year interval panel. The first lags have 
highly significant and positive coefficients in all specifications. Overall Export 
Sophistication increases Northbound export sophistication or reduces Southbound 
export sophistication. The impact, as previously, is greater and more significant for 
the broadly-defined Northbound exports than the narrowly-defined Northbound 
exports. FDI Inflow p.c. slightly increases Southbound export sophistication or 
reduces Northbound export sophistication, which is only significant for the broadly-
defined Northbound exports. Resource Rents has highly significant but quite small 
effect to increase Northbound export sophistication or reduce Southbound export 
sophistication in all specifications. Distance to South increases Northbound export 
sophistication or reduces Southbound export sophistication, but this impact is only 
significant in Column 2. GDP per capita growth rates of the broadly-defined and the 
narrowly-defined North turn to be significant. Higher economic growth in the North 
increases developing countries' Northbound export sophistication or reduces their 
Southbound export sophistication. Finally, in Column 3 and 4 the Arellano and Bond 
test rejects the null of the absence of second order serial correlation. This problem 
cannot be solved, even if the second lag of the dependent variable is added. However, 
the Difference-in-Hansen test for the first-differenced equation does not reject the 
null hypothesis of lagged level dependent variables as valid instruments. Thus, the 
Blundell and Bond mean stationarity condition holds and the Arellano-Bond test 
should not be a major problem. 
 
Table 4.10. System GMM regressions for S-N Difference (two-year interval panel) 
DepVar (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S-N EXPY Diff. 1 or 2 N-bound 1 N-bound 1 N-bound 2 N-bound 2 
Lagged S-N Diff. 1 0.478*** 0.501***   
 (0.139) (0.148)   
Lagged S-N Diff. 2   0.551*** 0.563*** 
   (0.129) (0.121) 
Total GDP -0.00651 -0.00589 -0.00663 -0.00618 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0106) 
Overall Productive Investment -0.314*** -0.290*** -0.162* -0.137* 
 (0.0975) (0.0999) (0.0834) (0.0798) 
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FDI Inflow p.c. 0.0227** 0.0222** 0.0118 0.00985 
 (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.00912) (0.00878) 
Resource Rents -0.00610*** -0.00600*** -0.00522*** -0.00518*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00203) (0.00190) (0.00182) 
Distance to North 1 0.168 0.197   
 (0.131) (0.132)   
Distance to South -0.267 -0.301* -0.178 -0.196 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.159) (0.150) 
Distance to North 2   0.152 0.167 
   (0.120) (0.116) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1)  -1.877**   
  (0.895)   
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South)  0.899  -0.240 
  (0.998)  (0.968) 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2)    -1.162* 
    (0.604) 
Constant 3.963*** 3.808*** 1.963** 1.776* 
 (1.241) (1.271) (0.961) (0.920) 
Observations 537 537 537 537 
Number of Countries 62 62 62 62 
Number of Instruments 18 12 18 12 
AR(1) 0.0000140 0.000125 0.000406 0.000190 
AR(2) 0.171 0.168 0.0474 0.0483 
Hansen Test (p) 0.559 0.484 0.293 0.493 
Difference-in-Hansen Test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Wald chi2 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two-step System GMM regression: Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Furthermore, two additional robustness checks have also been carried out. First, 
small countries with population between 50,000 and one million are added to the 
sample, which expands the number of countries from 62 to 84. Second, the three-
year overlapping interval panel is examined. The first three-year interval is 1995-
1997, the second one is 1996-1998, and the last one is 2012-2014, which results in 18 
overlapping three-year periods. The results do not show major differences. In 
particular, Overall Export Sophistication is still a robust contributor to the 
directionality of export sophistication. Higher Overall Export Sophistication increases 
the probability to have more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound 
exports. Distance to South and Resource Rents increase the probability to have more 
sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound exports. For the space limit, the 
results of the two additional robustness checks are not shown. 
 
In summary, this section gives regressions on the determinants of the directionality 
of developing countries' export sophistication based on (1) binary and continuous 
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measures of the directionality of export sophistication, (2) broadly-defined and 
narrowly-defined Northbound exports, (3) static and dynamic models, (4) linear and 
nonlinear models, (5) smaller and larger country samples, and (6) annual, two-year 
non-overlapping interval, and three-year overlapping interval panels. Different 
specifications give quite consistent results. First, state/path dependence of the 
directionality of developing countries' export sophistication is confirmed in all 
dynamic regressions, regardless of linear or nonlinear model or binary or continuous 
measures of the directionality. Second, Overall Export Sophistication has highly 
significant effect to reduce the probability to have more sophisticated Southbound 
exports than Northbound exports or reduce (increase) Southbound (Northbound) 
export sophistication in almost all specifications. It can be regarded as a major and 
robust determinant of the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication. Developing countries with more sophisticated overall export 
structure or, deeply speaking, greater productive capabilities are less likely to have 
more sophisticated Southbound exports. Third, Resource Rents is found to reduce the 
probability to have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound 
exports or reduce (increase) Southbound (Northbound) export sophistication. 
Fourth, in the majority of specifications Distance to South reduces the probability to 
have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports or reduces 
(increases) Southbound (Northbound) export sophistication. In some specifications, 
Distance to North 1 and Distance to North 2 increase the probability to have more 
sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports or increase (reduce) 
Southbound (Northbound) export sophistication. The impact of the three "distance" 
variables supports the role of remoteness in the directionality of developing 
countries' export sophistication. Geographical closeness reduces trade costs and 
increases export sophistication. This is similar to the prediction of bilateral trade 
flow in gravity model. Fifth, FDI Inflow p.c. shows mixed but small impacts, which 
is insignificant in many specifications. Sixth, GDP per capita growth rate of the 
North reduces the probability to have more sophisticated Southbound exports than 
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Northbound exports or reduces (increases) Southbound (Northbound) export 
sophistication. This implies that macroeconomic dynamics of trade partners impact 
on export sophistication. Provided that economic growth is a rough indicator of 
demand, increase in demand by trade partners raises the sophistication of this 
export direction. The above results are not sensitive to the broadly-defined or the 
narrowly-defined Northbound exports. Moreover, since developing countries 
specialising in mineral fuels have been dropped from the sample, the results are not 
distorted by the fact that the majority of developing countries' exports in mineral 
fuels go to the northern direction. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Since the 1970s, it has been observed that South-South exports tend to be more 
sophisticated than South-North exports and thus are believed to have greater 
developmental effects. This phenomenon raises the issue of the directionality of 
developing countries' export sophistication. However, explorations into this export 
directionality, either theoretical or empirical, have been insufficient. Recent evidence 
is quite limited and existing studies are largely subject to outdated country grouping. 
By adopting the industrialisation-based country grouping system, this chapter 
shows that, between 1995 and 2014, more than half of developing countries tend to 
have more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports on average, 
and the reverse is true for the others. This reflects the heterogeneity within 
developing countries in terms of export directionality. 
 
In addition to the evidence on the pattern of the directionality of developing 
countries' export sophistication, another issue is what factors determine this 
directionality. This chapter finds that a country's productive capabilities that are 
measured by its overall export sophistication are a major and robust determinant. 
Developing countries that have greater productive capabilities are less likely to have 
 202 
more sophisticated Southbound exports than Northbound exports. By contrast, 
lower productive capabilities lead to lower Northbound export sophistication or 
higher Southbound export sophistication. The mechanism underlying this finding 
may be that developing countries with greater productive capabilities are able to 
export their relatively sophisticated products to the more competitive markets of 
developed and emerging countries. Those with lower productive capabilities do not 
have such ability to enter more advanced markets with their relatively sophisticated 
products, if any. Instead, they have to serve more advanced market with their less 
sophisticated products, and markets of other developing countries are an outlet for 
their relatively sophisticated products. Another explanation for this finding is the 
integration into the global value chains. Developing countries tend to be at the lower 
tier of the global value chains, serving as suppliers of primary commodities or 
simple manufactures. This is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Foster-
McGregor and Stehrer, 2013). Because the downstream of the global value chains 
concentrates in the Global North, developing countries' participation in the 
upstream as primary suppliers naturally leads to less sophisticated Northbound 
exports. However, developing countries with greater productive capabilities may be 
able to supply more sophisticated products to downstream producers and thus take 
relatively higher position in the value chains. As a result, these countries may have 
more sophisticated Northbound exports than Southbound exports.  
 
The findings imply that the conventional wisdom that South-South trade is more 
beneficial to developing countries than North-South trade should be treated 
conditionally. This chapter argues that developing countries should not be taken as 
a homogeneous whole. Provided that more sophisticated export direction has 
greater developmental effect, Northbound exports should be more beneficial to 
those productively more advanced developing countries, and Southbound exports 
may be an opportunity for those productively less advanced ones, in terms of 
industrialisation and structural transformation. However, this implication must be 
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treated cautiously, because the sophistication of exports to different directions is 
examined without considering the corresponding export volume. For example, a 
country's Northbound exports may be highly sophisticated, but have a very low 
volume. In other words, high export quality may accompany low export quantity. 
In this case, can we say that Northbound exports are a greater opportunity for this 
country? This may be an empirical question and may not be answered without case-
by-case studies. A preliminary answer may be that efforts to expand the small but 
sophisticated export direction are helpful.  
 
Finally, what has been discussed so far refers to the export side of developing 
countries' South-North trade and South-South trade. Even if a developing country's 
Southbound exports are more sophisticated, its Northbound imports, say imports 
from developed countries, as found by Schiff and Wang (2006), tend to be definitely 
more sophisticated than Southbound imports, indicating greater technology 
diffusion. Therefore, learning by doing through Southbound exports and technology 
diffusion through Northbound imports should be taken into account at the same 
time. In this sense, echoing the literature since the 1950s from Myrdal (1956) to 
Klinger (2009), the development of South-South trade is a solution to the dilemma 
facing developing countries as demonstrated in radical political economy (e.g., 
Prebisch-Singer thesis, dependency theory, and world-system theory) that exporting 
primary commodities in exchange of manufactures from the centre impedes the 
periphery's development. 
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Appendix A. Modifications of the UNIDO Country Grouping 
The 2013 UNIDO country grouping divides the world into four tiers according to a 
country's manufacturing value added per capita ( 𝑀𝑉𝐴$% ) 71 : Industrialised 
Economies (IEs), Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs) and China 72 , Other 
Developing Economies (ODEs), and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Table A1 
(the same as Table 2.2 in Chapter 2) shows the UNIDO classification criteria. 
However, the UNIDO classification of some countries, mostly in the group of 
Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs), is problematic. For this reason, this appendix 
discusses some minor modifications of the original UNIDO country grouping.  
 
 
                                            
71 	𝑀𝑉𝐴$% = 012	(222)23$4567839 × ;<=012 
72 According to 𝑀𝑉𝐴$%, China belongs to the group of EIEs. However, due to its size, China is 
separately listed in the UNIDO statistics. 
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Table A1. The UNIDO Country Grouping  
Country Groups Statistical Thresholds73 Economies 
North Industrialised Economies (IEs) 𝑀𝑉𝐴$% 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≥ 2500  
            or 𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝑃𝑃𝑃) ≥ 20000  57 
Emerging 
South 
(ES) 
Emerging Industrial Economies 
(EIEs) 
& 
China 
1000 ≤ 𝑀𝑉𝐴$%(𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 2500  
            or 𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎	(𝑃𝑃𝑃) ≥ 10000  
            or 
share in world 𝑀𝑉𝐴 ≥ 0.5% 
33 
Developing 
South 
(DS) 
Other Developing Economies 
(ODEs) 
All others (except LDCs) 82 
Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) 
Based on UN official list 46 
   Source: UNIDO (2013) 
 
A.1. The Evolution of the UNIDO Country Grouping 
Nielsen (2011) argues that a country grouping system based on development level, 
namely, development taxonomy, must firstly deal with the question of what 
"development" is. Only after clarifying the concept of development, can a 
development taxonomy be robustly established. However, because a unified 
understanding of development does not exist, there is no generally-accepted country 
grouping system or development taxonomy. The United Nations has even never 
issued any development taxonomy with respect to its member states, except the list 
of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Different international organisations design 
their own groupings based on their different perceptions of development and 
different purposes. Because the primary mandate of UNIDO is to promote 
industrialisation worldwide, especially in the developing world, industrialisation 
level acts as the principle criterion to differentiate between country groups in the 
UNIDO system (UNIDO, 2013).  
 
In 1983, UNIDO issued its first country grouping, which divides the world into 
                                            
73 At 2005 current prices, international dollars in PPP. 
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Developed Market Economies, Centrally Planned Economies, Developing 
Economies, and China. China is separately listed due to its size. However, as 
recognised in UNIDO (2013), the 1983 country grouping reflects the perception of 
political and economic differentiations between country groups rather than 
differentiations in statistical terms. In other words, it lacks statistical grounding. 
After the end of the Cold War, the 1983 country grouping lost its relevance to the 
reality. In a revision, Developed Market Economies and Centrally Planned 
Economies are combined as a new group of Industrialised Countries. The rest of the 
world, except China, then constitutes Developing Countries, which are further 
divided into Newly Industrialised Countries (incl. both the first-generation East 
Asian NICs and the second-generation NICs), Other Developing Countries, and 
Least Developed Countries. However, according to UNIDO (2013), the revised 
country grouping suffers from problems on some countries' accession to the group 
of Industrialised Countries. For instance, all countries that previously belonged to 
Centrally Planned Countries are simply classified under Industrialised Countries 
without considerations on the long-term unbalanced development among these 
countries, as well as their divergent situations after the Cold War. A striking example 
is the Soviet Union. It comprised a highly industrialised European part and a 
backward Central Asian and Caucasian part. Until 2013, UNIDO country groupings 
were designed without explicit statistical grounding, and thus lacked quantifiable 
criteria. For this reason, the 2013 UNIDO country grouping is developed based on 
manufacturing value added per capita ( 𝑀𝑉𝐴$% ), which reflects a country's 
industrialisation stage.  
 
A.2. Minor Modifications of the UNIDO Country Grouping 
The problem of the 2013 UNIDO country grouping centres on the group of 
Industrialised Economies (IEs) and Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs). In the 
2013 grouping, only seven former centrally planned countries (i.e., Czech Republic, 
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Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Russian Federation) are 
classified under IEs. Some other former centrally planned countries that have 
comparable income or industrialisation level are classified under Emerging 
Industrial Economies (EIEs) by UNIDO. In earlier UNIDO country grouping, all 
former centrally planned countries were classified under Industrialised Countries. 
Although this earlier approach is somewhat arbitrary, it does justify a common 
perception that countries in the former Eastern Bloc tend to be highly industrialised, 
especially in comparison to developing countries. Besides those former centrally 
planned countries, several other countries are also subject to inappropriate exclusion 
from IEs.  
 
Table A2 shows countries that are moved away from the group of EIEs to the group 
of IEs with the reasons for each individual case. Countries under change can be 
divided into four groups:  
1. Southern Cone Countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) 
2. Advanced Ex-Soviet Republics (Belarus, Ukraine, and Latvia) 
3. Advanced Ex-European Socialist Countries and Advanced Constituent Republic of the 
Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/SFRY (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and 
Croatia) 
4. Traditional European Market Economies (Cyprus and Greece) 
5. Advanced Petroleum Exporters (Brunei Darussalam) 
 
Table A2. Notes on modifications of the UNIDO group of EIEs 
Country Reasons to be moved from EIEs to IEs 
Southern Cone Countries  
Argentina 1. (Very) High human development level (according to the 
UN HDI) 
2. Two similar countries, Chile and Uruguay, are classified 
under High-Income Economies by the World Bank 
Chile 1. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
2. (Very) High human development level 
Uruguay 1. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
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2. High human development level 
Advanced Ex-Soviet Republics  
Belarus 1. A high living-standard republic in the Soviet Union 
2. Industrialisation during the socialist period and strong 
industrial base (specialising in machine building within the 
Soviet Union, and currently having strong capabilities in 
engineering vehicle and optical equipment) 
3. Russian Federation, a country similar to Belarus, is 
classified under Industrialised Economies by UNIDO. 
Ukraine 1. A high living-standard republic in the Soviet Union 
2. Industrialisation during the socialist period and strong 
industrial base (specialising in machine building within the 
Soviet Union, and currently having strong capabilities in 
arms industry, especially engine and aircraft) 
3. Russian Federation, a coutry similar to Ukraine, is 
classified under Industrialised Economies by UNIDO. 
Latvia 1. One of the richest republics in the Soviet Union 
2. Industrialisation during the socialist period (specialising in 
electronics within the Soviet Union) 
3. EU member (since 2004) 
4. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
5. (Very) High human development level 
6. Advanced Country by the IMF 
7. Two similar Baltic countries (Estonia and Lithuania) are 
classified under Industrialised Economies by UNIDO. 
Advanced Ex-European 
Socialist Countries and SFRY 
Republic 
 
Bulgaria 1. Industrialisation during the socialist period (specialising in 
electronics within the COMECON74) 
2. (Very) High human development level 
3. EU member (since 2007) 
Romania 1. Industrialisation during the socialist period (specialising in 
mining and transportation machine within the 
COMECON) 
2. (Very) High human development level 
3. EU member (since 2007) 
Poland 1. Industrialisation during the socialist period (specialising in 
shipbuilding and construction machine within the 
COMECON) 
2. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
3. (Very) High human development level 
                                            
74 COMECON refers to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance led by the Soviet Union 
from 1949 to 1991. 
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4. EU member (since 2004) 
Croatia 1. The second richest republic (second to Slovenia and much 
more advanced than other republics) in the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
2. Industrialisation during the socialist period 
3. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
4. (Very) High human development level 
5. EU member (since 2013) 
6. Slovenia, a country similar to Croatia, is classified under 
Industrialised Economies by UNIDO. 
Traditional European Market 
Economies 
 
Greece 1. Traditional market economy 
2. Traditional EU member 
3. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
4. (Very) High human development level 
5. Advanced Country by the IMF 
Cyprus 1. Traditional market economy 
2. EU member (since 2004) 
3. High-Income Economy by the World Bank  
4. (Very) High human development level 
5. Advanced Country by the IMF 
Advanced Petroleum Exporter  
Brunei Darussalam75 1. High-Income Economy by the World Bank (one of the 
richest countries in the world) 
2. Very high human development level 
Source: Author's own elaboration 
 
Table A3 compares Human Development Index (HDI) of the reduced group of EIEs 
(after excluding the above thirteen countries) and the thirteen countries, which have 
been moved away from EIEs to IEs. Except for Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and 
Romania, the other nine countries' HDI values are all much higher than the highest 
HDI level in the reduced group of EIEs. Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania 
have HDI comparable to the highest level in the reduced group of EIEs. That is to 
                                            
75 Besides Brunei Darussalam, Saudi Arabia and Oman are the other two petroleum exporters 
with high income level and high human development index in the original group of EIEs. 
However, due to their special socio-economic structure, Saudi Arabia and Oman cannot be 
moved from EIEs to IEs.  
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say, the thirteen countries (to a lesser degree for Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and 
Romania), which are proposed to be upgraded from EIEs to IEs, have higher human 
development level than other EIEs countries. 
 
Table A3. HDI of the modified group of EIEs and removed EIEs countries 
HDI 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Reduced EIEs         
Max* 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.7 0.75 0.77 0.79 
Southern Cone         
Argentina 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.84 
Chile 0.64 0.65 0.7 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.83 
Uruguay 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 
Ex-Soviet Rep.         
Belarus     0.68 0.72 0.79 0.8 
Ukraine   0.71 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.75 
Latvia 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.8 0.85 0.87 0.87 
Ex-Socialist 
Countries 
        
Bulgaria 0.67 0.69 0.7 0.7 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.78 
Romania   0.7 0.69 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.79 
Poland 0.69 0.7 0.71 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 
Croatia   0.67 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.82 
Traditional Market 
Economies 
        
Cyprus 0.67 0.7 0.73 0.78 0.8 0.83 0.85 0.85 
Greece   0.69 0.67 0.73 0.81 0.81 0.82 
Petroleum Exporter         
Brunei Darussalam  0.76 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.86 
Source: Author's elaboration based on the United Nations HDI database 
*Max refers to the maximum HDI value in the reduced group of EIEs after excluding the thirteen 
removed countries and Saudi Arabia and Oman, the two special outliers. 
 
This modification also makes the country grouping more consistent with domestic 
disparity of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia in history. Among the 
fifteen former Soviet Republics, Russian Federation, Estonia, and Lithuania are 
originally classified under IEs by UNIDO; Belarus, Ukraine, and Latvia have been 
moved away from EIEs to IEs; Kazakhstan remains under EIEs due to its weak 
manufacturing; Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
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Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are originally classified under ODEs by UNIDO. Such 
a classification corresponds to the inter-republic disparity in economic development 
within the Soviet Union: the rich republics, except for Kazakhstan (EIEs), are 
classified under IEs, and the poor republics are classified under ODEs. Among the 
six republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Slovenia 
is originally classified under IEs by UNIDO; Croatia has been moved away from 
EIEs to IEs; Serbia remains under EIEs, instead of being moved to IEs, due to its long-
term economic downturn and war after independence; Montenegro has been moved 
away from ODEs to EIEs, because it has similar economic development level with 
Serbia, and because Montenegro and Serbia had always constituted a unified 
country from the dissolution of the former SFRY until 2006; Macedonia is originally 
classified under EIEs by UNIDO; Bosnia and Herzegovina is classified under ODEs 
by UNIDO. Similar to the case of Soviet Republics, this re-classification also accords 
with the inter-republic disparity of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The richest republics (Slovenia and Croatia) are classified under IEs; the 
poorest republic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) is classified under ODEs; and republics 
in the middle (Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) are classified under EIEs. A final 
note is given to the group of petroleum exporting countries. Besides Brunei 
Darussalam, Saudi Arabia and Oman are the other two petroleum exporters with 
high income level and high human development index in the original group of EIEs. 
However, due to their special socio-economic structure, Saudi Arabia and Oman 
cannot be moved to IEs.  
 
To sum up, thirteen countries have been moved away from EIEs to IEs and one 
country (Montenegro) has been moved to EIEs from ODEs. Additionally, Angola, 
Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Maldives are moved away from ODEs to LDCs. 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea have always been on the list of the United Nations 
LDCs, but they are classified under ODEs in the UNIDO system. Cape Verde and 
Maldives just graduated from the LDCs list in the recent ten years, and thus it is 
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better to still classify them under LDCs, considering that the time span of this thesis 
ranges from 1995 to 2014.  
 
A.3. UNIDO Country Grouping in a Comparison 
This section compares country grouping systems by UNDP, the World Bank, the IMF, 
UNCTAD, and UNIDO. The World Bank country grouping is established on a single 
measurement of GNI per capita and serves as a guidance for a country's accession 
to the World Bank's lending and preferential treatment (i.e., IDB eligibility and civil 
works preference). The IMF country grouping is based on three indicators: income 
level, export diversification, and financial market. The UNDP grouping is based on 
UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). UNCTAD does not provide 
explanations for its taxonomy. It differs from other groupings in that Transition 
Economies are singled out as a separate group, which is a common practice in 
international trade statistics. 
 
Table A4 compares the development taxonomies by UNCTAD, the World Bank, the 
IMF, UNDP, and UNIDO. Although different country grouping systems use 
different terminologies, each grouping system's sub-groups tend to have 
counterparts in other grouping systems. All the five country grouping systems 
divide the world into a developed part and a developing part, and they, except the 
IMF system, further divide the developing world into upper, medium, and lower 
parts. The upper part of the developing world basically corresponds to the Emerging 
South/Emerging Countries in this thesis, and the medium and lower part 
corresponds to the Developing South/Developing Countries. Thus, despite different 
conceptual bases, international agencies have relatively comparable development 
taxonomies. Table A5 lists countries by group in the five grouping systems. The last 
column gives the modified UNIDO grouping with red underlined names referring 
to countries that are different from the original UNIDO grouping. Because the IMF 
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country grouping is a dichotomous taxonomy by simply dividing the world into 
Advanced Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies without sub-
groups, Table A5 only lists Advanced Economies in the IMF column. 
 
Table A4. A comparison of various development taxonomies 
          Division 
Grouping Method 
North South 
Emerging South Developing South 
UNCTAD* Developed 
Economies 
High-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
Middle-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
Low-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
World Bank High-Income 
Economies 
Upper-Middle-
Income Economies  
Lower-Middle-
Income Economies  
Low-Income 
Economies 
IMF Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging and Developing Economies (without further division) 
UNDP Very High HDI 
Countries 
High HDI Countries Medium HDI 
Countries 
Low HDI Countries 
UNIDO Industrialised 
Economies 
Emerging Industrial 
Economies 
Other Developing 
Economies 
Least Developed 
Countries 
  Source: Author's Own Elaboration 
  * The UNCTAD group of Transition Economies cannot be classified under the North or the 
South because it is by definition too heterogeneous. 
 
Table A5. List of countries in various grouping systems 
UNCTAD World Bank IMF UNDP UNIDO Modified 
UNIDO* 
Developed 
Economies 
High-Income 
Economies  
Advanced 
Countries  
Very High Human 
Development 
Countries 
Industrialised 
Economies  
Industrialised 
Economies 
Andorra Andorra Australia Andorra Andorra Andorra 
Australia Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Austria Argentina Aruba Argentina 
Austria Aruba Belgium Australia Australia Aruba 
Belgium Australia Canada Austria Austria Australia 
Bermuda Austria China, Hong Kong Bahrain Bahrain Austria 
Bulgaria Bahamas China, Macao Belgium Belgium Bahrain 
Canada Bahrain China, Taiwan  Brunei 
Darussalam 
Bermuda Belarus 
Croatia Barbados Cyprus Canada British Virgin 
Islands 
Belgium 
Cyprus Belgium Czech Republic Chile Canada Bermuda 
Czech Republic Bermuda Denmark China, Hong Kong Cayman Islands British Virgin 
Islands 
Denmark British Virgin 
Islands 
Estonia Croatia China, Hong 
Kong 
Brunei Darussalam 
Estonia Brunei Darussalam Finland Cuba China, Macao Bulgaria 
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Faeroe Islands Canada France Cyprus China, Taiwan  Canada 
Finland Cayman Islands Germany Czech Republic Czech Republic Cayman Islands 
France Chile Greece Denmark Denmark Chile 
Germany China, Hong Kong Iceland Estonia Estonia China, Hong Kong 
Gibraltar China, Macao Ireland Finland Finland China, Macao 
Greece Croatia Israel France France China, Taiwan  
Greenland Curaçao Italy Germany French Polynesia Croatia 
Hungary Cyprus Japan Greece Germany Cyprus 
Iceland Czech Republic Korea, Republic of Hungary Greenland Czech Republic 
Ireland Denmark Latvia Iceland Hungary Denmark 
Israel Estonia Lithuania Ireland Iceland Estonia 
Italy Faeroe Islands Luxembourg Israel Ireland Finland 
Japan Finland Malta Italy Israel France 
Latvia France Netherlands Japan Italy French Polynesia 
Lithuania French Polynesia New Zealand Korea, Republic of Japan Germany 
Luxembourg Germany Norway Kuwait Korea, Republic 
of 
Greece 
Malta Gibraltar Portugal Latvia Kuwait Greenland 
Netherlands Greece Puerto Rico Liechtenstein Lithuania Hungary 
New Zealand Greenland San Marino Lithuania Luxembourg Iceland 
Norway Guam Singapore Luxembourg Malaysia Ireland 
Poland Hungary Slovak Republic Malta Malta Israel 
Portugal Iceland Slovenia Netherlands Netherlands Italy 
Romania Ireland Spain New Zealand New Caledonia Japan 
San Marino Israel Sweden Norway New Zealand Korea, Republic of 
Slovakia Italy Switzerland Poland Norway Kuwait 
Slovenia Japan United Kingdom Portugal Portugal Latvia 
Spain Korea, Republic of United States Qatar Qatar Lithuania 
Sweden Kuwait  Saudi Arabia Russian 
Federation 
Luxembourg 
Switzerland Latvia  Singapore San Marino Malaysia 
United Kingdom Lithuania  Slovakia Singapore Malta 
United States Luxembourg  Slovenia Slovakia Netherlands 
  Malta  Spain Slovenia New Caledonia 
  Nauru  Sweden Spain New Zealand 
  Netherlands  Switzerland Sweden Norway 
  Netherlands 
Antilles 
 United Arab 
Emirates 
Switzerland Poland 
  New Caledonia  United Kingdom United Arab 
Emirates 
Portugal 
  New Zealand  United States United Kingdom Qatar 
  Norway   United States Romania 
  Oman    Russian Federation 
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  Poland    San Marino 
  Portugal    Singapore 
  Qatar    Slovakia 
  Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
   Slovenia 
  San Marino    Spain 
  Saudi Arabia    Sweden 
  Seychelles    Switzerland 
  Singapore    Ukraine 
  Sint Maarten    United Arab 
Emirates 
  Slovakia    United Kingdom 
  Slovenia    United States 
  Spain    Uruguay 
  Sweden      
  Switzerland      
  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
     
  Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
     
  United Arab 
Emirates 
     
  United Kingdom      
  United States      
 Uruguay      
High-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
Upper-Middle-
Income Economies  
Emerging and 
Developing 
Countries (not 
listed here) 
High Human 
Development 
Country 
Emerging 
Industrial 
Economies 
Emerging Industrial 
Economies 
Algeria Albania  Albania Argentina Brazil 
American Samoa Algeria  Algeria Belarus Colombia 
Angola American Samoa  Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Brazil Costa Rica 
Anguilla Angola  Armenia Brunei 
Darussalam 
India 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentina  Azerbaijan Bulgaria Indonesia 
Argentina Azerbaijan  Bahamas Chile Kazakhstan 
Aruba Belarus  Barbados Colombia Mauritius 
Bahamas Belize  Belarus Costa Rica Mexico 
Bahrain Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 Belize Croatia Oman 
Barbados Botswana  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Cyprus Saudi Arabia 
Bonaire Brazil  Brazil Greece Serbia 
Botswana Bulgaria  Bulgaria India South Africa 
Brazil China  China Indonesia Suriname 
British Virgin 
Islands 
Colombia  Colombia Kazakhstan Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam Costa Rica  Costa Rica Latvia TFYR of Macedonia 
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Cayman Islands Cuba  Dominica Mauritius Tunisia 
Chile Dominica  Dominican 
Republic 
Mexico Turkey 
China Dominican 
Republic 
 Ecuador Oman Venezuela  
China, Hong Kong Ecuador  Fiji Poland Montenegro 
China, Macao Equatorial Guinea  Georgia Romania   
China, Taiwan  Fiji  Grenada Saudi Arabia   
Colombia Gabon  Iran  Serbia   
Cook Islands Georgia  Jamaica South Africa   
Costa Rica Grenada  Jordan Suriname   
Cuba Guyana  Kazakhstan Thailand   
Curaçao Iran   Lebanon TFYR of 
Macedonia 
  
Dominica Iraq  Libya Tunisia   
Dominican Republic Jamaica  Malaysia Turkey   
Ecuador Jordan  Mauritius Ukraine   
Equatorial Guinea Kazakhstan  Mexico Uruguay   
Falkland Islands  Lebanon  Montenegro Venezuela    
French Polynesia Libya  Oman    
Gabon Malaysia  Palau    
Grenada Maldives  Panama    
Guam Marshall Islands  Peru    
Iran  Mauritius  Romania    
Iraq Mexico  Russian Federation   
Jamaica Montenegro  Saint Kitts and Nevis   
Korea, Republic of Namibia  Saint Lucia   
Kuwait Palau  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Lebanon Panama  Serbia    
Libya Paraguay  Seychelles    
Malaysia Peru  Sri Lanka    
Maldives Romania  Suriname    
Mauritius Russian Federation  Thailand    
Mexico Saint Lucia  TFYR of Macedonia   
Montserrat Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
 Tonga    
Namibia Serbia  Trinidad and Tobago   
Nauru Serbia and 
Montenegro 
 Tunisia    
Netherlands Antilles South Africa  Turkey    
New Caledonia Suriname  Ukraine    
Niue Thailand  Uruguay    
Oman TFYR of Macedonia  Venezuela    
Palau Turkey      
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Panama Turkmenistan      
Peru Tuvalu      
Qatar       
Saint Helena       
Saint Kitts and Nevis       
Saint Lucia       
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
      
Saudi Arabia       
Seychelles       
Singapore       
Sint Maarten        
South Africa       
Suriname       
Thailand       
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
      
Turkey       
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
      
United Arab 
Emirates 
      
Uruguay       
Venezuela       
Middle-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
Lower-Middle-
Income Economies 
 Medium Human 
Development 
Countries 
Other Developing 
Economies 
Other Developing 
Economies 
Belize Armenia  Bangladesh Albania  Albania  
Bhutan Bangladesh  Bhutan Algeria Algeria 
Bolivia  Bhutan  Bolivia  Angola Anguilla 
Cape Verde Bolivia   Botswana Anguilla Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Cameroon Cape Verde  Cambodia Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Armenia 
Congo Cambodia  Cape Verde Armenia Azerbaijan 
Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon  Congo Azerbaijan Bahamas 
Djibouti Congo  Egypt Bahamas Barbados 
Egypt Côte d'Ivoire  El Salvador Barbados Belize 
El Salvador Djibouti  Equatorial Guinea Belize Bolivia 
Fiji Egypt  Gabon Bolivia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Ghana El Salvador  Ghana Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Guatemala Ghana  Guatemala Botswana Cameroon  
Guyana Guatemala  Guyana Cameroon  Congo 
Honduras Honduras  Honduras Cape Verde Cook Islands 
India India  India Congo Côte d'Ivoire 
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Indonesia Indonesia  Indonesia Cook Islands Cuba 
Jordan Kenya  Iraq Côte d'Ivoire Dominica 
Kiribati Kiribati  Kiribati Cuba Dominican 
Republic 
Lao P.D.R. Kyrgyzstan  Kyrgyzstan Dominica Ecuador 
Lesotho Lao P.D.R.  Lao P.D.R. Dominican 
Republic 
Egypt 
Marshall Islands Lesotho  Maldives Ecuador El Salvador 
Mauritania Mauritania  Micronesia Egypt Fiji 
Micronesia  Micronesia  Mongolia El Salvador Gabon  
Mongolia Mongolia  Morocco Equatorial 
Guinea 
Georgia 
Morocco Morocco  Namibia Fiji Ghana 
Myanmar Myanmar  Nicaragua Gabon  Grenada 
Nicaragua Nicaragua  Palestine, State of Georgia Guadeloupe  
Nigeria Nigeria  Paraguay Ghana Guatemala 
Pakistan Pakistan  Philippines Grenada Guyana 
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea  Republic of 
Moldova 
Guadeloupe  Honduras 
Paraguay Philippines  Samoa Guatemala Iran  
Philippines Republic of 
Moldova 
 Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Guyana Iraq 
Samoa Samoa  South Africa Honduras Jamaica 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
 Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Iran  Jordan 
Solomon Islands Solomon Islands  Tajikistan Iraq Kenya 
South Sudan Sri Lanka  Timor-Leste Jamaica Korea, D.P.R. 
Sri Lanka State of Palestine  Turkmenistan Jordan Kyrgyzstan 
State of Palestine Sudan  Uzbekistan Kenya Lebanon 
Sudan Swaziland  Vanuatu Korea, D.P.R. Libya 
Swaziland Syrian Arab 
Republic 
 Vietnam Kyrgyzstan Marshall Islands 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tajikistan  Zambia Lebanon Martinique 
Tanzania Timor-Leste   Libya Micronesia 
Timor-Leste Tonga   Maldives Mongolia 
Tonga Tunisia   Marshall Islands Montserrat 
Tunisia Ukraine   Martinique Morocco 
Tuvalu Uzbekistan   Micronesia Namibia 
Vanuatu Vanuatu   Mongolia Nicaragua 
Vietnam Vietnam   Montenegro Nigeria 
Yemen Yemen   Montserrat Pakistan 
Zambia Zambia   Morocco Palau 
     Namibia Palestine 
     Nicaragua Panama 
     Nigeria Papua New Guinea 
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     Pakistan Paraguay 
     Palau Peru 
     Palestine Philippines 
     Panama Republic of 
Moldova 
     Papua New 
Guinea 
Réunion 
     Paraguay Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
     Peru Saint Lucia 
     Philippines Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
     Republic of 
Moldova 
Seychelles 
     Réunion Sri Lanka 
     Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Swaziland 
     Saint Lucia Syrian Arab 
Republic 
     Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Tajikistan 
     Seychelles Tonga 
     Sri Lanka Trinidad and 
Tobago 
     Swaziland Turkmenistan 
     Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Uzbekistan 
     Tajikistan Vietnam 
     Tonga Zimbabwe 
     Trinidad and 
Tobago 
  
     Turkmenistan   
     Uzbekistan   
    Vietnam   
     Zimbabwe   
Low-Income 
Developing 
Economies 
Low-Income 
Economies  
 Low Human 
Development 
Countries 
Least Developed 
Countries 
Least Developed 
Countries 
Afghanistan Afghanistan  Afghanistan Afghanistan  Afghanistan  
Bangladesh Benin  Angola Bangladesh  Angola 
Benin Burkina Faso  Benin Benin  Bangladesh  
Burkina Faso Burundi  Burkina Faso Bhutan  Benin  
Burundi Central African Rep  Burundi Burkina Faso  Bhutan  
Cambodia Chad  Cameroon Burundi 
Cambodia  
Burkina Faso  
Central African Rep Comoros  Central African 
Republic 
Central African 
Rep 
Burundi Cambodia  
Chad Congo, Dem. Rep  Chad Chad  Cape Verde 
Comoros Eritrea  Comoros Comoros  Central African Rep  
Congo, Dem. Rep Ethiopia  Congo, Dem. Rep Congo, Dem. Rep  Chad  
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Eritrea Gambia  Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti  Comoros  
Ethiopia Guinea  Djibouti Eritrea  Congo, Dem. Rep 
Gambia Guinea-Bissau  Eritrea Ethiopia  Djibouti  
Guinea Haiti  Ethiopia Gambia  Equatorial Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Korea, D.P.R.  Gambia Guinea  Eritrea  
Haiti Liberia  Guinea Guinea-Bissau  Ethiopia  
Kenya Madagascar  Guinea-Bissau Haiti  Gambia  
Korea, D.P.R. Malawi  Haiti Kiribati  Guinea  
Liberia Mali  Kenya Lao P.D.R. Guinea-Bissau  
Madagascar Mozambique  Lesotho Lesotho Haiti  
Malawi Nepal  Liberia Liberia Kiribati  
Mali Niger  Madagascar Madagascar Lao P.D.R. 
Mozambique Rwanda  Malawi Malawi Lesotho 
Nepal Senegal  Mali Mali Liberia 
Niger Sierra Leone  Mauritania Mauritania Madagascar 
Rwanda Somalia  Mozambique Mozambique Malawi 
Senegal South Sudan  Myanmar Myanmar Maldives 
Sierra Leone Tanzania  Nepal Nepal Mali 
Somalia Togo  Niger Niger Mauritania 
Togo Uganda  Nigeria Mozambique Mozambique 
Tokelau Zimbabwe  Pakistan Myanmar Mozambique 
Uganda   Papua New 
Guinea 
Nepal Myanmar 
Zimbabwe   Rwanda Niger Myanmar 
    Senegal Rwanda Nepal 
    Sierra Leone Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Nepal 
    Solomon Islands Senegal Niger 
    Sudan Sierra Leone Niger 
    Swaziland Solomon Islands Rwanda 
    Tanzania  Somalia Samoa 
    Togo South Sudan Sao Tome and 
Principe 
    Uganda Sudan Senegal 
    Yemen Samoa Sierra Leone 
    Zimbabwe Timor-Leste Solomon Islands 
     Togo Somalia 
     Tanzania South Sudan 
     Vanuatu Sudan 
     Yemen Tanzania 
     Zambia Timor-Leste 
      Togo 
      Vanuatu 
      Yemen 
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      Zambia 
Transition 
Economies 
      
Albania       
Armenia       
Azerbaijan       
Belarus       
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
      
Georgia       
Kazakhstan       
Kyrgyzstan       
Montenegro       
Republic of 
Moldova 
      
Russian Federation       
Serbia       
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
      
Tajikistan       
TFYR of Macedonia       
Turkmenistan       
Ukraine       
Uzbekistan          
Source: Author's own elaboration. 
* Red names stand for countries that are moved to other country group. 
 
Appendix B. Years to be DCS Countries 
Table B1. Years to be DCS countries (62 countries) 
Country Years to be DCS 1 Country Years to be DCS 2 
Bangladesh 1 Vietnam 1 
Vietnam 1 Bangladesh 1 
Philippines 1 Mauritania 1 
Papua New Guinea 2 Myanmar 2 
Mauritania 2 Papua New Guinea 2 
Sri Lanka 2 Sri Lanka 2 
Egypt 3 Philippines 3 
Bolivia 4 Egypt 4 
Myanmar 4 Cambodia 4 
Cambodia 4 D. R. Congo 5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 Mali 7 
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D. R. Congo 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 
Mozambique 9 Guinea-Bissau 8 
Mali 10 Laos 8 
Laos 10 Bolivia 9 
Moldova 11 Mozambique 10 
Niger 11 Niger 11 
Guinea 12 Ethiopia 11 
Sierra Leone 12 Moldova 11 
Nepal 12 Central African Rep. 13 
Ethiopia 13 Sierra Leone 13 
Eritrea 14 Madagascar 14 
Dominican Republic 14 Paraguay 14 
Georgia 15 Dominican Republic 14 
Uzbekistan 15 Uzbekistan 14 
Madagascar 15 Eritrea 14 
Central African Rep. 15 Georgia 14 
Paraguay 16 Guinea 14 
Rwanda 16 Burkina Faso 15 
Guinea-Bissau 16 Albania 15 
Mongolia 16 Benin 16 
Albania 17 Mongolia 17 
Pakistan 18 Nepal 17 
Liberia 18 Zimbabwe 18 
Burkina Faso 18 Rwanda 18 
Haiti 19 Pakistan 18 
Armenia 19 Kyrgyzstan 19 
Panama 19 Armenia 19 
Zimbabwe 19 Tajikistan 19 
Kyrgyzstan 19 Haiti 19 
Jamaica 20 Liberia 19 
Togo 20 Panama 19 
Ghana 20 Jamaica 20 
Kenya 20 Jordan 20 
Benin 20 Togo 20 
Burundi 20 Honduras 20 
Nicaragua 20 Burundi 20 
Morocco 20 Morocco 20 
Zambia 20 Peru 20 
Lebanon 20 Zambia 20 
Malawi 20 Uganda 20 
Senegal 20 Gambia 20 
Tanzania 20 Tanzania 20 
Cote d'Ivoire 20 Guatemala 20 
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Peru 20 Kenya 20 
Honduras 20 Malawi 20 
Gambia 20 Senegal 20 
Jordan 20 Ghana 20 
Uganda 20 Nicaragua 20 
Guatemala 20 Cote d'Ivoire 20 
El Salvador 20 Lebanon 20 
Tajikistan 20 El Salvador 20 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Table B2. Years to be DCS countries (major exporting countries of mineral fuels) 
Country Years to be DCS 1 Country Years to be DCS 2 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 Trinidad and Tobago 0 
Yemen 0 Gabon 0 
Algeria 1 Yemen 1 
Iraq 2 Iraq 2 
Iran 2 Algeria 2 
Angola 3 Iran 2 
Syria 3 Angola 3 
Nigeria 3 Nigeria 3 
Azerbaijan 4 Syria 3 
Equatorial Guinea 5 Azerbaijan 4 
Congo 9 Equatorial Guinea 4 
Gabon 9 Turkmenistan 6 
Turkmenistan 9 Congo 9 
Libya 9 Libya 9 
Chad 10 Chad 10 
Cameroon 15 Cameroon 15 
Ecuador 20 Ecuador 20 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Table B3. Years to be DCS countries (small countries) 
Country Years to be DCS 1 Country Years to be DCS 1 
Dominica 4 Solomon Islands 1 
Maldives 6 Maldives 3 
Solomon Islands 8 Bhutan 6 
Seychelles 9 Kiribati 7 
Kiribati 10 Seychelles 8 
Vanuatu 13 Vanuatu 12 
Barbados 13 Dominica 12 
Bhutan 14 Djibouti 14 
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Cape Verde 15 Barbados 14 
Belize 16 Cape Verde 15 
Guyana 17 Belize 16 
Bahamas 17 Bahamas 17 
Djibouti 18 Guyana 17 
Saint Lucia 18 Saint Lucia 18 
Grenada 18 Grenada 18 
Samoa 19 Comoros 19 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 19 Samoa 19 
Antigua and Barbuda 19 Antigua and Barbuda 19 
Comoros 19 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 19 
Tonga 20 Fiji 20 
Fiji 20 Tonga 20 
Sao Tome and Principe 20 Sao Tome and Principe 20 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
 
Table B4. The Southbound EXPY-Northbound EXPY Difference (62 countries) 
Country S-N EXPY Diff 1 Country 
S-N EXPY 
Diff 2 
Myanmar -2644.1 Papua New Guinea -2573.1 
Papua New Guinea -2382.5 Bangladesh -1927 
Bangladesh -1959.1 Myanmar -1847.7 
Mauritania -1822.1 Sri Lanka -1564.7 
Sri Lanka -1660.8 Egypt -1463.2 
Vietnam -1502.5 Vietnam -1335.9 
Egypt -1248.7 Mauritania -1298.4 
Philippines -1043.1 D. R. Congo -1202.8 
Niger -911.4 Laos -995.9 
Cambodia -815.7 Guinea-Bissau -833.2 
Bolivia -759.6 Philippines -829 
Laos -502.8 Niger -823.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -486.3 Cambodia -814.7 
Guinea -404.6 Mali -805.9 
D. R. Congo -249.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina -296.7 
Mali 57.1 Bolivia -126.5 
Mozambique 62.9 Ethiopia -60.6 
Moldova 81.6 Moldova 25.9 
Ethiopia 199.3 Guinea 201.1 
Paraguay 737 Mozambique 242 
Sierra Leone 949.1 Paraguay 528.1 
Pakistan 999.8 Pakistan 990.7 
Madagascar 1131.2 Sierra Leone 1041.4 
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Dominican Republic 1430.4 Madagascar 1148.2 
Morocco 1736.5 Uzbekistan 1324.7 
Georgia 1802.5 Dominican Republic 1466.1 
Uzbekistan 1880.3 Georgia 1529.3 
Lebanon 1982.5 Morocco 1530.2 
Central African Rep. 2284.9 Lebanon 1770.7 
Haiti 2310.4 Burkina Faso 1822.1 
Zambia 2364.6 Central African Rep. 1912.2 
Nepal 2370.9 Haiti 2345.9 
Burkina Faso 2392.4 Eritrea 2596.3 
Liberia 2436.4 Zambia 2691.8 
Guinea-Bissau 2483 Uganda 2821.6 
Malawi 2601.1 Tajikistan 2856.1 
Kyrgyzstan 2746.9 Zimbabwe 2898.1 
Tajikistan 2784.6 Malawi 2962.6 
Uganda 2843.7 Liberia 2977.3 
Eritrea 3121.4 Benin 2980 
Armenia 3141.9 Armenia 3108.9 
Rwanda 3202.2 Jordan 3175.6 
Zimbabwe 3286.5 Kyrgyzstan 3306.7 
Albania 3507.8 Albania 3482.5 
Panama 3581.7 Tanzania 3786.4 
Jordan 3693.8 Peru 3950.1 
Peru 3740.1 Nepal 4109.2 
Mongolia 3861.8 Jamaica 4276.2 
Jamaica 4074.1 Burundi 4324.8 
Tanzania 4196.8 Rwanda 4440.9 
Burundi 4314.9 Mongolia 4585.4 
Kenya 4358.5 Kenya 4624.2 
Nicaragua 4548 Nicaragua 4768.2 
Ghana 4959 Panama 4774.4 
El Salvador 5157.4 Ghana 4996.1 
Senegal 5223.8 Senegal 5036.4 
Benin 5226.2 Gambia 5147.1 
Honduras 5349.7 Cote d'Ivoire 5430.7 
Guatemala 5372.9 Honduras 5476.3 
Cote d'Ivoire 5564.9 Togo 5586.2 
Gambia 5624.9 Guatemala 5716.6 
Togo 6364.7 El Salvador 5732.7 
Source: Author's calculation based on the BACI database. 
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Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics (62-country panel) 
Variables Obs. Mean Std.  Min Max 
S/N Dummy 1 1,240 0.72 0.45 0 1 
S/N Dummy 2 1,240 0.71 0.45 0 1 
S-N Difference 1 (ln) 1,240 0.22 0.4 -1.27 2.01 
S-N Difference 2 (ln) 1,240 0.21 0.4 -2.08 1.69 
Total GDP (ln) 1,240 22.79 1.28 18.58 25.83 
Overall Export Sophistication (ln) 1,240 9.04 0.34 7.55 9.78 
FDI Inflow p.c. (ln) 1,204 2.82 1.7 -4.62 6.86 
Resource Rents (% of GDP) 1,206 9.95 11.56 0 92.02 
Distance to North 1 (ln) 1,240 8.95 0.2 8.53 9.39 
Distance to North 2 (ln) 1,240 8.95 0.21 8.47 9.38 
Distance to South (ln) 1,240 8.94 0.18 8.75 9.44 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 1) 1,240 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (North 2) 1,240 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.04 
GDP p.c. Growth Rate (South) 1,240 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Source: Author's elaboration. 
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Chapter 5. Recent Trends of Developing Countries' Terms of 
Trade under the New Global Economic Hierarchy 
5.1. Introduction 
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950) on the long-term 
decline in the relative prices of primary commodities may be the most debated topic 
in development economics (Sarkar, 2001). Sapsford, Sarkar, and Singer (1992) even 
argue that almost all development economists have written on the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis 76 . Although it has been examined more extensively than any other 
hypotheses in development economics, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis remains 
contentious (Cuddington, 1992; Cashin and McDermott, 2002). In particular, in the 
1980s and the early 1990s, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis evoked intensive debates 
in terms of statistical methodology. Around one-third of empirical examinations find 
evidence in support of the secular deterioration in primary commodity prices and 
one-fourth reject it (Zanias, 2005). As argued by Sarkar (2001), the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis has still been widely seen as "a reality" rather than "a myth"77.  
 
As manufactures have accounted for increasing share in many developing countries' 
export basket over the recent decades, the focus of terms of trade research has been 
shifted from commodity terms of trade of primary commodities vis-à-vis 
                                            
76 It must be noted that since the paradigm shift in development economics in the 1980s, the 
research focus has been mostly shifted to micro-level issues, such as health, nutrition, education, 
migration, aids, and policy evaluation. Macro-level issues (e.g., terms of trade) have been 
somewhat marginalised in the mainstream development economics. Thus, the argument by 
Sapsford et al. (1992) holds true for development economists until the 1980s or at latest the 1990s.  
77 An extended version of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is termed as the Prebisch-Singer thesis. 
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis concerns the statistical behaviour of terms of trade of primary 
commodities or developing countries, while the Prebisch-Singer thesis is concerned with the 
relationship of the behaviour of terms of trade with growth and development through the role 
of export as a source of a country's capacity to import capital goods, which are of essential 
importance for development (Ziesemer, 2010). Actually, it does not make much sense to 
practically distinguish between the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis and the Prebisch-Singer thesis, 
because studies that statistically examine the behaviour of terms of trade can hardly avoid 
involving the underlying developmental implications. 
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manufactures to country terms of trade of developing countries vis-à-vis developed 
countries (Singer, 1958; Singer, 1975a; Sarkar and Singer, 1991). This seemingly 
favourable change in export composition, however, fails to reverse or mitigate the 
unequal exchange encountering developing countries, because the relevance has 
been shifted from the distribution of gains between primary commodity producers 
and manufacturers to that between non-innovation-intensive producers and 
innovation-intensive producers or between producers of low-income economy 
goods and producers of high-income economy goods (Kaplinsky, 2006). In the post-
war global market, developed countries almost exclusively capture the 
Schumpeterian rents from innovation-intensive manufactures, and developing 
countries as producers of standardised manufactures are excluded from such 
opportunities (Singer, 1975a; Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Singer, 1998). Just as argued 
by Emmanuel (1969), what matters is not the deterioration in terms of trade of 
products, but that of countries. In other words, which hierarchy a country belongs 
to (e.g., the North or the South) is more important than what it exports (e.g., primary 
commodities or manufactures).  
 
Since the 1990s, the global economic hierarchy has witnessed major changes. Some 
previous developing countries have formed a new group between developed and 
developing countries, namely, emerging countries, such as China and South Africa78. 
Accordingly, the traditional dichotomous global hierarchy of developed countries 
and developing countries has been replaced by a trichotomous hierarchy. Although 
the majority of developing countries' exports still go to developed countries, 
emerging countries, particularly China, have become growingly important trade 
partners for developing countries. Moreover, Chapter 2 shows the contrast in 
composition between developing countries' exports to emerging countries and to 
developed countries. While the former is dominated by mineral fuels and reflects 
                                            
78 Those more advanced ex-developing countries, such as the first-generation NICs (the Asian 
Tigers), have already transformed into developed countries. 
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the pattern considered by the original Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the latter has a 
significant share of manufactures and reflects the pattern concerned by the revisited 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. This contrast has significant implication for developing 
countries' terms of trade, because export composition, especially the shift towards a 
manufacture-dominant export basket, largely affects a country's terms of trade 
(Bidarkota and Crucini, 2000). 
 
Nguyen (1981) suggests that terms of trade studies should consider changes in the 
composition of country groups over time. The new global economic hierarchy, 
especially the rise of emerging countries, urges the updates of research on the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, which is based on the dichotomous vision on country 
grouping. Considering this research gap, this chapter aims to examine the trends of 
terms of trade of various groups of developing countries vis-à-vis developed 
countries, China, and other emerging countries79 from 1995 to 2014. It serves as an 
examination on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis under the new global economic 
hierarchy and provides the latest empirical evidence. Such exploration will reveal 
the distribution of gains from trade under the new global economic hierarchy.  
 
As another highlight, this chapter concerns the distinct behaviours of terms of trade 
of developing countries with distinct export specialisation (i.e., those specialising in 
agricultural products, in manufactures, non-fuel minerals, and mineral fuels). In the 
current global market, different groups of products follow different demand-
destination nexuses. Emerging countries' resource-intensive modernisation has 
driven the current commodity boom, especially in minerals and fuels (Radetzki, 
2006; Jerrett and Cuddington, 2008; Farooki, 2009; Erdem and Ünalmış, 2016). 
However, developing countries specialising in other primary commodities may not 
benefit from the commodity boom. Although common macroeconomic factors (e.g., 
                                            
79 China is singled out from the group of emerging countries and is examined separately in the 
following empirical analyses, but, for the sake of convenience, China is included in the group of 
emerging countries in the general discussion of Section 4.1. 
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the expansion of major economies) may drive the supply and demand for a wide 
range of unrelated primary commodities (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1987), Erten and 
Ocampo (2013) find that the recent rise in prices of some agricultural products is 
limited and is largely a reverse of the previous downward trend.  
 
The influence of the commodity boom on developing countries' terms of trade may 
be either strengthened or mitigated by cheap manufactures from emerging countries. 
As China and some other emerging countries with rich labour reserve enter the 
global market, the global competition in labour-intensive and low skill-intensive 
manufactures has become tougher and manufacture prices have turned down. As 
argued by Kaplinsky (2006), the commodity boom along with the entry of cheap 
manufactures from China may reverse the long-term decline in the relative prices of 
some commodities. Accordingly, developing countries exporting "hard 
commodities" (e.g., fuels and minerals) are more likely to benefit from China's entry 
into the global market in terms of both the demand and the supply side, while those 
specialising in agricultural products ("soft commodities") may tend to gain less, if 
any. For developing countries that specialise in manufactures, the trends of terms of 
trade may even experience deterioration. 
 
Time series analyses show significant differences between developing countries' net 
barter terms of trade (henceforth, NBTOT) vis-à-vis developed countries and vis-à-
vis China and other emerging countries on the one hand, and differences between 
the behaviours of NBTOT of different groups of developing countries on the other. 
Developing countries tend to have positive trends of NBTOT vis-à-vis developed 
countries, especially those specialising in fuels or minerals. This trend may be jointly 
explained by the increasing importance of manufactures in developing countries' 
exports to developed countries, developed countries' demand for a wide range of 
primary commodities from developing countries, and the commodity boom of fuels 
and minerals led by emerging countries, especially China.  
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However, it should be noted that the improvement in developing countries' NBTOT 
vis-à-vis developed countries may not be seen as a rejection to the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis. The very core of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, despite always being 
neglected, is actually the behaviour of double factoral terms of trade rather than net 
barter terms of trade. It is the factoral terms of trade that ultimately determines 
whether a country is at an advantageous position in the bilateral trade relationship. 
Singer (1991) argues that the gap in manufacturing productivity between developed 
and developing countries, especially those poorest ones, has been increasing. Data 
on total factor productivity (TFP) shows that the gap in productivity and technology 
between developed and developing countries is great and has persisted over the 
recent two decades 8081 . If this persistent North-South gap in productivity and 
technology is taken into account, then the improvement in developing countries' 
NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries may not deliver a positive outcome in real 
terms. 
 
On the other hand, developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis China tends to show 
negative trend or to be trendless, except those specialising in fuels. In particular, 
developing countries specialising in manufactures have experienced the greatest 
deterioration. This finding indicates these countries' disadvantageous position in the 
trade relationship with China, perhaps because they have to directly compete with 
China in manufactures and tend not to benefit from China's commodity boom. More 
generally speaking, because China's demand for primary commodities concentrates 
in fuels and minerals, developing countries that do not specialise in these "hard 
                                            
80 Figure A1 and A2 in Appendix A show the trends of TFP for developed countries, emerging 
countries, China, and various groups of developing countries between 1995 and 2010. Due to 
unavailability of data on the productivity of exporting sectors in developing countries, double 
factoral terms of trade cannot be calculated. However, the rough picture from TFP trends should 
provide sufficient information. Data on TFP are from the UNIDO database, which are available 
until 2010.  
81  It should be noted that TFP emphasises the technological and organisational aspect of 
productivity, and does not reflect the capital and labour aspect of productivity and does not take 
into account the efficiency of the utilisation of resource and employment issues.  
 234 
commodities" tend not to benefit from their trade with China in relative terms. This 
is actually also the case on a global scale, instead of only in developing countries' 
trade relationship with China. Developing countries specialising in fuels or minerals 
are at a relatively favourable position in the global economy in terms of terms of 
trade, whereas those specialising in agricultural products or manufactures are at a 
less favourable or even unfavourable position. The trend of developing countries' 
NBTOT vis-à-vis other emerging countries lies between that vis-à-vis developed 
countries and vis-à-vis China.  
 
Despite unfavourable trends of net barter terms of trade, all groups of developing 
countries have experienced significant improvement in their income terms of trade 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, regardless of developed countries, China or other 
emerging countries. In particular, the improvement in income terms of trade vis-à-
vis China is the greatest. This improvement is due to great growth in export volume, 
indicating developing countries' absolute gains from trade, in spite of perhaps loss 
in relative gains from trade. However, the rest of the world has comparable 
improvement in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis developing countries. Therefore, 
despite the favourable income terms of trade facing developing countries, the 
condition for global (North-South) convergence does not hold. As a consequence, 
developing countries have to mobilise more resources to maintain the favourable 
income terms of trade, which impedes their domestic consumption and investment, 
and the unequal global exchange has remained. In particular, this global inequality 
is further magnified by the persistent North-South gap in productivity and 
technology and by developing countries' high population growth. Since the global 
inequality is rooted in the competitive nature of the markets for primary 
commodities and simple manufactures and the oligopolistic nature of the markets 
for sophisticated manufactures, the findings are in line with the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis and thesis, their evolution and criticism, and previous empirical studies. 
Section 5.3 discusses the impact of the new global economic hierarchy on developing 
countries' terms of trade. Section 5.4 firstly introduces data and provides descriptive 
analyses on developing countries' terms of trade by country group from 1995 to 2014, 
and then presents empirical strategy for the time series analysis on developing 
countries' terms of trade and gives the results. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2. The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis: Theory and Criticism 
5.2.1. The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis and Its Underlying Mechanism 
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Maynard Keynes argue that prices of 
agricultural products relative to those of industrial products tend to increase in the 
long run. That is to say, a positive trend of terms of trade for primary commodities 
vis-à-vis manufactures should be observed. The rationale underlying this argument 
falls in the law of diminishing returns to land and other natural resources and the 
law of increasing returns in industrial sectors. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, 
however, Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer respectively found a declining trend in 
prices of primary commodities relative to prices of manufactures based on the 
British terms of trade data in the nineteenth century recorded in two UN reports in 
1949 (Sarkar, 2001). They argued that the declining relative prices of primary 
commodities imply a secular deterioration of developing countries' net barter terms 
of trade vis-à-vis developed countries. This is the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. 
 
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis can be explained by several factors. First, the income 
elasticity of demand for primary commodities is lower than that for manufactures. 
Engel's law suggests that the share of income that is spent on food decreases in 
income level, and the demand for food is relatively rigid. In other words, income 
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growth moves outwards the demand curve of primary commodities to a lesser 
extent in comparison to the movement of the demand curve of manufactures (Grilli 
and Yang, 1988). Moreover, some primary commodities have been gradually 
replaced by synthetic materials (e.g., natural rubber versus synthetic rubber). This 
reduces the demand for primary commodities by industrial sectors and then reduces 
wage in exporting countries of these primary commodities, which is one of the 
reasons for why technological progress tends to benefit developed countries by 
increasing profits but hurt developing countries by reducing wages (Singer, 1950). 
In contrast to primary commodities, the demand for manufactures tends to increase 
in income and to be more flexible. However, it should be noted that fuels and metals 
are exceptional primary commodities, because the demand for them is positively 
associated with industrialisation and income.  
 
Second, in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, primary commodities are assumed to be 
traded in a competitive market and the prices are competitively determined, while 
manufactures are assumed to be traded in an oligopolistic market and the prices are 
determined by mark-up over costs and the bargaining between employers and 
employees under the strong presence of trade union (Thirlwall and Bergevin, 1985; 
Grilli and Yang, 1988). This is the structural difference between primary commodity 
production and manufacturing production (Bloch and Sapsford, 2000). In this regard, 
while manufacturers benefit from technological progress in the form of higher price 
and wage, technological progress and productivity growth in primary commodity 
sectors generate downward pressure on prices and the benefits mostly accrue to 
consumers in developed countries rather than to producers in developing countries. 
This can be demonstrated by a larger (productivity growth-driven) outward 
movement of the supply curve of primary commodities than that of manufactures 
on the supply-demand graph (Grilli and Yang, 1988). 
 
A third explanation arises as a response to the new scenario that many developing 
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countries have become exporters of manufactures. Despite the awareness of country 
terms of trade between developing and developed countries, unavailability of 
country-level trade data constrained Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer to use 
commodity terms of trade of primary commodities vis-à-vis manufactures as a proxy 
for the country terms of trade of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. 
Alternatively, developing countries' country terms of trade can be inferred from 
country terms of trade of developed countries (Grilli and Yang, 1988). Prior to the 
1950s, primary commodities dominated the export basket of developing countries, 
and thus such proxy basically held water. However, because industrialisation was 
in operation in many developing countries, manufactures have increased their share 
in developing countries' exports. As a result, the correlation between commodity 
terms of trade of primary commodities vis-à-vis manufactures and country terms of 
trade of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries has become weaker, and 
only part of the movement of commodity terms of trade of primary commodities 
translates into the movement of developing countries' country terms of trade 
(Bleaney and Greenaway, 1993; Lutz, 2009). Therefore, the spotlight has been shifted 
to country terms of trade between developing and developed countries (Singer, 
1975b; Sarkar, 1986; Grilli and Yang, 1988; Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Bleaney and 
Greenaway, 1993). As a response to the change in developing countries' export 
composition, Singer (1975a and 1998) revisits the conceptual basis of the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis by introducing the concept of Schumpeterian creative destruction. 
Schumpeterian rents disappear as a product passes its life cycle from an innovative 
product to a standardised product. Innovative activities, which generate 
Schumpeterian rents, concentrate in developed countries, whereas developing 
countries, in spite of their recent industrialisation achievement, only export 
standardised products with exhausted rents. In this regard, the unequal distribution 
of gains accruing to developing countries as primary commodity producers and to 
developed countries as manufacturers, which underlies the classical Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis, has been re-conceptualised as the unequal distribution of gains accruing 
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to developing countries as standardised manufacturers and to developed countries 
as innovative manufacturers. In other words, developing countries' deteriorating 
terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries reflects the unequal distribution of 
Schumpeterian rents between standardised manufacturers in the periphery and 
innovative manufacturers in the centre. 
 
The secular deterioration in both commodity terms of trade and country terms of 
trade facing developing countries has two important policy implications: de-linking 
with the free-trade world market and/or transforming into manufacturing. Myrdal 
(1956), following Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer, discusses the unfavourable 
commodity prices facing developing countries and the unequal world market 
system. This line of discussion generated the Prebisch-Singer-Myrdal thesis of 
inward-looking industrialisation, which acted as the theoretical grounding of import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) and economic nationalism in the Third World 
from the 1950s to the 1970s (Sapsford et al., 1992)82. The Prebisch-Singer thesis is also 
the origin of the Latin American structuralist economics, which attributes inequality 
and backwardness to the unequal structure of the global economy. Moreover, the 
Prebisch-Singer thesis inspired neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment, such as 
dependency theory (represented by Andre Gunder Frank), world-system theory 
(represented by Emmanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin), and unequal exchange 
theory (represented by Arghiri Emmanuel).  
 
                                            
82 It should be borne in mind that the failure of the ISI model in Latin America is largely due to 
problematic interpretation and implementation rather than the model per se. The original 
proposal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), represented by Raúl Prebisch, was not a complete autarky development path, as 
misunderstood by many policy makers in Latin America. Instead, they suggested to promote 
regional integration and upgrade Latin America's position in the global labour division (Toye, 
2003; Ocampo and Ros, 2011). Despite criticisms from ECLAC, policy makers did not effectively 
correct their biased implementation of import substitution industrialisation (Love, 2005). 
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5.2.2. Two Criticisms of the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis 
An important but often neglected issue is that the very core of the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis lies in the deterioration in double factoral terms of trade (DFTOT)83 of 
developing countries rather than simply their net barter terms of trade (Singer, 1991; 
Sapsford et al., 1992; Sarkar, 1994). Actually, as mentioned by Singer (1982 and 1991), 
the proposition in his work in 1950 does not point to the conclusion that 
deteriorating net barter terms of trade necessarily implies welfare loss, but that only 
factoral terms of trade can reflect welfare gain or loss. This is because that decline in 
net barter terms of trade may be due to improvement in productivity and reduction 
in production cost (Sarkar, 1986). However, the unavailability of productivity data 
makes it difficult to directly examine the behaviour of factoral terms of trade (Rostow, 
1950). This restriction leads to the use of the trend of net barter terms of trade to infer 
the behaviour of double factoral terms of trade. However, it is safe and reasonable 
to argue that productivity growth is slower in developing countries than in 
developed countries. Thus, developing countries' deteriorating or even just 
trendless net barter terms of trade indicates a greater deterioration in their double 
factoral terms of trade (Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Singer, 1991). This is actually in line 
with the argument of dynamic benefits from industrialisation highlighted in Adam 
Smith's The Wealth of Nations that the greater productivity and technological progress 
in manufacturing in comparison to primary commodity sector can implicitly turn 
the favourable net barter terms of trade for primary commodity producers to the 
unfavourable double factoral terms of trade against them (Singer, 1991; Sapsford et 
al., 1992). 
 
Another criticism of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is concerned with the real 
welfare conclusion of terms of trade, because deterioration in net barter terms of 
                                            
83 Double factoral terms of trade (DFTOT) is defined by Jacob Viner as net barter terms of trade 
multiplied by the ratio of the productivity index of a country's exporting sectors to that of its 
trade partner's exporting sectors.  
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trade may be offset by increase in export volume (Imlah, 1950; Baldwin, 1955). Grilli 
and Yang (1988) suggest to distinguish between the trend of net barter terms of trade 
and the real income effect of trade. Net barter terms of trade does not take into 
consideration the volume of a country's exports and thus measures gains from one 
unit of trade rather than from total trade (Sarkar, 1986). Therefore, some suggest to 
use income terms of trade (ITOT), which is defined as net barter terms of trade 
multiplied by export volume index, as a measure of absolute gains from trade or the 
purchasing power of exports in terms of imports. Erten (2011) envisages three 
scenarios of the relationship between absolute gains from trade and net barter terms 
of trade. First, improvement in net barter terms of trade produces gains if the price 
elasticity of exports is not high enough to generate large downward pressure on 
export volume. Second, declining net barter terms of trade still produces gains if the 
increase in export volume does not outnumber the reduction in unit price of exports 
by a sufficiently large margin. Third, declining net barter terms of trade generates 
pure losses if the decline in unit price of exports offsets the increase in export volume. 
The first scenario corresponds to increasing net barter terms of trade and increasing 
income terms of trade, the second corresponds to decreasing net barter terms of 
trade but increasing income terms of trade, and the last corresponds to decreasing 
net barter terms of trade and decreasing income terms of trade.  
 
Opponents of the policy implication of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis argue that 
deterioration in net barter terms of trade may generate welfare gains by increasing 
income terms of trade, because lower export prices lead to higher export volume. 
Sarkar (2001) makes a response to this criticism. He ascribes the increase in income 
terms of trade to two factors: reduction in unit price of exports and increase in global 
income. He argues that increase in export volume tends to be due to increase in 
global income rather than reduction in unit price. Thus, taking the global income as 
given, deterioration in unit price of exports implies loss in income terms of trade, in 
comparison with the situation of unchanged unit price.  
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Net barter terms of trade of the exporting country and of the importing country 
moves in opposite directions, which implies that improvement of one country runs 
at the expense of deterioration of the other. In contrast, income terms of trade may 
increase in both countries, provided that there is sufficient increase in export volume 
on both sides. Therefore, net barter terms of trade should be understood as the 
distribution of relative gains from trade between two trade partners, which 
determines which country captures more benefits from the bilateral trade. The 
country that captures more benefits holds a superior position in the bilateral trade 
relationship. In comparison, income terms of trade should be interpreted as a 
country's absolute gains from trade, which determines whether both the two 
countries have any real gains from the bilateral trade. As pointed out by some critics 
of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, improvement in income terms of trade indeed 
implies real gains from trade, even if net barter terms of trade deteriorates. However, 
what these critics neglect is that such real gains run under an unequal bilateral 
exchange relationship at the cost that the disadvantageous country has to export 
more in exchange for a given level of imports.  
 
5.3. The New Global Economic Hierarchy and Developing Countries' Terms of 
Trade  
The recent two decades have witnessed the transformation of some previous 
developing countries into a new group of emerging countries, especially China. The 
rise of emerging countries has at least three major implications for developing 
countries' terms of trade. First, the high growth rate of trade between emerging and 
developing countries has made emerging countries an important trade partner for 
developing countries. This is shown in Table 5.1 for the period of 1995 to 2014. In 
particular, exports from developing countries, both the UNIDO group of Other 
Developing Economies (ODEs) and the group of LDCs, to China and exports from 
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China to developing countries have grown at a disproportionately high rate, which 
is much higher than the growth rate of bilateral trade between developing and 
developed countries.  
 
Table 5.1. Bilateral trade between developing countries and the rest of the world* 
           Importer 
Exporter 
Developed 
Countries 
Emerging Countries 
(excl. China) 
China 
ODEs 1995 181.9 (352.8) 33.7 (66.4) 3.7 (9.8) 
 2014 488.7 (679.1) 172.1 (251.6) 115.1 (216.6) 
 Growth Rate 6.5% (5.3%) 10.7% (9.2%) 20.5% (18.7) 
LDCs 1995 25.7 (38.3) 5.2 (12.8) 1.2 (3.4) 
 2014 83.8 (96.1) 28.1 (66.1) 53.9 (58.4) 
 Growth Rate 8.2% (6.7%) 12.1% (10.6%) 22.6% (17.5%) 
   Source: Author's own calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
   * In billions of 2010 constant US Dollars. Import values are shown in brackets, and export 
values are shown outside of brackets. 
 
Second, the product composition of exports from developing countries to emerging 
countries significantly differs from that of their exports to developed countries. Table 
5.2 compares the composition of developing countries' exports to developed 
countries, emerging countries (excl. China), and China. Since 1995, manufactures 
and fuels have increased their shares in both ODEs' and LDCs' exports to developed 
countries, each of which accounted for approximately 40% in 2014, and the share of 
non-fuel primary commodities has largely decreased. This phenomenon deviates 
from the classical North-South trade pattern underlying the original Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis, but is in line with the scenario underlying the revisited Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis that a shift to a manufacture-dominant export basket has undergone in 
many developing countries. By contrast, the share of manufactures has always stuck 
at a low level in developing countries' exports to China and other emerging 
countries (around 20% and even less than 5% for exports from LDCs to China), 
whereas the share of fuels has sharply amounted to more than half.  
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Table 5.2. Composition of ODEs' and LDCs' exports to the rest of the world84 
Product Category (Percentage) 1995 2014 
Exports to Developed Countries ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 30.3 37.2 18.7 18.2 
Fuels 38.0 26.1 42.1 36.4 
All Manufactures 28.2 24.9 34.9 40.1 
Product Category (Percentage) 1995 2014 
Exports to Emerging Countries ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 32.7 71.3 17.5 24.6 
Fuels 42.7 15.0 57.2 53.2 
All Manufactures 24.1 13.4 23.3 16.2 
Product Category (Percentage) 1995 2014 
Exports to China ODEs LDCs ODEs LDCs 
Non-Fuel Primary Commodities 68.3 26.8 24.8 29.6 
Fuels 20.7 64.8 56.0 64.8 
All Manufactures 11.0 4.6 19.1 2.5 
   Source: Author's own calculation based on the UNCTAD database. 
 
The dominance of fuels in developing countries' exports to emerging countries 
entails the third implication, which is concerned with the commodity boom and the 
super cycle led by emerging countries, especially China. Commodity boom is 
defined as a peak of commodity prices within a cycle that is significantly higher than 
the peak in the previous cycle (Farooki, 2009), and super cycle can be defined as a 
prolonged (e.g., decades-long) increase in primary commodity prices, which is 
driven by major economies' expansion (Heap, 2005; Jerrett and Cuddington, 2008; 
Zellou and Cuddington, 2012a; Zellou and Cuddington, 2012b). A super cycle 
typically lasts 20 to 70 years, which are equally divided by an upswing and a 
downswing (Erten and Ocampo, 2013). Emerging countries, especially China, are 
currently passing through a stage of resource-intensive industrialisation and 
                                            
84 Total exports refer to the category of "All Allocated Products (SITC 0 to 8+961+971)" in the 
UNCTAD database, non-fuel commodities refer to "Primary Commodities, excluding Fuels 
(SITC 0+1+2+4+68)" in the UNCTAD database, fuels refer to "Fuels (SITC 3)" in the UNCTAD 
database, and all manufactures refer to "Manufactured Goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68)" in 
the UNCTAD database. The sum of the shares of non-fuel commodities, fuels, and all 
manufactures in total exports is smaller than 100%, because products of SITC 667 (pearls and 
precious stones), 961 (coin), and 971 (non-monetary gold) are not covered by the above three 
product categories but they are included in "All Allocated Goods".  
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urbanisation, which drives the current super cycle of commodity prices since the 
middle 1990s and the commodity boom since the early 2000s (Heap, 2005; 
Cuddington and Jerrett, 2008; Farooki, 2009; Erten and Ocampo, 2013). Fuels and 
metal minerals are the primary beneficiaries of the boom, but co-movement in 
commodity prices has spread the benefits to some other primary commodities. This 
positive trend in commodity prices has been going along with the entry of China 
and some other emerging countries into the global market as major suppliers of 
cheap manufactures. As suggested by Kaplinsky (2006), this may reverse the long-
term deterioration in terms of trade of some primary commodities. However, 
developing countries specialising in primary commodities that are not highly 
demanded by China and other emerging countries, the so-called "soft commodities" 
(e.g., agricultural products), may not benefit much from the commodity boom. The 
situation may be even worse for those specialising in manufactures, which directly 
compete with China. Thus, terms of trade of developing countries as a whole may 
not make much sense. Instead, disaggregated analysis specifically for each distinct 
group of developing countries can deliver more useful information.  
 
5.4. Developing Countries' Terms of Trade from 1995 to 2014: A Disaggregated 
Empirical Analysis 
5.4.1. Data and Country Classification  
Export data are from the BACI database at the 1992-version Harmonised System (HS 
92) 6-digit disaggregation level from 1995 to 2014. Following Chapter 4, this chapter 
uses the modified 2013 UNIDO country grouping. Developed countries are defined 
as Industrialised Economies (IEs) in the UNIDO grouping. Emerging countries are 
defined as Emerging Industrial Economies (EIEs) less China. China is separately 
listed. Developing countries are defined as Other Developing Economies (ODEs) 
and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the UNIDO grouping. Moreover, 
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developing countries are further divided based on development status and export 
specialisation, respectively. First, by development status, developing countries are 
divided into Other Developing Economies (ODEs), which are the richer half of the 
developing world, and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which are the poorer half. 
Second, by export specialisation, developing countries are classified into major 
exporting countries of agricultural products (AGRIs), major exporting countries of 
non-fuel minerals (MINEs), major exporting countries of mineral fuels (FUELs), and 
major exporting countries of manufactures (MANUs). A country is defined as a 
major exporting country of a particular product category if this product category 
accounts for at least 40% in this country's total exports (the average of the shares in 
1995, 2005, and 2014). Agricultural products are defined as products of SITC 
0+1+2+4-27-28 85 ; non-fuel minerals are defined as products of SITC 
27+28+667+68+971; mineral fuels are defined as products of SITC 3 86 ; and 
manufactures are defined as products of SITC 5+6+7+8-667-68. A country may be a 
major exporter of two product categories. For instance, Moldova is major exporting 
country of both agricultural products and manufactures. Among the total of 101 
developing countries, only five countries do not have any product categories that 
account for no less than 40% of total exports (i.e., Bolivia87, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New 
Guinea, Saint Lucia, and Togo). These five countries are included in empirical 
analyses with respect to development level, but are excluded in empirical analyses 
                                            
85  Agricultural products are defined in a broad-sense way. In addition to conventional 
agricultural products, this category also includes hide and skin (SITC 21), crude rubber (SITC 
23), wood product (SITC 24), pulp (SITC 25), and textile fibre (SITC 26). 
86 The sub-group of SITC 35 under SITC 3 refers to electric current, which is not mineral fuel, 
but in the database there is no developing country that exports electric current. Thus, the 
inclusion of SITC 35 in SITC 3 does not distort the result. 
87  Bolivia is an important exporting country of non-fuel minerals, especially trace element 
minerals (e.g., silver, zinc, bismuth, antimony, and tungsten), and an important exporting 
country of natural gas. However, the share of mineral fuels in Bolivia's total exports did not 
outnumber 40% until 2005. In 1995, the share was only 12.3%, and the share was 51.1% in 2014. 
This is because the major reserve of natural gas in Bolivia had not been discovered until 1997. 
For another thing, the share of non-fuel minerals in total exports declined from 46.9% in 1995 to 
19.5% in 2005. By 2014, the share had rebounded to 30.2%. As a result, the 1995-2014 average of 
neither the share of mineral fuels nor the share of non-fuel minerals outnumbers the threshold 
of 40%. Thus, Bolivia is not classified under either major exporting countries of mineral fuels or 
those of non-fuel minerals. 
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with respect to export specialisation pattern. 
 
5.4.2. Descriptive Evidence  
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of net barter terms of trade (NBTOT) of developing 
countries vis-à-vis developed countries between 1995 and 2014. NBTOT is defined as 
the ratio of the unit price of a country's exports to the unit price of its imports. The 
choice of time period has major impact on observed trend of terms of trade (Erten, 
2011). Using 1995 as the base year is due to the availability of the HS 6-digit-level 
BACI database. However, this choice has its empirical relevance, because the current 
super cycle of commodity prices started in the middle 1990s. For instance, Zellou 
and Cuddington (2012a) and Erdem and Ünalmış (2016) identify 1996 as the starting 
year of the super cycle, and Jerrett and Cuddington (2008) suggest that the starting 
time point of the current super cycle lies between 1995 and 2000. Using 2014 as the 
ending year, despite the reason of data availability, also has its empirical support. 
Erdem and Ünalmış (2016) suggest 2014 as the end of the upswing phase of the 
current super cycle since the middle 1990s. 
 
The upper half of the figure shows NBTOT of developing countries by development 
status. A visual inspection clearly shows positive trends of NBTOT vis-à-vis 
developed countries for both ODEs and LDCs as well as developing countries as a 
whole (ODEs+LDCs). All observations lie above the base level in 1995. There is a 
rough pattern of co-movement in the behaviour of ODEs' and LDCs' NBTOT vis-à-
vis developed countries, but LDCs' NBTOT shows greater fluctuation. NBTOT does 
not show peculiar behaviour in the crisis years of 2007 and 2008, except for a 
temporary reduction for LDCs. The lower half of the figure gives NBTOT of 
developing countries by export specialisation. FUELs countries (henceforth FUELs) 
and MINEs countries (henceforth MINEs) show significant upward trends, while 
AGRIs countries (henceforth AGRIs) and MANUs countries (henceforth MANUs) 
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have rather stable NBTOT. FUELs and MINEs show a peak of NBTOT in 2008 and 
decline in 2007 and 2009. However, it is hard to make a judgement on whether this 
is due to the crisis, because similar fluctuation is observed before 2007 as well. AGRIs 
and MANUs still show positive trends of NBTOT between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Figure 5.1. Developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries 
 
             Source: Author's own calculation based on BACI database. 
 
Figure 5.2. presents developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries (excl. 
China). Unlike the case for their NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries, developing 
countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries does not show clear upward trend. 
Rather, the behaviour of various series of NBTOT is quite invariant. ODEs' NBTOT 
has always been higher than the 1995 base level since 2000, whereas the opposite is 
true for LDCs. In terms of export specialisation, MINEs' and MANUs' NBTOT tends 
to slightly fluctuate surrounding the base level. An outlier value of MINEs' NBTOT 
is recorded in 1997, which cannot be explained. FUELs' NBTOT shows a jump 
between 1998 and 2001 and then maintains at a stable level, which may indicate a 
structural break in intercept. AGRIs' NBTOT experiences a downswing between 
1999 and 2002, and then remains at a stable level lower than the 1995 base value. The 
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impact of the crisis is unclear. If developing countries are classified based on 
development status, their NBTOT deteriorates between 2008 and 2009 and then 
rebounds. However, if they are classified based on export specialisation, there is no 
peculiar behaviour during the crisis period, except the downturn in 2008 for MINEs.  
 
Figure 5.2. Developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries 
 
             Source: Author's own calculation based on BACI database. 
 
Figure 5.3 presents developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis China. Visual inspection 
fails to detect clear trend for the whole period, but all country groups seem to have 
negative trends in general after 2005. ODEs' NBTOT diverges from that of LDCs 
between 1998 and 2007. FUELs and MINEs always have quite high NBTOT in 
comparison with the base level. AGRIs' and MANUs' NBTOT is much lower than 
that of FUELs and MINEs. All country groups (to a much lesser extent MANUs) 
show decline in NBTOT between 2008 and 2009. Then, a rebound occurs 
immediately. This evidence supports that the recent boom is persistent due to the 
strong resilience of emerging countries towards the global economic downturn. 
After the global financial crisis, commodity prices immediately recovered (Erten and 
Ocampo, 2013). 
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Figure 5.3. Developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis China 
 
             Source: Author's own calculation based on BACI database. 
 
To sum up, visual inspection shows that only developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis 
developed countries shows clear (upward) trend. Their NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging 
countries and China does not show clear improvement. Despite similar performance 
in NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries, LDCs' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries 
and China performs obviously worse than that of ODEs. This pattern may be 
explained by the higher commodity dependence and lower diversification of LDCs' 
export basket. FUELs and MINEs obviously outperform AGRIs and MANUs in 
NBTOT. This is easy to be understood, because the commodity boom, which is led 
by emerging countries' industrialisation and urbanisation, benefits "hard 
commodities" more than "soft commodities" and manufactures. For another thing, 
AGRIs' and MANUs' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries outperforms their 
NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries and China. Developing countries' agricultural 
exports to developed countries are much more diverse than their agricultural 
exports to China. In 2005, developed countries imported 730 varieties of agricultural 
products from AGRIs at the HS 92 6-digit level, while the number is 598 for emerging 
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countries and even only 203 for China. This contrast in diversification may explain 
the better performance of AGRIs' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries than that vis-
à-vis emerging countries and China. The more favourable trend of MANUs' NBTOT 
vis-à-vis developed countries than that vis-à-vis emerging countries and China may 
be attributed to the much higher share of manufactures in developing countries' 
exports to developed countries than to emerging countries and China. 
 
5.4.3. Empirical Strategy of Time Series Analysis 
Visual inspections in the last section provide preliminary and rough evidence on the 
behaviour of developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis different trade 
partners from 1995 to 2014. Despite the quite short time series of only 20 
observations, rigorous time series analysis on the trend of developing countries' 
terms of trade is still interesting and necessary. Amongst empirical studies on terms 
of trade, only a few exceptions examine a time period less than 40 years, such as 21 
years (1965-1985) in Sarkar and Singer (1991) and 30 years (1970-1999) in Ram (2004). 
Small time dimension inevitably weakens the robustness and validity of time series 
analysis and constrains model specifications. This limitation, however, may not be 
a major problem here, because the aim of this chapter is concerned with the 
comparison between the behaviours of developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis 
different trade partners and the comparison between the behaviours of terms of 
trade for different groups of developing countries, rather than estimating the exact 
trend in each individual series of terms of trade.  
 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, there were extensive statistical examinations on the 
trend of terms of trade or commodity prices. The classical time series method is to 
fit a simple log-linear exponential trend equation (i.e., 𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑢) by OLS. 
This semi-log model is derived from taking natural logarithm with respect to the 
exponential trend equation 𝑦7 = 𝑦h𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑟𝑡), where 𝑦h is the terms of trade at the 
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initial time point. It has been a common view that this log-linear trend equation is 
the best empirical strategy to test the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Almost all 
rigorous statistical analyses on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, including those 
seminal works, are based on this method or its variants (von Hagen, 1989), such as 
Spraos (1980), Chu and Morrison (1984), Sapsford (1985), Sarkar (1986), Grilli and 
Yang (1988), Sarkar and Singer (1991), and Ram (2004). More generally speaking, 
this simple log-linear model is also the most commonly-used method in calculating 
the growth rate of a given economic variable (Kakwani, 2007). This model is based 
on a kind of trend stationarity (TS) by assuming that the behaviour of lny(t) follows 
a deterministic trend and the error process is stationary (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). 
That is to say, all shocks are either temporary or cyclical and do not have permanent 
impacts on the secular deterministic trend. Cuddington (1992) suggests that actually 
all studies on the trend of commodity prices take the implicit assumption of trend 
stationarity. However, as a doubt regarding this assumption, Cuddington and 
Urzúa (1989) initiate a so-called "hi-tech" debate on statistical problems for terms of 
trade studies, centring on the stationarity of terms of trade series (Sarkar, 2001). The 
authors also introduce new statistical techniques to terms of trade studies. 
Afterwards, some authors contribute to this debate, such as Ardeni and Wright 
(1992), Bleaney and Greenaway (1993), Lutz (1999), and Bloch and Sapsford (2000). 
Cuddington and Urzúa (1989) argue that some shocks, such as new resource 
discovery and technological progress, have permanent, rather than temporary, 
impacts on commodity prices. In this sense, the behaviour of commodity prices 
follows a stochastic process with permanent shocks, instead of a deterministic 
process with temporary shocks (Zanias, 2005). Given this, Cuddington and Urzúa 
(1989) suggest to use the difference-stationary model (DS), 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 𝑟 + 𝑢, which is 
the first-differenced form of the classical log-linear trend equation. With this DS 
model, Cuddington and Urzúa (1989) reject the secular deterioration in primary 
commodity prices and indicate a one-off permanent drop in the prices in 1920. A 
similar one-off drop is also found by Powell (1991) and Bleaney and Greenaway 
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(1993) on different time points. However, Sapsford et al. (1992) criticise that the 
results of Cuddington and Urzúa (1989) are subject to the interpolated outlier 
observations between 1914 and 1921, and they find that primary commodity prices 
follow trend stationarity and the price deterioration holds true.  
 
If the behaviour of a time series is not stationary, then OLS estimation produces 
spurious regression and wrongly identifies a trend that is actually absent (Nelson 
and Kang, 1984; Cuddington and Wei, 1992; Athukorala, 2000). On the other hand, 
first differencing a time series in the absence of unit root will artificially create a unit 
root in the error process of the first-differenced model, known as the "over-
differencing" problem, which is as problematic as failing to identify the unit root 
(Cuddington, 1992). In other words, both wrongly neglecting a unit root and 
wrongly identifying a unit root are harmful. Therefore, an appropriate unit root test 
is crucial. However, given the very small time dimension in this chapter (only 20 
observations), unit root test is subject to size distortion (Johansen, 2004). Moreover, 
the validity and power of unit root test are quite low for very short time series (e.g., 
less than 25 time points), regardless of the type of test, such as Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test or others (Fedorová, 2016). Thus, for such 
short time series of only 20 observations, it is not reliable to identify unit root based 
conventional tests. In order to overcome this limitation, following Cuddington and 
Urzúa (1989), both the classical trend-stationary model (TS) and the alternative 
difference-stationary model (DS) are used. However, in order to be consistent with 
the majority of previous terms of trade studies, the trend-stationary log-linear model 
is the major method and the difference-stationary model serves as a supplement. 
The trend-stationary model is specified as: 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑇 = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑢 
where TOT refers to either NBTOT or ITOT (income terms of trade), a is the constant, 
t is the time variable, r is the time trend, and u is the error term. This model allows 
for change in slope or intercept by introducing structural break dummy for 
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particular time period. Thus, in the case of structural break, the model is augmented 
by an intercept dummy (𝐷7) for structural break in intercept and a slope dummy 
(𝐷7×𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) for structural break in slope, taking one for pre-structural break years and 
zero for other years. However, test for structural break points may be unreliable and 
inconclusive for short time series. Thus, results of the test should be interpreted 
together with visual inspections of the behaviour of terms of trade (i.e., Figure 5.1 to 
5.3). However, even if so, the results of structural break analysis should still be 
treated cautiously. Another concern is autocorrelation in error term, which is 
prevalent in time series data. Autocorrelation leads to less efficient estimator and 
inconsistent standard errors. In the case of first order autocorrelation, the Prais-
Winsten correction and the Cochrane-Orcutt correction are used, respectively. 
Moreover, in the case of non-stationary trend, Cochrane-Orcutt correction can also 
partly avoid wrongly identifying a time trend that is actually absent (Nelson and 
Kang, 1984).  
 
For a terms of trade series with unit root, Cuddington and Urzúa (1989) suggest the 
following difference-stationary model, which is the first-differenced form of the 
trend-stationary equation: 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑇 = 𝑟 + 𝑢 
where 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑇 is in effect the growth rate of 𝑇𝑂𝑇, and r is the time trend, which is 
conceptually identical to that in the trend-stationary log-linear equation. The growth 
rate of terms of trade is regressed on a constant and the error term, which is fitted 
by ARMA model.  
 
Furthermore, the autoregressive model by Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) and 
Ziesemer (2010) is used as a robustness check. The model is specified as: ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑇7 = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑂𝑇7gh + 𝑢 
This model includes the lagged dependent variable as regressor. If the coefficient of 
this variable is significantly negative, then the lagged terms of trade serves as a 
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"gravitational pull" on the behaviour of terms of trade (Bleaney and Greenaway, 
1993). If the coefficient of this variable is equal to zero, then the terms of trade follows 
a random walk with increasing variance. Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) list four 
combinations of the estimates on r and 𝛾 , which is elaborated in Table 5.3. 
According to Bleaney and Greenaway (1993), the estimation can indicate the future 
trend of a time series, only if the coefficient of the lagged terms of trade is 
significantly negative. Adding lagged dependent variable may also alleviate 
autocorrelation in error terms and avoid the omitted variable bias (Ziesemer, 2010). 
 
Table 5.3. Parameter combinations in autoregressive model 
             Gravitational Pull 
Time Trend 
𝛾 = 0 < 0 
 𝑟 = 0 random walk with zero mean (no trend estimated) Convergence to past mean ≠ 0 random walk with drift 
(no trend estimated) 
non-zero long-term trend 
  Source: Author's own elaboration based on Bleaney and Greenaway (1993). 
 
5.4.4. Results  
Table 5.4 gives the results for developing countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed 
countries. Trend-stationary model confirms the positive trend found by visual 
inspection. Developing countries as a whole (ODEs+LDCs) and each sub-group 
show highly significant positive trend. An exception is AGRIs, which are trendless 
after correcting for autocorrelation. ODEs have greater positive trend (5.1% per 
annum) than LDCs (3.9% per annum). FUELs show the greatest growth rate of 7% 
per annum and therefore a cumulative increase in NBTOT of 140% from 1995 to 2014. 
MINEs have the second greatest positive trend, around 6% per annum. By contrast, 
MANUs' NBTOT increases at only 2% per annum. Difference-stationary model 
(shown in the last column) gives similar results, but LDCs lose statistical significance. 
Data on FUELs and MANUs are subject to convergence problem and thus fail to 
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generate results in the DS model. 
 
Table 5.4. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries 
by country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.048*** 
 
0.93 1.63 0.049*** 
ODEs 0.051***  
(0.051***, 0.048***) 
0.93  
(0.91, 0.86) 
1.33  
(1.91, 1.96) 
0.051*** 
 
LDCs 0.039*** 
(0.038***, 0.03**) 
0.6  
(0.47, 0.27) 
1.25  
(1.53, 1.12) 
0.032 
 
AGRIs 0.01* 
(0.007, -0.008) 
0.1  
(0.88, 0.02) 
0.95  
(1.1, 1.24) 
0.004 
 
MINEs 0.061*** 
(0.056***, 0.054***) 
0.79 
 (0.84, 0.39) 
0.93  
(1.8, 1.67) 
0.055*** 
 
FUELs 0.07*** 0.89 2.17 - 
 
MANUs 0.02*** 
(0.023**, 0.009) 
0.38  
(0.86, 0.02) 
0.84  
(1.72, 1.42) 
- 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(NBTOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.5 presents the robustness check by autoregressive model for developing 
countries' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries. Except AGRIs, all other country 
groups show significant negative estimates on 𝛾 , which shows the effect of 
gravitational pull. Thus, the paths of these country groups' NBTOT vis-à-vis 
developed countries are predictable. Developing countries as a whole and ODEs 
have positive trend, whereas LDCs are trendless with a tendency to converge to its 
past mean level, as shown by the insignificant coefficient of r. FUELs show very high 
positive trend of 7.7% per annum, very close to the result from the above exponential 
trend equation, while MINEs and MANUs are trendless with convergence to past 
means. Overall, autoregressive model generates similar results with exponential TS 
and DS models. 
 
Table 5.5. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries 
by country group 1995-2014 (autoregressive model) 
Country Group  r 𝛾 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
ODEs+LDCs 0.041*** -0.89*** 0.43 1.81 
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ODEs 0.034** 
 
-0.7*** 0.31 1.96 
LDCs 0.02  
(0.02, 0.025) 
-0.69**  
(-0.96**, -0.69**) 
0.26  
(0.49, 0.22) 
1.12  
(1.24, 1.07) 
AGRIs -0.003  
(-0.004, -0.008) 
-0.39  
(-0.45, -0.57) 
0.13  
(0.12, 0.16) 
1.24  
(1.62, 1.44) 
MINEs 0.024 
 
-0.44* 0.092 1.67 
FUELs 0.077*** 
 
-1.1*** 0.49 2.05 
MANUs 0.005 -0.56*** 0.38 1.42 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the autoregressive model with time trend: ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7) = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7gh) + 𝑢, where t is the time (year) variable and r is the 
trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, 
and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number in the bracket refers to Prais-
Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt estimate. 5% significance 
level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.6 gives results for exponential trend model for developing countries' NBTOT 
vis-à-vis emerging countries. TS model generates significant time trends for all 
country groups except LDCs and AGRIs, but DS model produces significant 
(positive) trend only for developing countries as a whole, ODEs, and MANUs. 
However, the magnitude of the estimated time trend coefficients is quite similar 
between the two models. Developing countries as a whole, ODEs, FUELs 
(insignificant in DS model), and MANUs show positive trends with small 
magnitude. MINEs (insignificant in DS model) show negative trends. 
Autoregressive model in Table 5.7 gives similar results as the DS model. Despite 
significant negative lagged terms of trade for all country groups, only developing 
countries as a whole, ODEs, MINEs, and MANUs show significant trends (all 
positive except MINEs). LDCs, AGRIs, and FUELs are trendless by converging to 
their past means. 
 
Table 5.6. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis emerging countries by 
country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.024*** 0.53 2.33 0.024*** 
 
ODEs 0.031*** 0.56 2.11 0.031*** 
 
LDCs -0.011 0.027 1.88 -0.011 
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AGRIs -0.016*  
(-0.017, -0.008) 
0.13  
(0.89, 0.01) 
0.7  
(1.44, 1.27) 
-0.022 
MINEs -0.038** 0.16 1.43 -0.039 
 
FUELs 0.038***  
(0.035**, 0.032) 
0.43  
(0.78, 0.06) 
0.82  
(1.62, 1.62) 
0.034 
MANUs 0.016* 0.13 2.39 0.016* 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(NBTOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.7. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis emerging countries by 
country group 1995-2014 (autoregressive model) 
Country Group  r 𝛾 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
ODEs+LDCs 0.031*** -1.23*** 0.55 2.06 
 
ODEs 0.037*** -1.13*** 0.49 2.02 
 
LDCs -0.01 -0.94*** 0.4 1.92 
 
AGRIs -0.003  
(-0.005, -0.012) 
-0.36*  
(-0.64**, -0.55**) 
0.09  
(0.28, 0.21) 
1.27  
(1.66, 1.65) 
MINEs -0.039* -0.75*** 0.3 1.85 
 
FUELs 0.013 -0.4* 0.1 1.62 
 
MANUs 0.02* -1.2*** 0.55 1.99 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the autoregressive model with time trend: ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7) = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7gh) + 𝑢, where t is the time (year) variable and r is the 
trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b 
and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimation are shown respectively in bracket. The first number in the bracket refers to Prais-
Winsten estimation, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt estimation. 5% 
significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that several country groups' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries 
shows large sudden jump in particular years, for example MINEs in 1997. In order 
to control for these peculiar movements, point dummy, 𝐷U, is included, which pulls 
the peculiar point back to the estimate of a normal year (Erten, 2011). The dummy 
takes zero for the year of sudden jump and one for other years. Thus, r refers to the 
trend of normal years. Table 5.8 shows the results with point dummy. In comparison 
with the TS model in Table 5.6, MINEs and MANUs lose their significance, but other 
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country groups do not show qualitative differences. 
 
Table 5.8. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis emerging countries 
1995-2014: robustness check for sudden jump (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝	𝐽𝑢𝑚𝑝	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
ODEs+LDCs 0.019*** 
 
0.403*** 0.73 1.94 
ODEs 0.024*** 
(0.022***, 0.025***) 
0.495*** 
(0.547***, 0.552***) 
0.75  
(0.90, 0.70) 
1.26 
(1.79, 1.82) 
LDCs -0.002 0.777*** 0.56 
 
2.06 
MINEs -0.022 
(-0.028, -0.042) 
1.476*** 
(1.336***, 1.292***) 
0.54  
(0.70, 0.56) 
1.15 
(1.79, 1.90) 
MANUs 0.005 0.813*** 0.73 2.87 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(NBTOT)=a+rt+𝑏𝐷U+u, where t is 
the time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-
order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-
Winsten estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first 
number in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to 
Cochrane-Orcutt estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
The sudden jump year is 2013 for ODEs+LDCs, ODEs, and MANUs, and is 1997 for LDCs and 
MINEs. 
 
Table 5.9 presents results from exponential trend equation for developing countries' 
NBTOT vis-à-vis China. Developing countries as a whole and LDCs do not show 
significant trend, but ODEs show significant negative trend (2% to 3% per annum). 
MANUs show great negative trend (around 7% per annum). By contrast, FUELs 
show significant positive trend of 4% per annum. AGRIs (after correcting for 
autocorrelation) and MINEs have negative but insignificant trend. DS model 
confirms the positive trend for FUELs, but gives insignificant trend for MANUs. The 
DS model fails to converge for ODEs and LDCs. 
 
Table 5.9. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis China by country 
group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs -0.013 0.1 1.53 -0.013 
     
ODEs -0.02**  
(-0.02*, -0.03**) 
0.2  
(0.4, 0.27) 
1.37  
(1.91, 1.91) 
- 
LDCs 0.015 
(-0.004, 0.015) 
0.01  
(0.74, 0.01) 
0.5  
(1.5, 1.47) 
- 
AGRIs -0.02*  
(-0.02, -0.03) 
0.11  
(0.4, 0.09) 
1.4  
(1.91, 1.98) 
-0.02 
MINEs -0.003 0.006 1.47 -0.0008 
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FUELs 0.04*** 0.52 1.56 0.042*** 
 
MANUs -0.07***  
(-0.06***, -0.08***) 
0.61  
(0.7, 0.49) 
1.04  
(2.1, 1.96) 
-0.052 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(NBTOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.10 shows results from autoregressive model. Except LDCs, all country 
groups have significant negative lagged terms of trade, which shows gravitational 
pull. Developing countries as a whole and ODEs have negative trends of NBTOT 
vis-à-vis China. MANUs show an even larger negative trend of 4.8% per annum, 
whereas FUELs show a positive trend of 3.3% per annum. MINEs show negative 
trend of 1.6% per annum and AGRIs are trendless with convergence to the past mean. 
 
Table 5.10. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries vis-à-vis China by country 
group 1995-2014 (autoregressive model) 
Country Group  r 𝛾 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
ODEs+LDCs -0.015* -0.81*** 0.36 1.78 
ODEs -0.025** -0.77*** 0.39 1.91 
LDCs 0.004 -0.25 0.01 1.47 
AGRIs -0.021 -0.72*** 0.3 1.98 
MINEs -0.016* -0.93*** 0.61 1.82 
FUELs 0.033* -0.83*** 0.3 1.85 
MANUs -0.048** -0.58** 0.27 1.96 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the autoregressive model with time trend: ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7) = 𝑎 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇7gh) + 𝑢, where t is the time (year) variable and r is the 
trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, 
and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number in the bracket refers to Prais-
Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt estimate. 5% significance 
level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
A concern for the behaviour of NBTOT is structural break. As discussed in Section 
5.4.3, structural break test and analysis may be unreliable and inconclusive for very 
short time series. Thus, the test for structural break has to be interpreted in 
combination with visual inspections of the behaviour of NBTOT. Structural break 
test shows estimated structural break points for AGRIs', MINEs', and MANUs' 
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NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries in 2010, 2004, and 2004, respectively. 
Structural break points for AGRIs' and FUELs' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries 
are in 2001 and 2000. Structural break points for ODEs+LDCs', ODEs', LDCs', FUELs', 
and MANUs' NBTOT vis-à-vis China are in 2003, 2003, 2005, 2005, and 2004, 
respectively. Other terms of trade series do not show structural break. These 
estimated structural break points do not obviously contradict visual inspections. 
Intercept dummy, 𝐷7 , and slope dummy, 𝐷7×𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 , are used for controlling for 
structural break in intercept and slope. The dummy takes the value of one before the 
estimated structural break point and zero for other years. The two dummies give the 
impact of structural break on time trend, which serve as robustness check. 
 
Table 5.11 shows the robustness check with structural break dummy. The intercept 
dummy and slope dummy are found to be statistically significant in most cases. 
AGRIs' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries shows negative trend (around -0.13). 
After the structural break in 2010, the negative trend is reversed to a slight positive 
trend, as shown by the slope dummy. The opposite trends before and after the 
structural break may explain the trendless estimation in the model without 
controlling for structural break. However, this post-structural break positive trend 
is established on a considerable one-off drop during the structural break as shown 
by the intercept dummy. MINEs' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries loses 
significant trend after controlling for structural break. MANUs' NBTOT vis-à-vis 
developed countries has a slightly greater positive trend in comparison to that in 
model without structural break dummy, and the positive trend is further 
accentuated after structural break. AGRIs' NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries has 
positive trend, which is opposite to previous result. FUELs' NBTOT vis-à-vis 
emerging countries loses its significance. The negative trend of NBTOT vis-à-vis 
China for developing countries as a whole turns to be significant and stronger, in 
comparison with the result from regression without structural break dummy. ODE's 
negative trend of NBTOT vis-à-vis China becomes stronger, and LDCs' trend in 
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NBTOT is reversed to be negative, in comparison to previous results. FUELs show 
positive trend after structural break in 2005, despite the substantial one-off drop 
during the structural break. MANUs' negative trend becomes stronger relative to 
previous result, but turns to be slightly positive after structural break. However, this 
positive post-structural break trend is based on large one-off drop during the 
structural break as well. Generally speaking, structural break analysis does not lead 
to large qualitative differences to the overall scenario of developing countries' trends 
of NBTOT derived from previous baseline regressions. 
 
Table 5.11. Trends of NBTOT of developing countries 1995-2014: robustness check 
for structural break (log-linear model) 
Country 
Group 
r 𝐷7 𝐷7×𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics 
NBTOT vis-à-vis Developed Countries   
AGRIs -0.127***  
(-0.13***, -0.127***) 
-2.509***  
(-2.558***, -2.419***) 
0.137***  
(0.143***, 0.131***) 
0.5  
(0.84, 0.42) 
1.33  
(1.47, 1.76) 
MINEs 0.001 1.038*** 0.062*** 0.95 2.35 
MANUs 0.031** 0.026 0.033* 0.61 1.54 
NBTOT vis-à-vis Emerging Countries    
AGRIs 0.016* 0.393** 0.039 0.65 2.26 
FUELs -0.0004 -0.521*** -0.058 0.86 2.93 
NBTOT vis-à-vis China     
ODEs+LDCs -0.056*** -0.685* 0.026 0.54 2.41 
ODEs -0.077*** -1.057*** 0.084** 0.57 2.12 
LDCs -0.054** -0.788* -0.035 0.64 1.53 
FUELs -0.026 -1.143*** 0.056* 0.72 2.36 
MANUs -0.119***  -1.192** 0.135** 0.73 1.52 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(NBTOT)=a+rt+𝑏𝐷7+𝑏′𝐷7𝑡+u, 
where t is the time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case 
of 1st-order autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b , and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under 
Prais-Winsten estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. 
The first number in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers 
to Cochrane-Orcutt estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value 
(1.411). 
 
NBTOT reflects a country's relative gains from bilateral trade, say, gains from one 
unit of trade. However, in order to see a country's gains from its total trade, it is 
necessary to examine its income terms of trade (ITOT). ITOT, which is defined as 
NBTOT multiplied by export volume, measures the purchasing power of a country's 
exports in terms of the capacity to import. If a country's export volume increases, its 
ITOT may increase even in the presence of NBTOT deterioration. Table 5.12 shows 
 262 
estimates on developing countries' ITOT vis-à-vis developed countries. Exponential 
log-linear trend model gives highly significant and quite large positive trends for all 
country groups. This is confirmed by DS model, except LDCs, which are trendless 
in DS model. FUELs and MINEs have particularly high growth rate of around 7% 
per annum, whereas AGRIs and MANUs have lower growth rate of around 4% and 
5.5% per annum, respectively. Correcting for autocorrelation does not qualitatively 
change the results. 
 
Table 5.12. Trends of ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries by 
country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.063***  
(0.063***, 0.054***) 
0.89  
(0.98, 0.78) 
1.14  
(1.66, 1.96) 
0.063*** 
ODEs 0.061***  
(0.061***, 0.051***) 
0.87  
(0.99, 0.68) 
1.06  
(1.71, 2.12) 
0.062*** 
LDCs 0.075***  
(0.075***, 0.07***) 
0.91  
(0.97, 0.82) 
1.37  
(1.79, 1.01) 
0.078 
AGRIs 0.039***  
(0.04***, 0.036***) 
0.88  
(0.99, 0.81) 
1.36  
(1.78, 1.99) 
0.04*** 
MINEs 0.07***  
(0.069***, 0.068***) 
0.87  
(0.98, 0.75) 
1.28  
(2.06, 1.97) 
0.063** 
FUELs 0.076***  
(0.074***, 0.062***) 
0.74  
(0.97, 0.39) 
1.12  
(1.82, 1.98) 
0.073*** 
MANUs 0.056***  
(0.056***, 0.049***) 
0.89  
(0.89, 0.91) 
1.32  
(1.55, 1.72) 
0.058*** 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(ITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the time 
(year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.13 presents the trends of developing countries' ITOT vis-à-vis emerging 
countries. TS model and DS model give highly similar results, except that the trend 
of FUELs turns to be insignificant in DS model (p-value=0.128). All country groups 
but MINEs show positive and considerable growth rate of more than 8.5% per 
annum. The growth rates of developing countries' ITOT vis-à-vis emerging countries 
tend to be obviously greater than the growth rates of their ITOT vis-à-vis developed 
countries. 
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Table 5.13. Trends of ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis emerging countries by 
country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group  r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.086*** 0.93 1.96 0.086*** 
 
ODEs 0.086*** 0.91 2.18 0.086*** 
 
LDCs 0.095*** 0.84 2.07 0.095*** 
 
AGRIs 0.086*** 0.97 2.01 0.086*** 
 
MINEs 0.025  
(0.024, 0.025) 
0.036  
(0.79, 0.039) 
1.32  
(1.86, 1.86) 
0.024 
FUELs 0.092***  
(0.091***, 0.074***) 
0.85  
(0.98, 0.47) 
0.86  
(1.73, 1.75) 
0.089 
MANUs 0.086*** 0.9 2.43 0.086*** 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(ITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the time 
(year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Finally, Table 5.14 gives the trends of developing countries' ITOT vis-à-vis China. The 
positive growth rates (on average 17% per annum) are substantially greater than the 
growth rates of their ITOT vis-à-vis developed countries (around 6% per annum) and 
emerging countries (between 8.5% and 9% per annum). The positive trend is highly 
significant for all country groups in both TS model and DS model. FUELs have the 
highest growth rate of around 20% per annum, which indicates a cumulative 
improvement of 400% from 1995 to 2014. MANUs have the lowest growth rate of 
around 13% per annum.  
 
Table 5.14. Trends of ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis China by country 
group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.16***  
(0.16***, 0.15***) 
0.93  
(0.94, 0.82) 
1.24  
(1.84, 1.76) 
0.16*** 
ODEs 0.16*** 
 (0.16***, 0.15***) 
0.92  
(0.95, 0.78) 
1.11  
(1.84, 1.8) 
0.16*** 
LDCs 0.18***  
(0.17***, 0.18***) 
0.82  
(0.92, 0.44) 
0.72  
(1.75, 1.7) 
0.16*** 
AGRIs 0.18***  
(0.17***, 0.21***) 
0.83  
(0.92, 0.62) 
0.69  
(1.94, 2.15) 
0.17** 
MINEs 0.17***  
(0.17***, 0.18***) 
0.94  
(0.96, 0.83) 
1.1  
(1.81, 1.72) 
0.17*** 
FUELs 0.21***  
(0.21***, 0.19***) 
0.92  
(0.86, 0.82) 
1.27  
(1.76, 1.9) 
0.2*** 
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MANUs 0.13***  
(0.13***, 0.11***) 
0.84  
(0.97, 0.33) 
0.6  
(1.71, 1.66) 
0.13*** 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(ITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the time 
(year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Another question of interest is whether the absolute gains from bilateral trade 
accruing to developing countries rise relative to the absolute gains accruing to their 
trade partners. Following Sarkar and Singer (1991), this question is examined by the 
trends of Relative ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis their trade partners. 
Relative ITOT (RITOT) is defined as: 
𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑇¤]¥]53$89¦	%3497\8]§ = 𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑇¤]¥]53$89¦	%3497\8]§𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑇7\6¤]	$6\79]\  
A statistically significant positive Relative ITOT implies that in the bilateral trade, 
developing countries' absolute gains rise relative to their trade partner's. A negative 
Relative ITOT indicates that developing countries' absolute gains decline relative to 
their trade partner's absolute gains.  
 
Table 5.15 shows the case of developing countries' RITOT vis-à-vis developed 
countries. According to TS model, except for AGRIs, all country groups show 
significant positive but quite small trends. This implies that in the bilateral trade 
between developing and developed countries, developing countries' absolute gains 
rise relative to developed countries' absolute gains. However, the quite small 
coefficients may not have economic significance. In particular, if the substantially 
greater growth rate of population in developing countries is taken into account, then 
it is safe to argue that such negligible advantage in Relative ITOT will be reversed to 
disadvantage in per capita terms. RITOT of LDCs, MINEs, and MANUs turns to be 
insignificant in DS model. Table 5.16 shows the case of RITOT vis-à-vis emerging 
countries. TS model shows that developing countries as a whole, ODEs, FUELs, and 
MANUs have significant positive but very small trends. However, FUELs and 
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MANUs turn to be insignificant in DS model. AGRIs and MINEs show negative but 
insignificant trends in both TS and DS model. Insignificant result implies that these 
developing countries do not hold advantage over emerging countries in absolute 
gains from bilateral trade. Table 5.17 gives the case for RITOT vis-à-vis China. In TS 
model, only MINEs (negative) and FUELs (positive) show significant trend, and in 
DS model none of the country groups shows significant trend. In brief, developing 
countries' Relative ITOT vis-à-vis emerging countries and China show much less 
significant trend in comparison with that vis-à-vis developed countries. 
 
Table 5.15. Trends of Relative ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis developed 
countries by country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.003*** 0.83 1.5 0.003*** 
 
ODEs 0.03*** 0.84 1.53 0.003*** 
 
LDCs 0.003***  
(0.003***, 0.02*) 
0.59  
(0.95, 0.13) 
1.05  
(1.54, 1.24) 
0.003 
AGRIs 0.0001  
(-0.00001, -0.0009) 
0.01  
(0.99, 0.02) 
0.93  
(1.11, 1.2) 
-0.0008 
MINEs 0.005***  
(0.003**, 0.001) 
0.67  
(0.98, 0.008) 
0.48  
(1.63, 1.62) 
0.003 
FUELs 0.005*** 0.66 1.87 0.005*** 
 
MANUs 0.002***  
(0.002**, 0.0005) 
0.34  
(0.99, 0.03) 
0.69  
(1.77, 1.47) 
0.003 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(RITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.16. Trends of Relative ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis emerging 
countries by country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country Group r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.002*** 0.61 2.13 0.002*** 
 
ODEs 0.002*** 0.63 2.1 0.002*** 
 
LDCs 0.0005 0.03 1.66 0.0005 
 
AGRIs -0.0001  
(-0.0004, 0.0006) 
0.01  
(0.99, 0.01) 
0.64  
(1.64, 1.59) 
-0.0002 
MINEs -0.002  
(-0.002, -0.003) 
0.07  
(0.77, 0.04) 
1.35  
(1.76, 1.78) 
-0.002 
FUELs 0.002* 0.098 2.18 0.002 
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MANUs 0.001** 0.29 2.12 0.002 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(RITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
Table 5.17. Trends of Relative ITOT of developing countries vis-à-vis China by 
country group 1995-2014 (log-linear model) 
Country 
Group 
r (TS) 𝐴𝑑𝑗	𝑅b DW Statistics r (DS) 
ODEs+LDCs 0.0006  
(0.0006, -0.0003) 
0.03  
(0.86, 0.005) 
1.28  
(1.85, 1.75) 
0.0006 
ODEs -0.0006  
(-0.0004, -0.002) 
0.02  
(0.88, 0.03) 
1.13  
(1.87, 1.78) 
-0.0003 
LDCs 0.004**  
(0.003, 0.003) 
0.27  
(0.89, 0.03) 
0.83  
(1.83, 1.78) 
0.003 
AGRIs -0.0007  
(-0.0006, -0.0006) 
0.01  
(0.8, 0.003) 
1.07  
(1.93, 1.89) 
-0.0006 
MINEs -0.003** 0.16 1.84 -0.003 
 
FUELs 0.02* 0.14 1.71 0.002 
 
MANUs -0.002  
(-0.001, -0.005) 
0.06  
(0.91, 0.08) 
0.64  
(2.01, 1.92) 
-0.001 
Source: Author's calculation based on BACI database at HS 92 6-digit level. 
Note: Trend rate is estimated by fitting the trend equation: Log(RITOT)=a+rt+u, where t is the 
time (year) variable and r is the trend rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of 1st-order 
autocorrelation, trend rate, 𝑅b, and transformed Durbin-Watson statistics under Prais-Winsten 
estimation and Cochrane-Orcutt estimation are shown respectively in brackets. The first number 
in the bracket refers to Prais-Winsten estimate, and the second number refers to Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimate. 5% significance level is used for Durbin-Watson critical value (1.411). 
 
To sum up, developing countries' terms of trade, both NBTOT and ITOT, vis-à-vis 
different trade partners tends to follow different behaviours. Generally speaking, 
developing countries as a whole show positive trends of NBTOT vis-à-vis developed 
and, to a lesser extent, emerging countries, but their NBTOT vis-à-vis China has 
unfavourable trend. NBTOT of different sub-groups of developing countries vis-à-
vis developed countries tends to have positive trend, whereas their NBTOT vis-à-vis 
emerging countries and China, especially the latter, tends to show negative trend or 
to be trendless, except FUELs. The time series estimates on developing countries' 
NBTOT are consistent with the previous visual inspection. Developing countries' 
ITOT shows positive trend in the majority of cases and has quite high growth rate. 
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This suggests developing countries' absolute gains from trade. In particular, their 
ITOT vis-à-vis China shows considerably greater growth rate than that of their ITOT 
vis-à-vis developed countries and, to a lesser extent, emerging countries. This 
indicates that developing countries' trendless or even deteriorating NBTOT vis-à-vis 
China is compensated by their increasing export volume to China. However, 
developing countries' trade partners have comparable absolute gains from trade 
with developing countries, which is shown by developing countries' trivial positive 
or even insignificant Relative ITOT. For another thing, different groups of 
developing countries show different behaviours of terms of trade. In terms of 
development status, ODEs outperform LDCs in trade with developed and emerging 
countries, but not in trade with China. In terms of export specialisation pattern, 
FUELs outperform other developing countries in both NBTOT and ITOT. On the 
other hand, AGRIs and MANUs show the weakest trends in NBTOT and ITOT. 
AGRIs' and MANUs' NBTOT vis-à-vis developed countries outperforms their 
NBTOT vis-à-vis emerging countries and China. The former tends to be trendless or 
slightly positive, whereas the latter tends to be trendless or negative. Finally, results 
from trend-stationary model, difference-stationary model, and autoregressive model 
do not show large qualitative differences. As anticipated, significant trends are more 
easily detected under trend-stationary model. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis on the secular deterioration of terms of trade of 
primary commodities and developing countries may be the most important but 
perhaps also the most contentious topic in development economics, especially prior 
to the 1990s. This deterioration reflects the unequal distribution of gains from trade 
between primary commodity producers in the periphery and manufacturers in the 
centre, and thus reflects the unequal structure of the global economy. Over the last 
decades, however, manufactures have accounted for an increasingly important share 
 268 
in many developing countries' export basket. Thus, the early empirical basis of the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis on commodity terms of trade of primary commodities 
vis-à-vis manufactures has been revised to country terms of trade of developing 
countries vis-à-vis developed countries.  
 
However, the rise of emerging countries, especially China, as new global players in 
addition to developed and developing countries, has largely changed the global 
economic hierarchy. It is not only interesting but also important to examine the 
behaviour of developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis emerging countries, 
besides that vis-à-vis developed countries, for at least three reasons. First, emerging 
countries, especially China, have disproportionately increased their trade with 
developing countries, in comparison with the growth of trade between developing 
and developed countries. This makes emerging countries a major trade partner for 
developing countries. Second, the composition of developing countries' exports to 
emerging countries, in particular China, significantly differs from that of their 
exports to developed countries. While the former is dominated by fuels with a low 
share of manufactures, the latter is dominated more or less equally by fuels and 
manufactures. Since export composition largely determines the trend of terms of 
trade, differences in composition between developing countries' exports to 
developed countries and to emerging countries make difference for their terms of 
trade. Third, the resource-intensive industrialisation and urbanisation of emerging 
countries, especially China, have led to a super cycle of commodity prices since the 
middle 1990s and a commodity boom since the early 2000s. This has raised the prices 
of fuels, minerals, and some other primary commodities. This trend together with 
cheap manufactured exports from some emerging countries, in particular China, 
may reverse the long-term decline in terms of trade of some developing countries. 
However, for countries that do not specialise in "hard commodities" and countries 
that compete with emerging countries in manufactures, their terms of trade may 
encounter unfavourable shocks. 
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This chapter aims at providing the latest evidence on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis 
under the new global economic hierarchy. It examines the trends of terms of trade of 
various groups of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries, China, and 
other emerging countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series analyses show 
significant differences between developing countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis 
developed countries and vis-à-vis China and other emerging countries on the one 
hand, and differences between the behaviours of terms of trade of different groups 
of developing countries on the other. Developing countries' net barter terms of trade 
vis-à-vis developed countries tends to show significant positive trends, which is 
stronger for those specialising in fuels or minerals and weaker for those specialising 
in agricultural products or manufactures. This positive trend seemingly contradicts 
with the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis and the findings of several recent studies (e.g., 
Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Ram, 2004; Erten, 2011). A possible reason may be the 
exclusion of emerging countries from the group of developing countries. Previous 
studies tend to treat emerging countries as part of developing countries. Another 
reason may be the selection of time period. Sarkar and Singer (1991) examine the 
period of 1965 to 1985, Ram (2004) examines the period of 1970 to 1999, and Erten 
(2011) examines the period of 1960 to 2006. Instead, this chapter examines the period 
of 1995 to 2014. This period has special characteristics, such as the super cycle and 
boom of commodity prices, the entry of emerging countries into the global market 
as major suppliers of low-end manufactures, and the shift to a manufacture-
dominant composition in developing countries' exports to developed countries, all 
of which, in theory, greatly impact on developing countries' terms of trade. Moreover, 
developed countries have diverse demand for primary commodities from 
developing countries. The diverse export composition is expected to be beneficial to 
developing countries.  
 
On the other hand, developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China 
 270 
tends to show negative trends or to be trendless, except those specialising in fuels. 
In the bilateral trade between developing and developed countries, besides the 
commodity boom, two factors may explain the improving terms of trade: increasing 
manufactured exports from developing countries to developed countries and 
developed countries' diverse demand for primary commodities from developing 
countries, especially agricultural products. For the case of China, however, the first 
factor does not exist, because developing countries' manufactured exports to China 
have declined to a minor or even marginal share. The second factor does not exist 
either, because China's demand for primary commodities from developing countries 
is much more concentrated than the counterpart demand by developed countries. 
Three factors may account for developing countries' declining net barter terms of 
trade vis-à-vis China: the concentration of China's fast-growing primary commodity 
demand on fuels and minerals, cheap manufactures from China, and the 
marginalisation of manufactures in developing countries' exports to China. Since 
China's demand for primary commodities concentrates on fuels and minerals, 
developing countries that do not specialise in these "hard commodities" tend not to 
benefit from the commodity boom. This is shown by the weak terms of trade 
performance of countries specialising in agricultural products. Meanwhile, cheap 
manufactures from China seem not to reverse the negative impact of specialisation 
in "soft commodities" on these countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis China. Developing 
countries specialising in manufactures have experienced the greatest deterioration 
in their net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China. This phenomenon indicates these 
countries' relatively disadvantageous position in the trade relationship with China, 
because they may directly compete with China in manufactures and tend not to 
benefit from China's commodity boom. Actually, even with respect to developed 
countries, developing countries specialising in agricultural products or 
manufactures still show weaker net barter terms of trade than those specialising in 
fuels or minerals as well. This implies that developing countries specialising in 
agricultural products or manufactures are at a weak position in the current global 
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market, whereas those specialising in fuels or minerals are at a relatively favourable 
position. 
 
Developing countries' income terms of trade, however, shows positive trends with 
quite high growth rate, regardless of trade partners. This finding implies that relative 
losses from unfavourable net barter terms of trade can be compensated by growth 
in export volume, and that developing countries have absolute gains from their 
trade with the rest of the world. In particular, their income terms of trade vis-à-vis 
China shows much greater growth rate than that vis-à-vis developed and other 
emerging countries. This is a result of the strong growth of developing countries' 
exports to China. However, developing countries do not have advantage over the 
rest of the world in absolute gains from trade, because the rest of the world has 
comparable absolute gains from their trade with developing countries. Because 
developing countries have considerably higher population growth rate than the rest 
of the world, especially developed countries and China, their absolute gains from 
trade in per capita terms are definitely much lower than those accruing to their trade 
partners.  
 
Can developing countries' improving income terms of trade lead to global (North-
South) convergence? The answer seems negative. One may question that, without 
considerations about factoral productivity, whether net barter terms of trade or 
income terms of trade can shed light on the convergence vs. divergence debate. For 
one thing, the persistent North-South gap in productivity has been shown. For 
another thing, the global divergence can be revealed by comparing income terms of 
trade facing both the North and the South. Developing countries have improved 
income terms of trade, but developed and emerging countries (including China) 
have comparable improvement as well, needless to say developing countries' falling 
net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis emerging countries (including China). Thus, 
according to Singer and Raffer (2001), the condition for global convergence does not 
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hold. On the contrary, developing countries have to mobilise more resources to 
maintain the favourable income terms of trade, impeding domestic consumption 
and investment, and thus unequal exchange has remained (Singer and Raffer, 2001). 
In particular, this inequality is magnified by the persistent North-South gap in 
productivity and technology and by the fallacy of composition due to developing 
countries' efforts in maintaining income terms of trade through expanding exports88. 
More deeply speaking, the origin of the global inequality lies in the competitive 
nature of the markets for primary commodities and simple manufactures and the 
oligopolistic nature of the markets for sophisticated manufactures. In this sense, the 
findings here do not contradict with the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.  
 
It should be borne in mind that the trends of terms of trade found in this chapter, 
regardless of positive, negative, or trendless, may be a period-specific phenomenon 
largely due to the, perhaps temporary, changes brought by China and other 
emerging countries into the global economy. The priority for developing countries, 
regardless of the type of export specialisation, is still the stimulation of production 
upgrading, or more generally speaking, industrialisation and structural 
transformation, through, as shown in Chapter 3, accumulating human and physical 
capital. Importantly, as suggested by Singer and Raffer (2001), the policy implication 
of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has been shifted from simple industrialisation to 
continuous production upgrading. Only by ascending the ladder of product 
sophistication, can developing countries get rid of the highly competitive markets 
for primary commodities and simple manufactures. The persistent North-South gap 
in technology and productivity points out developing countries' failure in this 
regard and the hardship of achieving this goal. However, in spite of the relatively 
unfavourable net barter terms of trade facing developing countries specialising in 
                                            
88 The development of global value chains tends to strengthen the fallacy of composition. The 
global value chains feature oligopoly at the top tier but great competition at the bottom tier. 
Therefore, integration into the global value chains may intensify the competition between 
developing countries at the bottom end of the value chains. Moreover, the intensification of 
competition at the bottom tier may also be a kind of strategy wielded by the MNEs. 
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manufactures and agricultural products, the significant improvement in their 
income terms of trade implies that they have absolute gains from trade with the rest 
of the world through which they can promote industrialisation, just as their 
counterparts specialising in fuels and minerals. Then, we return to the issue 
discussed in Chapter 3 that appropriate use of revenues from exports is of the central 
importance and the developmentalist model with a strong and accountable state in 
place may serve as a reference for developing countries. Otherwise, developing 
countries may have to face resource curse and/or various problems led by rentier 
state, and they may lose more than what they have gained if the current commodity 
boom comes to an end. 
 
Finally, this chapter is just an exploratory study, because China and other emerging 
countries are still at a relatively early or middle phase of their modernisation process 
and the current super cycle of the global economy is still at an early to middle stage 
(Cuddington and Jerrett, 2008; Erten and Ocampo, 2013). In order to obtain more 
robust empirical evidence on developing countries' position in the global market 
under the new global economic hierarchy, studies based on a longer term are 
necessary. This may be undertaken in the future. 
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Appendix A. Gaps in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) between Country Groups 
Figure A1. Trends of TFP by country group 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the UNIDO database. 
 
Figure A2. Trends of TFP by sub-group of developing countries 
 
             Source: Author's calculation based on the UNIDO database. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Industrialisation and trade have essential roles to play in development process. The 
economic and social effects of industrialisation have been well documented by the 
development literature in both economics and sociology. In the classical 
development theories and development economics, industrialisation is seen as a 
synonym for development. Almost all today's developed countries have 
experienced industrialisation in history. The transformation of the Asian Tigers from 
developing countries to developed countries further demonstrates the importance 
of manufactured exports in the process of industrialisation and development. 
Manufactured exports are also the key to success for those second-generation Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) and emerging countries over the recent three 
decades. 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, there have been two major changes in the 
pattern of developing countries' industrialisation and trade. First, manufactures 
have accounted for increasing share in developing countries' exports, especially 
from the 1980s onwards. However, this seemingly positive trend fails to reverse or 
mitigate developing countries' disadvantageous position in the global market, 
because the logic of the global market has been shifted from the advantage of 
exporters of manufactures over exporters of primary commodities to the advantage 
of exporters of innovative products over exporters of standardised products. 
Developing countries, despite being increasingly industrialised, still stick at the 
bottom of the global production chain as low-end manufacturers. This leads to the 
shift in the challenge facing developing countries from simple industrialisation to 
continuous upgrading of production and export structure. Second, the fast-growing 
trade between developing countries, namely, South-South trade, has been 
highlighted in the literature. The early development economics literature focuses on 
the political-economic benefits of South-South trade as a way to reduce the 
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dependence of the South on the North. The recent literature has shifted the focus to 
the greater intensity of capital and skill embodied in South-South trade than in 
North-South trade. This raises the issue of export directionality. Provided that more 
sophisticated export direction has greater developmental effect, South-South trade 
is believed to be more growth-enhancing than North-South trade. 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to knowledge on the evidence, mechanism, and 
determinants of developing countries' trade and industrialisation, centring on 
South-South trade, export upgrading, export directionality, and terms of trade. 
Chapter 2 to 5 address each of the four issues. The descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 
highlights the "illusion" of the size and growth of South-South trade, which is a result 
of inappropriate country classification in the existing literature. The "illusion" has 
two sources. First, the inclusion of de facto advanced countries (i.e., the Asian Tigers 
and advanced former European socialist countries) in the group of developing 
countries strongly inflates the size of South-South trade by more than doubling it. 
This inflation effect particularly comes from the strong performance of the Asian 
Tigers in skill- and technology-intensive manufactures. Thus, the inappropriate 
country classification prevalent in the existing South-South trade studies generates 
not only an illusion of South-South trade, but also an illusion of the manufacturing 
and technological capabilities of the real Global South. The second source of the 
"illusion" is the inappropriate treatment of emerging countries and China in the 
South-South trade literature. If China and emerging countries, especially the former, 
are excluded from South-South trade statistics and South-South trade is defined 
exclusively as trade between real developing countries, then the growth rate of 
South-South trade significantly decreases and its size becomes quite small. In brief, 
the delightful picture of a fast-growing South-South trade, which is highlighted in 
the literature, is no more than a gloss of success.  
 
Moreover, developing countries' export composition reveals some major changes 
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over the recent two decades. Manufactures have increased their share in developing 
countries' exports to developed countries and have become a dominant part in this 
export direction, which is comparable to the share of fuels. This phenomenon 
corresponds to the observation in the literature since the 1960s that developing 
countries have undergone a shift from a primary-dominant export composition to a 
manufacture-dominant export composition (Sarkar and Singer, 1991; Szirmai, 2012). 
In contrast, fuels have become the absolutely dominant part in developing countries' 
exports to emerging countries and China and manufactures only account for a minor 
share in this export direction, which somewhat resembles the traditional North-
South trade relationship. This is a result of the resource-intensive industrialisation 
and urbanisation of emerging countries and China, reflecting the super cycle of 
commodity prices since the middle 1990s and the commodity boom since the early 
2000s. Moreover, trade potential analysis shows that developed and emerging 
countries show high trade complementarity with developing countries, whereas 
developing countries' trade complementarity with developed and emerging 
countries is low. In other words, the needs of developing countries for the rest of the 
world is larger than the needs of the rest of the world for developing countries, 
which implies the disadvantageous position of developing countries in the global 
market. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the determinants of developing countries' export upgrading 
with a particular interest in the impact of China and productive investment. 
Amongst general contributors, this chapter highlights the role of access to sea, 
human capital, productive investment, and trade openness. Landlocked countries 
are doomed to be at a disadvantageous position of export upgrading, a "curse of 
geography". However, efforts in improving education, accumulating productive 
investment, and promoting openness are definite ways to stimulate export 
upgrading. By contrast, FDI inflow, population, and institutional quality, which have 
been found or argued to matter for export upgrading in several previous studies, are 
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not found to matter here. The first reason may be the developing countries-only 
sample in this chapter. FDI going to many developing countries concentrates on 
extractive sectors or, more generally speaking, natural resource sectors, and thus 
tends not to enhance export sophistication. Moreover, developing countries tend to 
have excessive but low-skilled labour force, and thus larger population or richer 
labour endowment is not necessarily a cost advantage for the cost discovery of new 
productive activities as suggested in the cost discovery model (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007). The absence of the effect of 
institutions on export upgrading supports the argument that institutional quality in 
the mainstream terms is like a black box with a vague role to play. Institutions can 
be regarded as an input into productive activities and production upgrading, but the 
mechanism underlying the functioning of institutions is unclear. It may take effect 
through either a better planning of production or a better functioning of the market. 
Perhaps more importantly, because industrialisation is socially determined, it 
reflects the motivations and interests of various political and social agents, from the 
state to entrepreneurs. Moore (1966) points out that all industrialisations in history 
are intrinsically up-to-down revolutions led by minority group. That is to say, 
industrialisation is a profit- or interest-driven process initiated by those from the 
upper social class, such as entrepreneurs and politicians, in order to fulfil their own 
interests, rather than to fulfil the needs of the average people (Kiely, 1998). Thus, 
agents' motivations may play a more important role than the so-called "institutional 
quality" in the industrialisation process. This accords with the centrality of strong 
and developmentally-oriented elites in the developmentalist model of 
industrialisation and development (Leftwich, 1995). In this sense, it should not be 
surprising that institutional quality in the mainstream terms is not found to be 
relevant for developing countries' export upgrading. 
 
In turn, the influence of the motivations of political and social agents or, alternatively 
speaking, the social determinants of export upgrading are captured by the robust 
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positive role of productive investment. Productive investment is a proxy for the 
political-economic embeddedness that shapes the motivations of political and social 
agents. Higher productive investment reflects greater motivations of agents to 
promote industrial production, either for economic profits or for political interests. 
Moreover, developing countries' absolute gains from trade with China, measured by 
income terms of trade, are an important source of their productive investment. Trade 
with China contributes to developing countries' export upgrading through their 
enhancing effect on productive investment. The absolute gains from trade with 
China can be largely explained by the rising prices of primary commodities due to 
China's great demand, decreasing prices of manufactures due to China's 
considerable supply, and the great growth in developing countries' exports to China. 
This effect is particularly strong and robust for the period of 2002-2014, during which 
China rapidly strengthened its role in the global economy.  
 
This finding provides an alternative perspective to view the influence of China on 
developing countries' industrialisation. Previous studies tend to consider the direct 
channel through which exports to China or imports from China may crowd out 
developing countries' manufacturing and risk their re-primarisation. However, they 
neglect the indirect channel through which trade with China may contribute to local 
manufacturing as a source of productive investment. The finding here suggests that, 
for developing countries, China serves more as a stimulator of capital accumulation 
than a competitor in manufacturing market or a predator of natural resources. 
Therefore, the priority for developing countries is the appropriate use of gains from 
trade for productive purpose. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the evidence on the directionality of developing countries' export 
sophistication and examines the determinants of this directionality. International 
trade theories predict that South-South exports should be more sophisticated than 
South-North exports. However, the latest evidence between 1995 and 2014 shows 
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that while more than half of developing countries tend to have more sophisticated 
Southbound exports than Northbound exports on average, the opposite is true for 
the others. This phenomenon reflects the heterogeneity within developing countries. 
A country's productive capabilities are found to be a major and robust determinant 
of export directionality. Developing countries that have greater productive 
capabilities are less likely to have more sophisticated Southbound exports than 
Northbound exports. By contrast, lower productive capabilities lead to lower 
Northbound export sophistication or higher Southbound export sophistication. The 
mechanism underlying this finding may be related to technological and productive 
gap between exporting countries and importing countries. Greater technological 
and productive gap weakens developing countries' competitive advantages in 
relatively sophisticated products in developed and emerging countries' markets, 
which reduces or even impedes their sophisticated exports to these countries. In 
contrast, smaller gap makes it easier to export relatively sophisticated products to 
other developing countries with similar technological and productive level. 
Developing countries that have lower productive capabilities are not able to enter 
more advanced markets and/or the downstream value chains with their relatively 
sophisticated products. Instead, they have to access more advanced markets with 
less sophisticated products, and markets of other developing countries are a natural 
outlet for their relatively sophisticated products. However, for developing countries 
that have greater productive capabilities, the technological and productive gap with 
developed and emerging countries is smaller and they are able to export relatively 
sophisticated products to these markets. The implication of export directionality is 
clear. Promoting the more sophisticated export direction should be, in theory, more 
beneficial to export upgrading. A potential way to achieve this goal is to develop 
trade agreement with countries in the more sophisticated direction. However, policy 
makers should also take into account the absolute sophistication level of the more 
sophisticated export direction, because the sophistication of both Southbound and 
Northbound exports may be low in absolute terms. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 examines the recent trends of developing countries' terms of trade, 
which provides the latest evidence to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Time series 
analyses show significant differences between developing countries' net barter 
terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries and vis-à-vis China and other emerging 
countries on the one hand, and differences between the behaviours of net barter 
terms of trade of different groups of developing countries on the other. Developing 
countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis developed countries tends to show 
significant positive trends, which is stronger for those specialising in fuels or 
minerals and weaker for those specialising in agricultural products or manufactures. 
Three factors may explain this positive trend: the great share of manufactures in 
developing countries' exports to developed countries, developed countries' diverse 
demand for primary commodities from developing countries, and a by-product of 
the commodity boom led by emerging countries. Thus, this positive trend is likely 
to be a period-specific phenomenon. Importantly, this finding may not intrinsically 
contradict the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, because the very core of the welfare 
conclusion of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis lies in double factoral terms of trade, 
rather than net barter terms of trade, of developing countries vis-à-vis developed 
countries. Given the much greater technological and productive progress of 
developed countries, developing countries' positive net barter terms of trade is likely 
to be weakened or even turn to be unfavourable factoral terms of trade.  
 
On the other hand, developing countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis China 
tends to show negative trend or to be trendless, except those specialising in fuels. 
Three factors may account for this phenomenon: the concentration of China's fast-
growing primary commodity demand on fuels and minerals, cheap manufactures 
from China, and the marginalisation of manufactures in developing countries' 
exports to China. Developing countries that specialise in "soft commodities", rather 
than those "hard commodities", tend not to benefit from China's commodity boom, 
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even if cheap manufactured imports from China may act as a countervailing force 
to some extent. In contrast, since developed countries tend to import a wider range 
of primary commodities (e.g., agricultural products) from developing countries, 
developing countries specialising in "soft commodities" may still benefit from their 
trade with developed countries in relative terms. The greatest deterioration in net 
barter terms of trade is recorded for developing countries specialising in 
manufactures. This indicates these countries' relatively disadvantageous position in 
the trade relationship with China, because they may directly compete with China in 
manufactures and tend not to benefit from China's commodity boom. Developing 
countries' net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis other emerging countries shares a 
somewhat similar situation with that vis-à-vis China, but being less unfavourable. In 
brief, on a global scale, developing countries specialising in agricultural products or 
manufactures are at a weak position in the global market, whereas those specialising 
in fuels or minerals are at a relatively favourable position. However, unfavourable 
or less favourable situation in net barter terms of trade can be compensated by 
growth in export volume. All groups of developing countries show substantial 
improvement in their income terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially 
China, implying great absolute gains from trade. 
 
The findings on terms of trade and export upgrading can corroborate each other, 
pointing to the central concerns of this thesis that whether developing countries 
need to industrialise and how they can industrialise through trade. Developing 
countries' necessity to industrialise can be basically ascribed to the role of the special 
properties of industry in promoting economic and social development and the 
unequal exchange embedded in the unequal and unbalanced world economy. The 
former concerns the internal motivations of industrialisation and the latter is 
concerned with the external constraints that push developing countries to 
industrialise. Chapter 5 on developing countries' terms of trade demonstrates how 
developing countries still face unequal exchange in the new global economic 
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hierarchy even if the growth in the volume of trade with developed and emerging 
countries has generated absolute gains for them. This corroborates the argument that 
the growth in trade volume and improvement in income terms of trade tend not to 
generate global (North-South) convergence (Raffer and Singer, 2001). In order to 
achieve development under this global inequality, developing countries need to 
upgrade their production structure, which relates to Chapter 3 on the determinants 
of export upgrading. Although trade growth and improvement in income terms of 
trade tend not to generate global convergence, absolute gains from the trade growth 
provide the material conditions for developing countries to upgrade their 
production structure and eventually give the opportunity to reduce the global 
inequality.  
 
As found in Chapter 3, absolute gains from trade promote export upgrading through 
their enhancing effects on productive investment. Therefore, the challenge faced by 
developing countries is whether and how they can channel these gains to productive 
investment. According to the social account of industrialisation, social and political 
agents and the context in which they are embedded play the central role in this 
process. With both external constraints on a global scale and the lack of 
development-conducive social and political context, developing countries should 
have developmentally-oriented agents (e.g., developmental states and 
entrepreneurs) in place to promote industrialisation. However, the question to 
development theory is how such agents can be generated. Provided that particular 
social and political conditions should be in place prior to the inauguration of 
industrial take-off, economic growth per se might not be the cause but the outcome 
of the emergence of such agents. Then, the concern lies in whether developing 
countries have the endogenous mechanism to generate developmentally-oriented 
agents.  
 
This question should be considered by taking into account different types of export 
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specialisation, because country with a particular export specialisation may need 
distinct agents to realise industrial development. For developing countries 
specialising in agricultural products, industrialisation should not be understood 
only as the development of manufacturing, but also as the industrialisation of 
agricultural production, as suggested by Chang (1949). More importantly, the 
industrial-agricultural relations should be treated as a complementary one 
(Karshenas, 1995). Without the increase in agricultural productivity and the 
resulting outflow of agricultural surplus, countries specialising in agricultural 
products tend not to have necessary sources of investment to inaugurate and sustain 
industrial development. Moreover, agricultural development can also stimulate 
agricultural exports and then increase the capacity to import capital goods. In order 
to boost agricultural development and channel agricultural surplus into industry, a 
group of development-conducive rural agents (e.g., the landowning class and the 
peasants) who will not refuse changes in technology and production organisation 
should be in place. For developing countries specialising in manufactures, the 
primary concern lies in the accumulation of investment for expanding production 
and upgrading technology. To this end, a strong state that can autonomously 
implement industrial policy and a group of active entrepreneurs that engages in 
exploring new productive activities are of central importance. Moreover, a healthy 
relationship between the state and the business, say state-business relations, is also 
a must. Finally, for developing countries specialising in minerals and fuels, the key 
issue is the appropriate use of resource rents. Importantly, both rentier and predator 
states, which are not uncommon in this group of countries, must be avoided. 
However, this issue relates to power relations within the bureaucracy and between 
the state and the mining and fuel business, which are deeply embedded in social 
and political contexts. 
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